

2017 European Journal of Human Security

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The Human Security Research Center (HSRC) is a research unit of the Faculty of Security Studies – University of Belgrade for the field of human security. In addition to numerous other activities conducted by the Center, it has begun publishing the European Journal of Human Security (EJHS), dealing with one of the most important topics of the contemporary world – the security of human beings.

The Center was founded in 2002 at the initiative of Professor Dragana Dulić, as a result of her immense enthusiasm and her dedication to promoting the importance of each individual's survival, security in everyday life, dignity, and their values as human beings.



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EDITORIAL

We are genuinely pleased and honoured to be appointed editors-in-chief of the European Journal of Human Security (EJHS), launched by the Human Security Research Centre of the Faculty of Security Studies – University of Belgrade. EJHS is the successor to the international journal of Human Security/Ljudska bezbednost, which was first published in 2004 as a bilingual journal. We would, therefore, like to take the opportunity and express our gratitude to all the authors who contributed to this issue, members of the former Editorial Board, the International Board, whereas our special thanks go to Professor Dragana Dulić, former editor-in-chief, for her immense effort and time invested in the promotion of the concept of human security in Serbia. Appreciating her legacy – the Human Security Research Centre, journal of Human Security/Ljudska bezbednost and the First Conference on Human Security in this region in 2004 – it is great responsibility for us to follow in her footsteps, but it is also a privilege and a demanding challenge. New name of the journal reflects our ambition to create a journal which will be recognized as enticing and interesting by a number of readers in the region and beyond, and which will attract potential contributors from beyond our immediate surroundings, with English as the official language of the Journal.

We have intended to publish EJHS as an international journal twice a year, with occasional special thematically defined issues, with the Editorial Board comprised of domestic university professors and associates and the International Board including important and distinguished professors and lecturers from well-known universities and institutions worldwide. First two issues have been planned to popularise and promote the very journal and introduce the audience to its concept and our editorial policy, aimed at creating and fostering favourable



conditions for the journal to achieve its optimal position among scholarly journals and publications in the field of security in its broadest sense.

By obeying the standards and meeting the criteria for journal quality, by obeying methodological standards and rules of clear and effective communication, EJHS will endeavour to provide its potential contributors with an opportunity and forum to present their high quality papers on the multifaceted concept of human security, exchange their opinions and results with other participants in this debate and contribute to better understanding and definition of human security as one of the most important issues of the modern world. In order to initiate and stimulate broad and in-depth discussion, EJHS will advocate multidisciplinary as well as interdisciplinary approach to this concept, imposing no limits as long as the concept of human security is at its very centre.

Although in a new guise, EJHS relies on the tradition of the journal of Human Security/Ljudska bezbednost in its endeavours to encourage and broaden scientific approach to the study of human security within the academic community of the region, Europe and beyond. The first step towards reaching that goal is publication of the first issue dedicated to the papers of eminent professors, researchers and lecturers who were invited to present their papers at the Third International Conference on Human Security, Belgrade, November 2016. Their papers have been chosen for their critical attitude towards the concept of human security, its possibilities and limitations; for their close attention and meticulous questioning of this subject that increased significantly in importance in 2015 and 2016 – migrations and diverse political, social, economic and security implications that caused enormous surge of migrants in Europe; and finally, it is the subject that forces its way forward, that inevitably pushes to its limits and poses a question of posthuman security, including the technological advancement, subjectivity evolution and the digital self.



We would like personally, and on behalf of the Editorial Board, to extend our deep gratitude and thanks to the Faculty of Security Studies without whose support this Journal would not be possible, to the Human Security Research Centre and to all contributors to the first issue, as well as to all associates and colleagues who have believed in this project from the very beginning. We do sincerely hope that we will prove worthy of their trust and that the Journal will arouse interest of a wider scientific and professional community, with every next volume better and more intriguing than the previous ones.

Sincerely,
Vanja Rokvić and Svetlana Stanarević, editors





Human Security: Present and Future Frontiers

Mary Martin¹

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This article is based upon a presentation delivered at the 3rd International Academic Conference on Human Security, Belgrade, organized by the Human Security Research Center (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade), 4–5 November 2016.

Amartya Sen, one of the founding fathers of the idea of human security, remarked twenty years ago that it is actually not a new idea, but that human security had had a remarkable revival from the mid-1990s, being constantly evoked in discussions, and taken up as a policy 'leitmotif' by some (Sen, 2013, p. 17; Werthes & Bosold, 2006).

This surge in popularity has come at a price. The term 'human security' is often used loosely and without much reflection on what it means and what its implications are. It is a measure of how far human security has come towards being an emerging universal norm that all kinds of political actors invoke as a way of wrapping themselves in its legitimacy even when their motives and their methods are very far from securing the safety, welfare and dignity of individuals.

People and states have concerned themselves with the security of individuals for centuries. In the 17th century, English philosopher Thomas Hobbes wrote of the need for a mutual obligation between the state and individuals. The sovereign power had a duty to protect its citizens and they in return had to consent to give it their allegiance and obedience. This is the political contract

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which underlies a good and safe life – what Hobbes called the *commonwealth*. Without it, Hobbes famously asserted, individuals were on their own and their lives were solitary, nasty, brutish and short.

Hobbes is identified with the emerging idea of modern statehood and state power. His concern in his 1651 treatise *Leviathan* was to promote the concept of the all-powerful sovereign to whom individuals should owe allegiance; thus, he is usually associated with the beginnings, not of human security, but of state-based security where the state's imperative, rather than the individual or collective needs of people, defines security. In 1994, when UNDP coined the term 'human security' to mark a turn away from this classic understanding of security and highlighted a different type and level of need and risk as the basis for security, the state and the individual were cast on opposite sides of a conceptual coin.

This opposition or even dichotomy between the state and the individual underpinned the early years of human security post-1994 but has more recently begun to break down. Now the challenge is to see how human security can enhance what states do in terms of guaranteeing the safety and rights of individuals and how state resources and institutions can mainstream human security ideas.

Underlying both the 17th-century and 20th-century concepts of security is a requirement for protection against the outside world and its manifold dangers. This remains the first and principal tenet of human security – human life is worth something and must be preserved. In proposing a political arrangement between the individual and the state, mediated by collective association and initiative, Hobbes also touched on the second tenet of human security – that of empowerment. His proposition of a contract between the powerful and those needing their power in order to stay safe contained the premise that power is exercised at a price and that the state could only legitimately wield its influence abroad against the enemies of the people if it was also prepared to act in the people's interests at home.



Although there is an ideational link between 17th-century and contemporary articulations of human security, it was context rather than ideas which shaped how understandings of security evolved. This led in Hobbes's day – in the midst of England's civil war and state collapse – in one direction towards realism and a focus on strong states, and on the other hand, at the end of a century of war in the 20th century, to an emphasis on the rights and perspective of insecure individuals *contra* – rather than *cum* – the state.

Today's political events offer ample evidence of the need to protect individuals and of the failure of current security policy to put people before power politics. In Syrian cities like Aleppo, on the beaches of the eastern Mediterranean, at the frontier posts of Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, where there is sectarian violence and real hardship for individuals, geopolitics, nationalism and state interests are trampling on human security. Even humanitarian assistance is struggling to cope in these situations; human rights are routinely and systematically abused. Amartya Sen's idea of security for people rather than states at moments of downturn and crisis, and the direction of policy towards ensuring basic freedoms, dignity and empowerment of people appear to be in retreat.

At the turn of this century, human security proponents had the luxury of engaging in academic debates about broad versus narrow definitions of the concept. Sceptics warned that human security masked a form of biopolitics, and that by focusing on people, this type of security was an attempt to control and oppress them by manipulating the very attributes which make them human (Chandler, 2008). Human security debates quickly became bogged down in definitional nuance.

Today, the questions that confront students of human security, policy makers and practitioners are both more existential and practical. Human potential is being curtailed and freedoms trampled beneath a different kind of state-based politics. After twenty years, are we contemplating a kind of Pyrrhic victory for human



security – that it can be considered a global norm, only to be discarded from key policy agendas on the most important issues of global and regional security? How can this norm be translated into action on behalf of vulnerable groups and communities in ways which then either demonstrate or challenge its validity within contemporary security thinking? How can it be both global and local in application? In this article, I want to take stock of the current meanings attached to human security, gauge its present political force and suggest how it might move forward.

The last two decades have marked considerable progress for human security thinking but there is no consensus acceptance for it in either conceptual or practical terms. It continues to meet resistance and pushback, but more than this, as the examples from Syria and Eastern Europe show, there is a risk that human security is marginalized in key policy debates.

Yet human security has progressed beyond being simply a worldview or a utopian vision of how things should be. It has been taken up by the UN, notably through the General Assembly resolution 66/290 of September 2012 which agreed a common definition of human security as:

“The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.”

The UN Secretary-General’s follow-up report to the GA resolution noted that an increasing number of member states, including Mexico, Ecuador, Kenya, Thailand, Mongolia and Lithuania, were using human security to strengthen national planning and address disparities and inequities.² The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) finances activities by UN organizations to demonstrate the added value of the human security

² Follow-up to General Assembly Resolution 66/290 on Human Security, 23 December 2013.



approach and expand use and awareness of it as a concept and method. There are no current figures for UNTFHS spending, but since it was set up in 1999, the Fund, financed by member states, notably the government of Japan, has disbursed over \$350m in 70 countries.³

Antonio Gutierrez, taking up office as the UN Secretary-General in January 2017, said that human dignity would be at the core of his term, although he did not mention human security by name.⁴

The UN 2030 agenda of sustainable development is infused with ambitions of human development, the creation of public goods to satisfy core needs such as food, water, education and combat poverty and an emancipated vision of previously disadvantaged communities. Yet nowhere is the term human security mentioned.

Other actors such as the European Union, also notable for its embrace of a holistic and people-centred understanding of security also rarely, and less frequently than in the past, use the term. For example, in the 2016 EU Global Security Strategy, entitled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe”, there are just four mentions of human security compared with 34 for ‘resilience’. The latter term has come to express the idea of sustainable and people-centred development, and has overtaken human security as a conceptual framework for policy.⁵

Perhaps this does not matter: the underlying principles of human security are more important than terminology. To worry about a shift in the vocabulary of security, and the replacement of one phrase by another newly fashionable one, might appear to be an undue concern with semantics. However, there are several implications of this decline in the term human security which are worth noting.

3 See more: <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/HSF00> [Accessed 1 May 2017]

4 See more: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/secretary-general/> [Accessed 1 May 2017]

5 See more: https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/pages/files/eugs_review_web_13.pdf [Accessed 3 May 2017]



Firstly, perhaps more than any other security approach, human security still faces tremendous political opposition, particularly by states who believe it is either a cover for forced regime change and external intervention – as was the case with Responsibility to Protect – or who see it as a binary opposite of the preservation of statehood and state power. If states still feel uncomfortable with the idea of human security, what does this tell us about contemporary relationships between people, politics and power? If there is a resistance to using or talking about human security, does this point to a flaw in the idea itself or does it highlight a more foundational issue of the motives, agendas and capacities of those who set security policy and practice?

Instead of becoming embedded and internalized as part of global security discourse, the contested status of human security means it is easier to relegate it and replace it with other thematic or guiding principles. In this case, the fundamental shift that human security promises, towards enshrining the protection of individuals rather than states, remains partial and incomplete. It becomes easier to revert to the default mode of classic state sovereignty and defence.

Another consequence of the proliferation of human security as a term in the past twenty years is that, while it is resisted in some state-based policy circles, it has been picked up by others seeking to cloak themselves in its perceived legitimacy. Russian security discourse, for example, has used the term as a justification for armed aggression in the case of Georgia in 2008, when Russia claimed the invasion and occupation of Georgian territory was in order to protect the human security of ethnic Russians in South Ossetia. As Makarychev points out, whereas in the west human security initially proposed a stronger role for non-state actors, Russia has used it to substantiate increased state intervention (Makarychev, 2013, p. 153)

Secondly, the persistent problem of slipperiness makes it more likely that human security can be manipulated politically. It is regarded as conceptually imprecise and as



carrying no particular follow-through in terms of policy prescription or practice. In contrast to, say, human rights, human security is not codified in terms of international law or even soft law. It comes with no prescriptive rule book or sanction if it is breached or ignored. This lack of precision in terms of definition and policy application is often cited by policy-makers as the reason for not using it in praxis or lexis (Brahmi cited in Martin & Owen, 2010).

Chinkin and Kaldor, while claiming that human security is a “practical strategy in difficult places”, also suggest that it is the lack of accompanying tools or strategies which makes it difficult to realize human security. “It requires extensive political, economic, legal and security tools to implement multi-level, multi-faceted peace agreements, post-conflict development reforms and piecemeal rather than grand solutions” (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017). Taken as a set of normative objectives, which comprise the dense and diverse security needs facing individuals in conflict or crisis situations, human security appears to offer no immediate or straightforward propositions about what exactly can be done to address such complexity. At the very least, a human security strategy is likely to be messy: instead of a single top-down peace agreement, human security involves hybrid processes combining elite action, such as high-level diplomacy, with action on the ground with multiple stakeholders, all with different needs and conflicting agendas. Viewed like that, grand, overarching and top-down security strategies seem much easier to implement, and continue to be pursued by policy-makers.

The UN, faced with this problem of imprecision alongside the potential of conceptual overstretch, have emphasised the idea of human security as a particular methodology: human security means ‘how’ security is done, not only ‘what’ the objectives are. The UN Human Security Unit’s handbook focuses on the need to deal with the context of individual insecurity, narrowing down objectives to those which are particularly salient to a specific community, location and time period. It urges policies and strategies which promote empowerment and an active role for local communities in building their own security.



Thirdly, a decline in the use of the term human security blocks innovative solutions to current political and security challenges. It deprives us of a vocabulary and vision to tackle issues in a different way to classic methods and approaches to political and security problems. If we are unable to name an alternative approach, we remain trapped discursively in tropes such as the War on Terror, the war against drugs/organized crime and state sovereignty. Human security expresses an intention to do more than just treat the symptoms of problems but go to the heart of underlying causes and find solutions in the everyday practical experiences of the people who are most at risk and most directly impacted by downturns, crises and adverse conditions. It functions as an important descriptor for the willingness to look at problems in an alternative way.

If human security risks slipping away before our eyes, where are the present and future frontiers of the concept which will allow us to recapture and preserve its ideals of protection and empowerment and assert that there is an alternative, more effective way of addressing insecurity?

Firstly, there is a case for assessing the missed opportunities in human security and revisiting ways in which it could have been more successfully embedded in security practice.

The 2004 Barcelona Report of the Human Security Study Group made two recommendations to the European Union which have been overlooked in terms of giving effect to a new way of doing security: first was that the EU should create a human security response force, and second was that the legal framework governing conflict, security responses and interventions also needed to change.

The 'Human Security Response Force' was proposed as a model for reconfiguring conventional capabilities such as military and armed forces to provide support for crisis interventions and target basic needs such as water, shelter and safe streets, providing essential services, rations, medical assistance and security. The idea was a pan-European force that would bring together existing



military and civilian capabilities, comprise 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (with specialist skills from police, human rights monitors, development specialists and administrators), and also draw on volunteers both among local populations and in external, intervening states. The force would prioritize the safety of people caught up in combat zones. It would provide more than humanitarian assistance. It would be the focal point for continuing medium and longer-term efforts to restore normality and tolerable living conditions, but also for reducing the flow of people from the conflict zone and filling the potential vacuum of political authority which arises between military interventions and political settlements. The significance of the proposal for embedding human security ideas was that it would have entailed both an institutionalization of the operational dimension of human security and flanked the response force itself with processes such as training and lessons-learned and given human security ideas a visible manifestation. Marlies Glasius (a member of the Human Security Study Group) later sketched a job description of a human security worker as a highly trained professional, graduated from a human security academy (with) training in military and police skills, such as disarming combatants, making arrests and containing angry crowds; in how to understand development concepts and practices, such as participation and gender awareness; and in multi-purpose skills, such as logistical and legal knowledge. When not deployed, she would be constantly training and exercising. Before any deployment, however urgent, some learning sessions should always be devoted to the political and cultural context of the location. Apart from following a general curriculum, each human security worker could be specialized in one 'hard' and one 'soft' area of expertise (Glasius, 2008).

The idea of human security as a specifically endowed, trained and deployed capability never progressed beyond these ideas, although human security training has been incorporated into academic and practitioner curricula by many institutions. Although a response force resonates



with traditions of civic mobilization in EU member states and is evident today in the White Helmet groups in Syria and volunteer brigades in Ukraine, these initiatives are still principally humanitarian efforts and have not served to mainstream human security thinking in the way proposed by the Barcelona Report.

Other forms of institutionalization have been patchy: the establishment of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, the appointment of a Special Advisor for Human Security, regular reports from the Secretary-General on human security from 2010 onwards and informal groups such as the Human Security Network (now largely defunct) and the Friends of Human Security grew out of the early enthusiasm for the concept but, with the exception of the UN Trust Fund, have not been able to lobby for, promote and preserve the political significance of human security within the mainstream.

The second area of missed opportunity is the development of a legal framework to underpin and give effect to human security ideas. The Barcelona Report argued that a law governing external intervention and operations on the ground should cut through the “tangle of ... jurisdictional regimes” to provide a single and coherent body of international law governing foreign deployments. The new legal framework would build on the domestic law of the countries targeted by crisis interventions, the domestic law of intervening states, international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law (Albrecht et al., 2004, p. 19). With its focus on making external crisis interventions more legitimate and effective, the Human Security Study Group concentrated on one aspect of human security – what might be termed a narrow focus – but the principle of a legal regime to clarify and codify the normative objectives of human security remains valid, if unrealized.

A legal framework for human security would include addressing impunity as the means to establish a rule of law, which provides protection for individuals and allows them the same opportunities as currently powerful elites.



This requires a system of legitimate authority not only at the national level but within communities as well and formal methods of accountability for all power holders, national and international, to local populations. As Chinkin and Kaldor argue, the justice element of human security represents a departure from the Liberal Peace model, because it requires the arrest of those who may have been involved in peacemaking but who jeopardise ongoing peace, sustainability and resilience because they perpetuate human rights abuses or war economies and therefore contribute to the continuing vulnerability of local society (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017). Like the proposal for a new configuration of capabilities into a human security response force, this idea of inverting current justice mechanisms to establish accountability is radical and ambitious. It is not only essential to generate trust and increase the empowerment of local people in fragile societies, but it also shows how human security can offer an alternative practical vision of how to rebuild security.

Perhaps more than missed opportunities, the absence of human security on key contemporary policy agendas is a cause for concern and critical to assessing the future of the concept. Two current policy examples serve to highlight both the challenge facing human security and the scope for it to make a difference to global issues today and restate its claim to significance: migration and the role of the private sector.

There is any number of topics – climate change, terrorism, energy security and health pandemics – where human security can be applied to produce different kinds of policy, programmes and action. These issues are found in any textbook on the subject. They are used to illustrate problems which affect individuals' daily lives and to make the point that understandings and practices of security have changed and expanded in the last two decades.

Migration and the private sector are areas where human security approaches have been sidelined or ignored and where traditional understandings of security tend to prevail. Yet they serve to show what is at risk if



we allow human security to slip below the intellectual and political radar, fail to name it or link it to practical policy choices. In the case of both migration and the private sector, the vocabulary of human protection and empowerment, the emphasis on ensuring basic needs – material, physical and emotional – as policy goals, the principle of accountability to individuals, and the use of human security as a distinct methodological approach could provide alternative perspectives and solutions to security and governance problems.

Eastern Europe and the Balkans are witnessing a surge of migrants from the Mediterranean and western Asia seeking entry to the European Union, among several geographic flashpoints for people flows – from the Sahel into southern and western Europe, from Central America into the US, and between Asia and Australia.

Migration politics are dominated by traditional security thinking. EU governments have unrolled miles of barbed wire, reinforced border guards and, in the case of the UK, tried to close the English Channel under a slogan of taking back control of the country. In the US, Donald Trump threatens to build a wall to deter migrants from south of the border, as part of making America great again. Suddenly, the new normal is territorial sovereignty and defence of the nation state. Addressing migration as part of national security policy risks not only influences the future politics of states competing against each other to make sure their borders are more watertight than their neighbours', it has other consequences: a rise in cross-border organized crime and trafficking by creating a black market in people, a potential for extremism and reservoirs of deprivation, poverty and exclusion from the failure to integrate migrants within host societies. Here, then, there is an urgent need for human security scholarship, for practice and policy evidence to analyse the results of current policy approaches and to propose alternatives based on human security.

At the individual level, nobody believes they are a refugee for ever – they at least hope to be something



else. This contrasts with a top-down perspective which sees migration only as an amorphous and growing political and economic problem. Yet individual migrants and refugees morph daily into economically productive citizens and residents, contributing to and enriching their new societies in myriad ways. One change a human security approach to the migration crisis can make is to reinforce that belief that individuals are more than just what temporary circumstances and crises have forced them to become (Vietti & Scribner, 2013).

The second example represents another kind of frontier for the study and practice of human security. It is the role of the private sector in addressing human security needs in situations of crisis, conflict and transition. Business can play a significant role in attempts to rebuild societies after conflict, humanitarian disasters, health pandemics and violent regime change, and in preventing a relapse into conflict and crisis. Legitimate and responsible business activities are critical to the long-term viability of communities, states and regions. Business intersects with human security and with the resilience of individuals and communities in many ways.

Companies are a source of material security through providing jobs; they influence the psychological and emotional welfare of workers and communities; their influence extends beyond the workforce through providing and using public goods.

Companies also often have a more enduring impact than peace-builders and development agencies because investment cycles are longer than crisis interventions by international organizations. They can be the mechanisms for a focus on legitimate livelihoods, public works which improve social goods, and equal access to and delivery of economic and social rights.

The classic way of thinking about the private sector in contexts of conflict and crisis is simply as means to win foreign investment, to fix failed economies through improving currencies and GDP. Foreign corporations in particular are assumed to assist transitions from conflict



through foreign direct investment (FDI), the transfer of skills, technology and international norms. This political economy view, with its emphasis on the macro-economic components of reform and reconstruction, is preoccupied with markets and national economic institutions (Ganson & Wennmann, 2016, p. 77). Much less consideration has been given to how corporations, particularly global business, can contribute to building resilient communities and making citizens safe. Human security provides a more bottom-up perspective, which expands conventional economics and security to encompass a broader view, and one more geared to individual needs (Alkire, 2010; Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007), but it needs to elaborate how companies fit into this change of emphasis, or how security policy might be expanded in ways which integrate the corporate dimension and its impacts on protection and empowerment (UNDP, 2008).

There is of course a rapidly expanding field of business and human rights which seeks to protect individuals against corporate abuse (UN, 2008). However, human rights as a discourse of governance concentrates on minimizing and mitigating abuses against local populations as the result of business operations. Although human rights are indispensable in a human security approach, human security encompasses more than a rights-based discourse from the perspective of individuals – it engages with issues such as political authority and good governance, the quality of economic development and how individuals attempt to manage their insecurity. Thus human security shows a more complex landscape of human action than defence of human rights. Furthermore, human rights is often seen by companies as a compliance issue, requiring technical and sometimes minimalist observance of international norms and principles. In contrast, human security is a more fluid, ever-changing condition shaped by the interrelation of corporate behaviour and local individual needs and expectations. The balance between universal norms and local contingencies is more weighted towards the local in human security than human rights, with human security more susceptible to being shaped flexibly



in a context-specific way than globally prescribed human rights provisions. A human security approach by business could do more than a rights-based agenda to transform the relations between the private sector and vulnerable people and communities, to improve not just their protection but also their empowerment, and to encourage companies to consider a wide range of individual needs from physical safety to food security, livelihoods with dignity and healthy environments in the areas where they operate (Martin & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2017).

A human security approach which involves the private sector in peacebuilding, in issues from small arms control to human trafficking, migration and better global healthcare, opens up many possibilities for innovative rather than traditional approaches to policy challenges. The potential is that companies and communities can work together constructively and find areas of mutual benefit, instead of bargaining over legal and quasi-legal obligations.

These two examples are not just cases of 'missing' human security, or evidence of a failure of human security ideas to prevail over a hegemonic discourse of either geopolitics and the War on Terror in the case of migration flows, or of neoliberalism and the desire to protect the freedoms of global capital above vulnerable people in the case of the private sector in peace and security. These cases also show that human security is far from running its course and its potential. Rather than retreating in the face of what appears to be a resurgence of classic international relations, of nationalism and zero-sum games, there is a need to identify new areas where human security can provide a different analytical perspective, where it can suggest alternative approaches to intractable problems, and point to methods which ensure that security is not just a bargain at elite levels, but a discourse of protection and emancipation which can improve the safety, welfare and dignity of communities at every level.

There is an argument that what is required of human security today is to deepen the concept rather than choose between narrowing or widening traditional



understandings of security. Deepening requires clearer conceptualization, including how human security as a term relates to other ideas such as resilience, sustainability and hybrid peace. Human security projects and interventions need to be accompanied by sharp definitions of intent and clarity of purpose (Martin & Owen, 2010, p. 12).

Kaldor and Chinkin suggest that the contemporary model of human security needs to be reconstructed as a strategy of resistance. It offers an alternative to the repolarisation of international politics and the militarization and securitization of global issues as represented by wars on terror, drugs, organized crime and so on (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017). It is the right to be protected, as distinct from a Responsibility to Protect through top-down intervention. Achieving this means not only recourse to the universal normative nature of the human security idea, but emphasizing the importance of context, the actually situated individual (not an abstract cipher) and concrete details about how their life can be improved and their security guaranteed. This is to argue for human security as a disaggregated concept comprising micro-processes and particularities. This places human security today closer to ideas of hybridization in conflict-affected societies. Hybridization is about how local actors respond to and shape peace initiatives through working with international actors and institutions (Richmond & Audra, 2012).

It is where top-down and bottom-up initiatives meet. Where human security can lend additional traction to this concept and to the implementation of policy on the ground is to show how that space between top-down and bottom-up can be expanded and enriched through enacting ideas of protection, empowerment and allowing for the voice of individuals to be heard.



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Can Human Security Ideas Ever Be Truly “Critical”?¹

Edward Newman²

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This article is based upon a presentation delivered at the 3rd International Academic Conference on Human Security, Belgrade, organized by the Human Security Research Center (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade), 4–5 November 2016.

In March 2016, the international humanitarian medical organization Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) decided to suspend its activities at the Moria refugee camp on the Greek island of Lesbos until further notice. Moria was a major centre where refugee arrivals were identified, registered, and fingerprinted before being relocated for settlement or returned to their home countries. The decision of MSF followed the announcement of the EU-Turkey deal, which led to the forced return of migrants and asylum-seekers from the Greek island. In its statement, MSF (2016) said that continuing to work there “would make us complicit in a system we consider to be both unfair and inhumane. We will not allow our assistance to be instrumentalized for a mass expulsion operation, and we refuse to be part of a system that has no regard for the humanitarian or protection needs of asylum seekers and migrants.” For a time, the UNHCR itself refused to be involved in the implementation of the deal between the EU and Turkey.

1 The article also draws upon the author’s article ‘Human Security: Reconciling Critical Aspirations with Political ‘Realities’’, *British Journal of Criminology*, vol. 56, no. 6, 2016.

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The predicament that these humanitarian agencies found themselves in raises a range of questions and problems at the heart of human security as a policy guide. Some twenty years after human security emerged as a policy concept in a landmark UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994), a fundamental challenge concerns whether human security can work both as a radical concept *and* as a policy instrument – thus, if human security can be theoretically critical whilst also policy-relevant.

According to the principle of human security, the referent object and beneficiary of security should be individuals and communities. When the idea became popularized within an international policy setting, thanks to the UN Development Programme, it was considered to be quite radical. The concept has had some success as a normative reference point for human-centred policy movements and a number of states and intergovernmental organizations have adopted human security as a policy theme. It has also been embraced by many civil society actors.

However, over the last twenty years, human security has proven to be quite weak in its policy application, and it arguably no longer poses difficult questions for the holders of power – if it ever did. In policy circles such as the UN and the EU, human security is generally used – at best – to ameliorate the manifestations and symptoms of insecurity and deprivation. It is not used as a device to expose and address the structural conditions which give rise to this insecurity. Human security is promoted and operationalized within the existing political, legal and normative constraints of the ‘real world’.

For many academic observers, this has undermined whatever credibility the concept of human security ever had, and theoretically critical security studies has become increasingly hostile towards it. The gap between security studies and policy-oriented human security has become wider than ever.

Most importantly, there is a fundamental paradox or predicament at the heart of human security in terms of



its policy operationalization. Human security, taken to its logical conclusion, holds 'critical' implications for the way politics and economics are organized: it challenges the values and institutions which exist as they relate to human welfare, and it focuses upon underlying sources of insecurity. Yet the ontological starting point of most human security analysis and its policy orientation assume the inevitability and legitimacy of these institutions (see Newman, 2010; Newman, 2016).

This leads to some key questions:

- Can 'progressive' ideas such as human security change the institutions and structures that generate insecurity?
- Alternatively, can human security policy interventions have a meaningful and positive impact upon individual lives *without* changing the structural sources of deprivation?
- Has the operationalization of human security undermined its transformational potential?
- Can radical aspirations be reconciled with political 'realities', or does this undermine human security as an intellectual project?
- Can the operationalization of human security ever be complicit with deeper sources of insecurity or deprivation?
- In presenting security as a positive value, does Human Security reinforce the securitization of everyday life?

There is a twofold challenge for the human security movement. Firstly, human security is challenged to demonstrate that it has humanitarian value, that it can have a positive impact upon the lives of people who are marginalized, deprived, and persecuted. This means that the human security concept – and those academics who champion it – has to withstand critique on its ability to fulfil its own internal logic and promise. Most importantly, this concerns whether the human security field is asking the 'right' questions. If it is not, this form



of internal critique exposes internal contradictions and limitations and the intellectual ambitions of human security will flounder. Secondly, the human security movement faces acute political challenges in broader perspective, as 'security' is defined in ever more regressive ways in the context of the 'war on terror', and an upsurge of nationalist and populist politics. Linked to this, the values and institutions of multilateralism – that is, the internationalist environment that gave rise to the human security movement in policy circles – are increasingly under strain in a transitional international order. The traditional sponsors of multilateralism in North America and Europe are either unwilling or unable to uphold global public goods in the way that they did since the end of the Second World War, and the newly rising or resurgent states have not yet demonstrated their commitment to uphold these norms and institutions. The normative and political contestation generated by this changing international order – as a form of power political resurgence – has pushed many progressive movements, such as human security, off the radar. As a result of these trends, human security is in an increasingly inhospitable environment. Yet, simultaneously, it is needed more than ever, given the range of pressing challenges which confront the world. The challenge is therefore for human security, as a concept and as a policy movement, to adapt to the changing political realities but also to stay true – or perhaps to return to – its radical beginnings in a way that has traction both in policy circles and within academia. Whether human security survives as a meaningful project depends to a large degree on its capacity to achieve this.

Human security as policy

The human security concept has been applied to policy in a number of ways. It has been promoted as a broad human-focussed orientation by groups of states, through things such as the Human Security Network, the Commission on Human Security, and in regional settings, including the African Union, ASEAN, and the European Union. In this sense, human security rests



upon a broader movement to give greater attention to people-centred challenges relating, for example, to poverty, underdevelopment, human trafficking, and human rights violations. The landmark 2005 World Summit Outcome (UN, 2005) provided a milestone for the human security agenda in policy terms by endorsing the concept as a general public good. Human security can therefore be seen alongside other policy efforts such as the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines, the promotion of corporate social responsibility, and the movement to protect civilians from atrocities such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (which culminated in the establishment of the 'Responsibility to Protect' principle).

Secondly, human security has been operationalized in the implementation of project assistance, in particular in relation to development programmes and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. This provides a useful empirical illustration of how human security has been operationalized and – if any – its added value in terms of alleviating human suffering and deprivation.

Some of the UN's work in the area of human security has been facilitated by the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS, 2017), which was established by the UN in 1999. Up until the end of 2013, the UNTFHS had funded 214 projects in over 85 countries, with over \$415 million disbursed since its foundation.

With the support of the UNTFHS, many UN agencies have implemented field programmes and activities aimed at promoting the health and welfare of communities, and this provides further illustration of how human security has been translated into policy. These agencies include UN Development Programme, Food and Agricultural Programme, UN Children's Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, UN Population Fund, World Health Organization, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, UN Development Fund for Women, UN Relief and Works Agency, UN Human Settlements Programme, International Atomic Energy Agency, UN



Industrial Development Organization, UN Mine Action Services, International Labour Organization, UN Volunteers, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Organization for Migration, UN Office on Drugs and Crime and some UN peacekeeping missions, including the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNTFHS, 2017). As a requirement of this funding, these organizations must conceptualize their activities with reference to human security and demonstrate how the concept brings added value.

The reports of the programmes undertaken with the use of UNTFHS resources also provide a good indication of the sort of concrete activities undertaken in the name of human security: programmes to improve pastoral livelihoods and food security, supporting access to basic healthcare for vulnerable communities, increasing access to primary education, strengthening resilience in communities which are vulnerable to natural disasters, supporting school feeding programmes, promoting HIV/AIDS awareness and reducing risk, increasing access to sexual and reproductive health services, facilitating the rehabilitation of war victims, promoting girls' education and development, assisting rural communities in agricultural and livestock development, development within refugee-impacted communities, managing water and energy services for poverty eradication, assistance in micro- and small-scale enterprise development for displaced communities, programmes for reducing maternal morbidity and mortality, programmes to promote the use of insecticide-treated bed-nets and household management of malaria by mothers, protecting and reintegrating internally displaced persons, supporting centres which address violence against women, supporting skills training and community service facilities for the reintegration of ex-combatants and former rebels, supporting drug demand reduction, support for former poppy farmers, prevention of trafficking in children and women at the community level, promoting community reconciliation through poverty reduction in



post-conflict societies, rebuilding after natural disasters and removing the threat of cluster bombs and promoting post-demining rehabilitation, amongst others (UNTFHS, 2017). At the programme level, these human security interventions undoubtedly enhance the welfare and livelihoods of individuals and communities. Arguably, even if the human security concept does not bring much added value in terms of addressing practical needs, this list also illustrates that human security has generated additional attention and resources for such challenges. There has also been renewed interest in human security at the UN following the endorsement of the concept at the 2005 UN summit, with a keynote report of the UN Secretary-General (2013).

However, in policy circles, human security has evolved from being a fairly radical challenge to state-centric realism to a rather conservative idea that largely runs in parallel with – but secondary to – conventional security thinking.

It is helpful to recall why the 1994 Human Development Report was so pioneering. The HDR suggested that: “For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution?” In dealing with ‘personal security’, the report lists seven types of threat, and, notably, the first one reads “Threats from the state (physical torture)”, and also includes “Threats directed against women (rape, domestic violence)” (UNDP, 1994).

This kind of radical thinking, in terms of how the UN promotes human security, is quite absent from diplomatic discourse on human security more recently. The way that human security has been promoted in the UN context does not acknowledge that some states are often unable or unwilling to protect the basic security needs of individuals and communities, and the UN’s reluctance



to acknowledge this, while unsurprising, exposes the fundamental weakness of the intergovernmental approach to human security.

The operationalization of the human security concept has also failed to explore or deepen understanding of the underlying or structural conditions which give rise to insecurity. So, human security has been reinvigorated at the UN, but at the same time it has been institutionalized within the conventional, state-centric parameters of international society. In this sense, the UN's human security activities and programmes, although often well intentioned, at best address the manifestations of deprivation and insecurity, and generally not its underlying root causes. It therefore remains doubtful whether human security has brought forth a genuine reconceptualization of security at the UN. It now, within the UN at least, reflects a conservative approach to addressing human insecurity, notwithstanding the great assistance that it brings to people who receive help from human security projects.

Can human security ever be truly critical whilst also policy-relevant?

Some critics of human security argue that human security has become mainstreamed – at least rhetorically – in policy circles since the 1990s because human security serves existing hegemonic interests. For some analysts, this undermines the value of human security. Some scholars write that: “human security cannot be rescued because it has been institutionalized and co-opted to work in the interests of global capitalism, militarism and neoliberal governance” (Turner et al., 2011, p. 83). The human security concept is also subject to broader critiques that have been generated towards the concept of security and securitization as a negative, pernicious force in whose name rights are trampled upon (Chandler, 2011; Christie, 2010; Neocleous, 2008). Clearly, many of these critical perspectives are not merely suggesting that the human security idea, as



a policy orientation, is ineffective or insignificant, but rather that it is pernicious and oppressive.

These arguments can and should be challenged. Human security provides an opportunity for security studies scholars who hope to make a positive impact upon the world.

Clearly, the human security concept does not exist in a vacuum, devoid of existing political structures and institutions. Progress is often slow and human security must often be promoted in the context of hostile structures. Any evaluation of it must take this as a starting point. And within an inhospitable power political environment, a shift towards the needs of individuals and communities might be something to be welcomed, even when it does not challenge or change the institutions which generate and perpetuate that insecurity. Still, we should be vocal in holding political actors accountable when they claim to be adhering to concepts such as human security or the Responsibility to Protect.

With this in mind, we can consider if policy approaches to human security – for example, those undertaken through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security – can be meaningful at the human level, even if they do not address the structural sources of insecurity and deprivation.

When human security has been adopted by policy actors, it has arguably been applied to some positive effect, and the human security interventions described earlier have improved the lives of thousands of people. To reject this outright because it reflects a ‘problem-solving’ approach to address insecurity in cooperation with state actors is morally questionable.

But a more critical academic approach can be pursued that engages with policy and promotes a greater consideration of the structural dimensions of deprivation and insecurity. Human security must be used to interrogate and problematise the values and institutions which currently exist as they relate to human welfare, and more thoroughly question the interests that are served by these institutions.



For example, the grassroots activities supported by the UNTFHS address challenges such as food insecurity, lack of access to basic healthcare and primary education, vulnerability to natural disasters, lack of access to sexual and reproductive health services, deprivation and victimization in forcibly displaced populations, lack of access to life-saving medicines, human trafficking, and the threat of cluster bombs and unexploded ordinance. This does result in meaningful improvements in the lives of individuals and communities which receive such support, in the name of human security.

However, the prevalence of these challenges can only be understood – and addressed – in their social, political and economic contexts. These deprivations are generally the consequence of severe underdevelopment rooted in the international terms of trade, the integration of developing societies in neo-liberal norms of globalization, and unpayable poor country debts. The failure of the ‘international community’ to address situations of armed conflict or uphold an effective asylum and refugee system, the failure to prevent the free flow of weapons into conflict-prone regions, a pharmaceutical market which makes it impossible for poor communities to afford life-saving medicines are also structural conditions that are ignored in the operationalization of human security.

How can we judge if human security interventions are morally compromised? An ethical framework is needed:

A human security intervention is flawed if it is merely managing human misery or containing the consequences of this, or if it serves to directly legitimize or perpetuate the broader structures which give rise to this insecurity. In these circumstances, it would be flawed even if it ameliorated the suffering of some individuals and communities, if it plays a role in perpetuating the broader sources of deprivation which undermine the personal security of far larger numbers of people.

A human security intervention would be illegitimate if it diverts attention or resources away from addressing the underlying sources of deprivation.



A human security intervention would be problematic if it involves concessions to the political authorities which are responsible for the broader situation of deprivation, since this would directly or indirectly endorse those authorities.

Human security interventions, in the context of wider structural inequities, are morally acceptable when they are not operationalized through illegitimate authorities provided that they have a demonstrable positive impact, and that they are undertaken in a way that does not obstruct other efforts to address the structural sources of insecurity and injustice.

We have to believe that there is a meaningful prospect for academics to seek to bring about changes in policy which enhance the life chances of individuals and communities. Human security can be rescued from its predicament if scholars engage with the concept critically.



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Immigration and Integration of Immigrants: Impacts of Research for Social and Security Policies

Dragana Avramov¹

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This article is based upon a presentation delivered at the 3rd International Academic Conference on Human Security, Belgrade, organized by the Human Security Research Center (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade), 4–5 November 2016.

In recent years, there have been a plethora of conferences, expert groups, and stakeholder workshops addressing what some refer to as ‘new migration’. These events are meant to provide the knowledge base for underpinning the updated European Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on Security, and respective recommendations, directives, legislative documents, proposals, and action plans.²

In this article, we first address two questions: is there anything strikingly new in the ongoing immigration flows, and has there been lack of research to support policy choices or is it the case of the low take-up of research findings to redress the deficit of effective policies?

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2 See, for example: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information_en Brussels, with legislative documents, fact sheets, press material, and in particular 13 May 2015 COM (2015) 240 final Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a European Agenda on Migration.



Regarding security aspects, we argue that the impact of excessive social inequalities is a challenge for security and that badly integrated persons, of migrant and autochthones background, are both casualties and security hazards. Badly integrated immigrants having insufficient skills to be competitive in the labor market and not having appropriated the core values and norms of the host country fall victim to segregation and auto-segregation/communitarianism. The weight of non-formal community-based networks and parallel community structures built over years by violent movements has blatantly become evident to policy makers and lay people following the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015 and Brussels Bombing on 22 March 2016.

On the basis of the analysis of the driving forces and (lack of) management of immigration in Europe, we advance some reflections about immediate and longer-term forward-looking immigration and integration policy choices.

Migration challenges in Europe

Two key challenges may be identified. On the one hand, there is need for crisis management, in particular managing the refugee crisis (involving border management, saving lives, targeting criminal smuggling networks, relocation), and managing the asylum system (involving standards, the monitoring process, infringement procedures, 'asylum shopping'/abuses); on the other hand, foresight is necessary for attracting workers with the skills European countries need.

In determining what is new, we will briefly look at demography (namely the driving forces and Europe's needs for immigrants), the policy responses (taking into account the acceptance of immigrants in Europe, and integration of immigrants), and social impacts (involving selective legal immigration based on individual characteristics of candidate immigrants, and technology for controlling borders and tracking irregular migrants and ensuring their safe return).



Driving forces embedded in demography

The key migration driving forces are embedded in demography (population growth), lack of security (wars, natural and man-made disasters), and pursuit of better opportunities (creating and sharing the distribution of abundance). These driving forces have remained largely unchanged for the present human since our ancestors hominines migrated from Africa some 90,000 years ago. Cliquet and Avramov (2017) discuss extensively the evolutionary heritage and modern changes in our drives for status achievement, egalitarianism, and avoidance of deprivation.

Of course, migration routes change – but evolution science tells us that humans are opportunists. We seize every opportunity to improve things for ourselves and for our offspring. So obviously we look at new routes. Also, the volume changes according to circumstances, as does the composition of the migrant populations. The question here is if we can anticipate change.

Figure 1 shows that in Africa, for example, growing numbers of young people needing education and wanting a good life are foreseeable and have been foreseen.




Figure 1: Population growth: age group 0-24 in Europe and Africa between 2015 and 2100 (United Nations Population Division, 2017).



Figure 1 also shows that in Europe (data include the Russian Federation) the number of young people who will be entering education and the workforce is on a slow path to decline. It is reasonable to assume that young people from Africa will strive to access the level of abundance and security that their European counterparts enjoy.

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The data for individual countries are even more revealing about the demographic driving forces from less developed economies to more prosperous countries.

In the period from 2010 to 2015, the total population of Austria stood at 8.4 million and the fertility rate was 1.35. Ethiopia had the total of 83 million inhabitants and the fertility rate of 3.85.

Since most people who will be having children and growing old in the next three decades or so are already born, it does not take much effort or too sophisticated skills to illustrate the probable future (United Nations Population Division, 2017). As a result of fertility dynamics, in 2050, the total population of Austria will remain largely unchanged (providing there is a fertility increase to 1.74), while that of Ethiopia will grow to 140 million (providing fertility drops to 1.87).


Population growth figures are only one part of the demographic landscape. The age structure shows very different population needs, with Austria facing significant shares of its population in transition to retirement, and Ethiopia significant shares of children and adolescents in transition to schooling and work. The shares of youth in transition to adulthood will be increasing in Ethiopia to levels that the economy may not be able to integrate.

Indeed, the age pyramids for Austria and Ethiopia (Figure 2) are a remarkable example of the long-term perspective that is foreseeable and foreseen. Demography informs policies and is integrated in policy narratives of various ideological colors. However, it is rarely taken into consideration for effectively changing policies. In most circles, demography is often presented as 'our destiny'.




Figure 2: Age groups in Austria and Ethiopia in 2050 (United Nations Population Division, 2017)

Austria




Ethiopia



In Europe, the population decline was foreseen as early as the 1970s, when fertility started to decline. Foreseen several decades ago, the decrease in the size of Europe’s population is expected to occur as of 2025. Population decline is also expected in more developed countries such as Japan, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. By contrast, in least developed countries,³ the population growth up to 2100 will be quite remarkable (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Population growth up to 2100: Europe, more developed countries, least developed countries (United Nations Populations Division, 2017)



What does demography tell us about human security?

At least three conclusions may be drawn from a glance at the current demography and expected demographic future. Demography reveals that inequalities in life chances between populations in different countries and regions of the world, and between generations, will persist (the same as today, but more so). It signals that certain forms of population pressure, particularly youth

³ Least developed countries include: East Africa (Kenya, Zimbabwe); middle Africa (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon); Sudan; Lesotho; West Africa (Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria); South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal); S.E. Asia (Cambodia, Lao, Timor); Yemen; Haiti; Solomon Islands; Vanuatu; Samoa; Tuvalu; Kiribati.



bulges, may entail a higher risk for intrastate conflict. It shows that we may expect further increase in the diversity of potential immigrants according to country of origin, language, religion and other philosophical orientations.

We know from research that the most difficult situations emerge when high numbers of immigrants, large ethnic distance and strong inter-group competition coincide. Demography, furthermore, points in the direction of the conclusion that we need to manage our ecological footprint,⁴ as the ecological sustainability of our planetary environment is a prerequisite of human security. The ecological overshoot is already estimated at 1.5. If developing countries had a similar level of prosperity today as the developed ones, humans would be using the equivalent of nine Earths to support their consumption (Ewing et al., 2010, Wackernagel & Rees, 1996).

The 'ecological footprint' is perhaps not a completely satisfactory instrument to measure the total ecological impact of humanity but it is an impressive and most elaborated proxy for measuring the human impact on the environment that sustains life as we know it.

Of course, demography operates in conjunction with other 'push factors'. There is nothing new in the link between regime change, uprisings, wars, natural disasters and mass population displacements. Immigration pressure into prosperous and easily accessible Europe could hardly have been a surprise.

4 Global Footprint Network's core research calculates both the Biocapacity (BC) and the Ecological Footprint (EF) for more than 200 countries, using over 5,000 data points for each country per year, derived from internationally recognized sources; these have been used to determine the area required to produce the biological resources a country uses and to absorb its wastes and to compare this with the area available. The ratio EF/BC is the estimated ecological overshoot. For 2007, the ecological overshoot (EF/BC) is 50 per cent above unity, meaning humanity used the equivalent of 1.5 Earths to support its consumption.



Managing the work environment

In Europe and in many developed economies worldwide, there are conflicting narratives as to the possible choices regarding managing work landscape and/or managing immigration.

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In a global world, context changes in numbers and shares of the working age population (15 to 59 years of age) are a pretty good indicator of the foreseeable and foreseen expected pressure on the labor market.

The expected decline in the size of the working age population is visible in Europe and remarkable in China, as may be seen in Figure 4.

Regarding Europe, some plausible hypotheses may be advanced. Population ageing in Europe is a strong pressure factor for structural changes to the ways our societies are organized, to the shaping of the life course of individuals, and to the values attached to inter-generational solidarity (see Council of Europe, Perspectives on Youth, 2016).


Employers may need to be more flexible about how and where people work and how they are rewarded. Enterprises will need to adapt their policies on (older) employees' by organizing permanent education and training, and adapt their work environment to the capabilities and aspirations of their workers, including facilities for flexibility and variation in work schedules. Enterprises will also need to adapt their products, marketing and sales practices to the expanding pool of elderly consumers (see European Commission, Global Europe 2050, 2012). Widening the talent pool by activating and retaining older workers may become a strategic necessity. Enterprises need to understand this and actively and gradually prepare for retaining larger numbers of older workers. Despite the evident (see Council of Europe, Active Ageing, 2004), working longer years is still vehemently opposed by organizations such as trade unions, prospective pensioners, some political parties and enterprises.



Europe’s demography reveals an ageing workforce and policy responses necessitate further feminization of the workforce (more women in work), working longer years, and attracting growing numbers of skilled migrant workers from developing countries.

After 2018, European economies may face considerable shortages in their labor supply. Shortages have already been seen in key sectors such as science, technology, engineering and healthcare (see, for example, European Parliament, Labor Market Shortages in the European Union, 2015).

Figure 4: Population prospects (working age 15–59) in selected regions in the world (United Nations Population Division, 2017)



In Europe, in a longer-term prospective – up to the mid-21st century – demography will be an ever-stronger driver for change, with more jobs than people in an ageing landscape. Immigration is not a long-term solution to Europe’s ageing workforce (migrants also age and have fewer children than in their country of origin), but a



European policy on legal migration and integration is necessary in the context of both demography and global competition for attracting and retaining skills and talents.

When reflecting on the possible future, it is also necessary to think 'out of the box'. Social media are powerful tools for supporting debates on the possible future.⁵ The automation-driven changes may entail a possible shift towards post-work society where the need for adults to spend vast part of their lives at work will have been eliminated and work will have become optional – people would work because it is fun. The non-addressed question remains as to how the pre-work⁶ developing countries could fend for themselves in the post-work world of the prosperous economies.

Take-up of research findings for immigration policy implementation and policy changes

In a forward looking European Commission study Global Europe 2050, economists advanced a plausible hypothesis that the EU-28 would need one million recruited immigrants per year between 2030 and 2050. They would be aged 20 to 45 and coming from Third Countries. What economic models often underestimate is the overall population dynamics. Recruiting one million worker-immigrants aged 20 to 45 per year between 2030 and 2050 would (due to family formation and family reunification) result in a minimum of 62 million new citizens with an immigrant background in 2050 (estimation by Avramov for Global Europe 2050). Is that too many foreigners?

5 The notions of expected, probable and possible future were developed by the French family sociologist and demographer Louis Roussel in his masterpiece "La Famille incertaine" (1989).

6 Here we refer to 'work' as we know it in the developed countries with regulated employment and working conditions, limited number of working hours per week and days per year, fringe benefits, low retirement age and work-based pensions.



It is reasonable to assume that the general population would need to accept and provide favorable conditions for inclusion for such large numbers of foreigners in the labor market, education, housing, and eventually retirement schemes, just to name a few. One of the requirements is that immigrants are welcome. So let us look at what has been known in academia for 10 years or so about the acceptance of immigrants in Europe. First, we have known for years that in the EU there is an East/West divide in (not) welcoming immigrants. At the turn of the century, two-thirds of nationals in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Germany and Estonia were already of the opinion that there are too many immigrants in their country. The share of foreigners at the end of the 20th century was 0.1 percent in Poland, 2 percent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia, 8 percent in Germany and 26 percent in Estonia (Avramov, 2008).

Despite small numbers and low shares of immigrants, as many as 40 percent in Hungary agreed that there is no room for foreigners in their country in the 2000s. The study revealed that the actual number of foreigners does not appear to impact the opinion that there are already too many foreigners in any of the eight countries under consideration (European Commission, Global Europe 2050, 2012).

A significant share of Hungarians shared the sentiment that immigration is a threat and expressed this anti-immigration sentiment 15 to 20 years ago. Policymakers had more than a decade to contribute to changing the population climate with respect to migrants and immigration issues, had they wanted to. Events in recent years seem to indicate that they did not want to. It should come as no surprise that the transit along the Balkan route of a significant number of people originating mostly from Muslim-majority countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq reignited the simmering non-acceptance of immigrants in Hungary. Current policy choices are embedded in this popular sentiment.



The European Union has been funding research and technological development since 1984 under the EC Framework Programmes. Research and innovation projects are meant to be support to European policy. International migration has been considered as a fundamental issue of politics and policy.

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There is no comprehensive EU inventory of all the research projects, coordinated actions, networks of excellence and peer-learning activities that have provided research findings and drawn policy implications, recommendations, guidelines, and inventories of 'best practice' on how to manage immigration. An informed hypothesis is that there have been hundreds. We will use one as an example to illustrate the timeline between knowledge and events that trigger crises.

In 2005, the EC funded the research project Needs for Female Immigrants and Their Integration in Ageing Societies (FEMAGE, 2005–2007). The timeliness of the study about the challenges for Europe's demographic future and social cohesion, which are associated with the immigration flows and the presence of third-country nationals in the European Union, could not be overestimated. The European Commission was going to unveil its plan for a Blue Card for skilled immigrants that would have allowed suitably qualified people and their families to live and work within the European Union. One of the outputs of the FEMAGE project was the book *Acceptance of Immigrants in Europe?* (Avramov, 2008). The analysis built on the national Population Policy Acceptance Surveys (PPAS) and the international database FEMAGE-MIG (Avramov & Cliquet, 2007), capturing the viewpoints about immigration and expectations towards foreigners in the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and Finland. However, the timeliness, relevance and pertinence of the research findings did not enhance the policy impact of the study. There was no significant take-up of the research findings of this project funded by the EC. The research findings were largely ignored and were not taken up for policy building by Member



States, or the EC for that matter. In policy circles, there was no obvious need for reconciling long-term needs for immigrants with the widespread prejudices embedded in fears of loss of work to foreigners and acculturation by foreigners.

The publication of the book conveying a message that large segments of the population are not willing to accept immigrants in countries such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic and the official rejection by Hungary and Poland to accept the relocation of any refugees from Greece and Italy and the acceptance of 12 people by the Czech Republic took place some fifteen years apart. At best, nobody bothered to change the population climate in these countries; at worst, groups drew their political capital from fears about foreigners. As a consequence of the dismissal or the choice to ignore the research findings, the European 2015 scheme for relocation and resettlement⁷ remains a statistical exercise and has not become an effective tool for supporting human security.

We acknowledge that in the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) in general, and in migration research in particular, theories, methods and data matter and research may produce different results. Researchers are not ideology-free and may draw different policy conclusions and recommendations based on similar research findings (IMPACT-EV, 2014). This may make policymakers nervous and reluctant to consider research evidence.

We need great caution for assessing policy and social implications of research on migration issues, but one takeaway is relevant: EU policy agendas on immigration and security may need to add actions to shape attitudes and expectations of natives and immigrants in realistic directions in order to enable and improve integration capacities of Member States.

⁷ See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_annex_en.pdf



Transition countries, such as those along the Balkan route, including Serbia, may expect to have to provide more than temporary shelter/parking for people escaping war and/or poverty. In that respect, preparing the population to actually integrate some refugees and relocated asylum seekers, especially those having the needed skills, may be a wise policy choice. Western Balkan countries are less prosperous than Austria, Germany, or Sweden, the preferred destinations for migrants, but are more prosperous than many countries from which refugees and asylum seekers originate.

Is the presence of large numbers of immigrants inevitably a problem?

There is plenty of evidence that Europe has managed immigration badly. Narratives about tolerance (often used as a tool for hidden segregation), multiculturalism (often used as a tool for hindering the social mobility of certain groups), the right to work for illegal immigrants (often used as a tool to dismantle European social security systems), denials such as “there is no such thing as immigrant background” (we have all come from somewhere and are now all citizens) and “there is no such thing as integration” (who is integrated?), just to mention some ideology-loaded notions and lobbying platforms, were not particularly helpful.

Ideological bias in multicultural /communitarianism/ integration narratives in the SSH focusing only, or predominantly, on the structural integration of immigrants and insufficiently addressing the controversy between ideology of communitarianism and values of modernity (see, for example, Avramov & Cliquet, 2005; Cliquet & Avramov, 2017) needs to assume part of the responsibility for the mismanagement of immigration.

Nevertheless, it may be concluded that the mismanagement of migration in Europe is not an outcome of bad research or lack of robust research-based evidence. The mismanagement of immigration and effective integration of immigrants may be the outcome of bad policy choices



partly due to the low take-up or extremely selective use of fragmented knowledge from research.

The population of countries such as Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic may think that there are too many foreigners but are there too many immigrants in Switzerland – a country with one of the highest shares of immigrants in Europe. In the Swiss Confederation, with three main languages and three cultural communities, resident foreigners and temporary workers make up about 22 percent of the population.⁸ An average of 40,000 foreigners have naturalized each year since 2002. It may be assessed that some 30 percent of its population is with immigration background.⁹

Evidently, when discussing the Swiss numbers, we need to address the composition of the immigrant groups, specific characteristics of the immigrants, and the effectiveness of the economic, social and cultural integration policies and practices of the host country.

Nevertheless, the evidence from Switzerland points in the direction of the conclusion that it is not (only) about numbers. It is more so about the integration of immigrants. This leads us to conclude that forward-looking in terms of numbers of immigrants wanting to come to Europe, and/or being needed by European economies, needs to be looked at in terms of integration capacities of the European host countries, and the EU as a whole, and not only in terms of labour force statistics.

Forward-looking strategies on integration and human security

Immigration and human security discourse needs to be broadened to include structures and processes to enhance capacities for the comprehensive inclusion of immigrants in society.

⁸ See: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/switzerlands-non-eu-immigrants-their-integration-and-swiss-attitudes>

⁹ See, for example: <https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-born-population.htm>



Research has shown that an analytical approach proposed by Heckmann (2000) for addressing integration is still relevant and useful. He suggests the following kinds and degrees of integration of immigrants. Structural integration entails the acquisition of rights and access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendants. Cultural integration encompasses processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioral and attitudinal change in individuals. Social integration relates to people's private relations, group and associational membership. Identificational integration concerns membership in a new society and is shown in feelings of belonging and identification (Heckmann, 2000).

One of the pre-requirements for successful integration is embedded in the population climate in the receiving countries. Going back to the FEMAGE study, we can illustrate some key expectations of natives towards foreigners and integration. We see that people attach much importance to cultural integration. The vast majority of people, 85 percent of Hungarians and 59 percent of Western Germans, shared the view that foreigners should master the language and abide by the customs and rules of the host country. They also shared the view that immigrants who have not integrated after five years should return to their own country.

It is easy to label large shares of a population as xenophobes, but the expectations towards foreigners are in line with the notion of citizenship – all citizens are expected to abide by the customs and rules of the country. Indeed, in all eight countries the overwhelming majority of natives expected foreigners to make the effort to adapt to the core cultural norms of the host country.

Not much seems to have changed regarding the population climate in recent years. What has changed over the past 15 years or so is that the numbers of foreign-born have been increasing in many EU countries, but more importantly that diversity has been increasing in terms of native languages, religions, and phenotypic



characteristics. This diversity inevitably entails changes in the narratives about integration, ethics and cultural norm hierarchies.¹⁰

Capacity for integration and security

What we are suggesting is that the integration scenarios need to be the basis for the appraisal of needs for immigrants according to different sectors of economy and educational attainment, age and family situation. These reflections also need to take into account the hidden potential for activating the already present stock of immigrants and people with foreign origin. They also need to take into account the prospects of competition at the bottom segment of the labor market between autochthones and all others but also between newly arriving immigrants and immigrants already settled in the destination country.

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In fact, what we are suggesting is to explore the feasibility, in the European context, of practices of countries like the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand – countries that have been praised for their integration of immigrants, often without acknowledging that immigrants are being selected/pruned and ‘cherry-picked’ according to desired personal and family characteristics.

What we are suggesting is that discussions about ‘needs for immigrants’ based on crunching numbers are unproductive and that the key challenge for the social sciences and humanities is to open and address issues of requirements for enhancing the integration capacity of different countries. Human security as freedom from want and freedom from fear (UNDP, 1994) needs to include freedom from fear of foreigners and conflicts between communities.

Community-based recruiting practices such as bilateral agreements for recruiting workers, as was the case in Belgium for attracting Italians in the second half

¹⁰ We are here referring to hierarchy or norms and not hierarchy or cultures.



of the 1940s (see the Bilateral Agreement Italy-Belgium, 1946¹¹) or Moroccans in the mid-1960s (see, for example, the February 1964 bilateral labor force agreement; and Bousetta (2008) discussion about the resulting migration flows), have not been glorious examples of good practices. One can assume that individual skills and talents, rather than countries of origin, as basis for recruitment practices are more conducive to inclusion in the host country.

In the context of forward-looking, we could revisit, in some other article, the Global Europe 2050 assumption that Europe needs to have a net inflow of one million immigrants per year over the next few decades in the light of the 'capacity to integrate' scenarios and more specific skills of needed workers.

Global, national, regional, and communal levels of integration

Management of immigration and integration of immigrants is obviously a European policy issue and a national issue. But in reality, the concentration of immigrants in particular regions (districts) has impacts at the local level, which may be more significant than those at the country level. The sense of belonging to one's own community and the forging of alternative systems of values and norms for guiding behavior towards others can also produce global impacts as may be seen from the example of Brussels. Brussels, with 62 percent of foreign-born residents, ranks second only to Dubai, which has 83 percent of foreign-born residents (World Migration Report 2015). Brussels is authentically multicultural as it has two official languages (French and Dutch) and a governance system that equally involves the two linguistic communities. In recent years, it is the municipality of Sint-Jans-Molenbeek (in Dutch, one of the official languages in Brussels) or Molenbeek-Saint-Jean

11 The agreement provides for the sending of 50,000 Italian workers (2,000 per week) into the Belgian mines in exchange for the right to get 200 kilos of coal per miner and per day paid by Italy (see the ROUTES project).



(in French, also one of the official languages in Brussels) that has become known as an example of violent communitarianism that has produced fertile grounds for breeding, sheltering and protecting some notorious Muslim-inspired extremists and terrorists. Although it encompasses numerous immigrants, the municipality developed features and non-formal communitarian structures by its population originating predominantly from Morocco. Some 11 percent of the legally resident population has Moroccan nationality and 40 percent of all foreigners are Moroccan.¹² Estimates about the share of Belgian nationals with Moroccan extraction living in Molenbeek are less reliable. As Albrecht Meier reported for *Tagesspiegel*, “the nature of immigration into Molenbeek has changed: in the beginning, in the sixties, people came here for work. Now, for many, Molenbeek is their destination merely because life here is easier than it is back in Morocco”.¹³

The striking nature of violent communitarianism was exhibited when Salah Abdeslam, a Belgium-born French national of Moroccan descent, who was involved in the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015, spent four months on the run and was hiding in Brussels. He was apprehended during a police raid conducted in the Molenbeek area of Brussels on 18 March 2016 – the area where he grew up. He was sheltered by his community in a house situated around the corner from where his parents and brother live. At the time of his arrest, the neighborhood youth was attacking the police trying to help Abdeslam to escape.

There is a burning need for the social sciences and humanities to contribute to human security by revisiting the notions and practices of communitarianism that pillarize and separate groups, and look at the degrees and types of integration that go deeper than the acquisition of the rights to work, housing, education, welfare protection, and include what Heckmann (2000) calls cultural, social and ideational integration.

12 See: http://www.observatbru.be/documents/graphics/fiches-communales/2006/12_molenbeek-st-jean_fr.pdf

13 See: <https://www.euractiv.com/section/security/interview/molenbeek-mayor-poverty-is-no-excuse-for-radicalism>



Crisis management strategies and foresight

A strategy for crisis management is being put in place by the European Union. It still appears to be a trial-and-error exercise. Calls for management of immigration in a longer-term perspective, such as action plans for reducing the incentives for irregular migration and developing a new policy on legal migration, are aspirational. The easy part of crisis management and border control is the use of 'off-the-shelf technology' available for managing borders, mobility, and creating a sense of in-group security.

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Tracing effective pathways to achieving a new policy on legal migration is trickier. It may have to pass via reducing inequalities within countries, between generations, and between regions worldwide, and may require new toolboxes for fostering the structural, cultural, social and identificational integration of people who move between countries and regions of the world.

The question of excessive inequalities is too thorny an issue for Member States to allow EU institutions to tackle. This despite hundreds of EC-funded research projects that have demonstrated the negative effects of inequalities for individuals and for social cohesion, and numerous calculations of financial costs of inequality. The recent OECD publication "In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All" (2015) is well taken up in narratives. The report provides an overview of inequality trends and policy directives. In terms of conclusions and its catchy title, it reiterates what has been known for a long time. However, the narrative about the negative impacts of excessive inequalities, or in the more policy-correct positive language, about the benefits of a lack of excessive inequalities, has not (yet) been taken up in policy implementation.

"Developing a new policy on legal migration: in view of the future demographic challenges the EU is facing, the new policy needs to focus on attracting workers that the EU economy needs, particularly by facilitating entry



and the recognition of qualifications”¹⁴ may need to pass via some pragmatic and unpopular roads entailing scouting for immigrants and screening of applicant immigrants according to the needs of different sectors of economy and immigrants’ features (e.g. education, age, family situation, knowledge of the core values and norms enshrined in the EU and national legislations and administrative practices and willingness to accept them), the calculation of benefits and costs of recruiting immigrants in a longer-term perspective, consideration for effects at EU and also at national and local level, and elaboration of comprehensive integration scenarios and roadmaps. Calls for such a comprehensive approach may make politicians nervous and many lobbyists furious, but may be necessary for developing the integration capacity of different countries and localities and authentically enhancing human security.

¹⁴ See: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en



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Posthuman Security J. Peter Burgess¹

This article is based upon a presentation delivered at the 3rd International Academic Conference on Human Security, Belgrade, organized by the Human Security Research Center (Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade), 4–5 November 2016.

The title of this intervention, ‘Posthuman security’, should be understood in distinction from ‘post-human security’. I do not intend to mark or describe the end or the aftermath of some historical era in which ‘human security’ in its conventional use would no longer play a role. It is not because such a claim could not – or should not – be made. There are indeed many voices that claim that such a need is at hand, and that just such a historical analysis would be of considerable service.

If we were to attempt such a post-mortem reconstruction, we might begin with the early inspirations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Charter, the Cold War shutting-down of the concept of ‘security’, the ‘discovery’ of the subaltern, and the new institutional challenges faced in crisis response and development work. We would surely include the breakthrough 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994), the creation of the Human Security section at the United Nations, the intellectual triumph, and practical ambivalence, of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (Weiss & Hubert, 2001).

My exercise is a different one. My aim in the following is to ask the question of ‘the human’, whose security it is human security’s ambition to advance and preserve.

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New research and new reflexion – by anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers and others – suggests that the humanity of humans is, as with most phenomena, finite, that the definition or concept that regulates it has limits, that these limits have become more tangible, and that, as a consequence, a new look at ‘human security’ is warranted (Baxi, 2009; Braidotti, 2013; Dinello, 2005; Fukuyama, 2003; Hayles, 1999; Ong & Collier, 2005; Pin-Fat, 2013).

The discourse of human security

The discourse of human security emerges as a discourse of the individual. Like many natural law-based principles, it assumes the inviolable character of the individual, endowed with dignity and innate worth from which flow a certain set of rights. Human security also presents itself as a discourse about security. It is a narrative about what threats to the individual are and what moral claims individuals have to security. In this sense, it presupposes some very fundamental ideas about what the essence of danger and individuality actually are. It builds on an implicit understanding of what it means for the individual to be in danger. And since the project of human security (‘freedom from fear, freedom from want’) puts human experience – fear – in the centre, human security also presupposes an understanding of what it is for the individual to be in danger – affective, perceptive, emotional, spiritual, moral danger.

Human security announces itself – not least in the 1994 Human Development Report and elsewhere – as a challenge to the hegemony of neorealism in the analysis of international politics and in the formulation of development policy. Neorealism, as we know, is not interested in the relationship between the individual and threats, but rather in the relation between states and threats. In its earliest incarnation – in the UNDP report – the focus of security is shifted from nation-state actors, operating in a closed international system, to sub-state groups, operating in a wide range of settings in regional, sub-regional, local and even personal contexts.



Born out of a pragmatic exercise in 1994, the concept of human security evolved rapidly through the early 2000s in association with a variety of intersecting interests. It is linked to the principles of human rights, to the changing environment of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and to the mechanisms of international humanitarian law, all of which have been progressively strengthened (Allouche, Nicol, Mehta, & Srivastava, 2016; Bittner, 1992; Moser, 2013; Newman, 2016; Nyman & Burke, 2016; Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, & Ferguson, 2010; Tadjbakhsh, 2014).

This general evolution takes place against the background of a changing understanding about the nature of security. This understanding has two interrelated forms of emergence.

The first form of emergence involves our knowledge about human security, about the invention of a concept capable of accounting for a fully-formed, but largely invisible or ignored reality. In this context, the 1994 formulation of a set of ideas about human security constitutes the naming of a previously existing – and yet invisible – reality.

The second form of emergence corresponds to the inception of a new form of security, either a new set of objective threats confronting a new set of potential objects of threat, or a new experience or perception of threat, insecurity and vulnerability.

Both of these forms of emergence disrupt the relationship between security and the self. As is often pointed out, from the very origins of political theory, the object of security has been the community or the state. Already in Hobbes's *Leviathan*, a security threat is regarded as a menace to a shared order, a shared set of values, or shared property. This value is considered to be intrinsic. It springs out of the fact that it is shared, out of its shared-ness. Security, in this context, refers to the project of preserving the value that is affirmed by the social, political or cultural bond or consensus.



Human security, as we know, displaces the source of the intrinsic value of the object of security from a social, political or cultural collective to the individual. The value-function of security, its role as an indicator or referent of value-under-threat, is moved from a collective, inter-subjective determination of value to an individual determination of value.

This implies not only that the consensus-forming mechanisms of groups – in this case, nation-states – is no longer accountable for security assessments and measures taken, but also that security values need not even be articulated at the level of political dialogue. Security values, i.e. values in need of securitisation, are not part of political dialogue or consensus and possibly remain un-articulated at the individual level.

In short, the discourse of human security stakes strong and important claims about both the human and about security.

Yet both the human and security itself are changing rapidly, both as concepts and as ontologies – or kinds of being. What is the future of human security in a reality where the human and security become something else? Something they were not before?

Of course, human security has come under critical pressure from a variety of critical positions since its inception and development (Chandler, 2008; cf. Chandler & Hynek, 2011; den Boer & de Wilde, 2008; Duffield & Waddell, 2006; Ryerson, 2010). These criticisms have contributed in many ways to strengthen the robustness of the concept and its application.

What we wish to ask here is how does the evolving notion of the human bode for the concept and practice of human security? What is the human in human security, and where is it going?



The human

The humanity of the human has thus long been taken for granted, and yet it has not remained unchanged. The specificity of human beings has invisibly, insidiously changed in relation to it.

In terms of the rights, privileges and responsibilities attributed to human beings, we are aware of a certain convergence in the 18th century under the aegis of the European Enlightenment. The core assumptions behind the principles that ultimately give force and legitimacy to the concept and practice of human security are the direct heritage of this condensation. We might be surprised to learn that, like the discourse of human security, the concept of the human also has a clear historical framing. It is of course far older than the historical framing of human security.

We do not often think of the human as being contingent, as being something that might or might not exist. We do not think of the human as not existing or as ever ceasing to exist. We simply take it as a matter of fact, as something that has always been the case and always will be.

But, from a biological point of view, it is taken as a matter of fact that human beings have not always walked the earth. And it is generally regarded as uncontroversial to assert that the human species will someday disappear altogether.

From the point of view of consciousness – from human beings understood as conscious beings, creating and appreciating meaning, equipped with reason, spirituality, aesthetic sense, etc. – the problem is trickier and perhaps more controversial. But still, few would accept or defend the claim that humans understood as conscious or sentient beings have a beginning and end.

Even the most conservative view would argue that the beginning of human consciousness is identical with the biological origin of humans, and that its end is identical with the biological end.



To many, this is a natural continuation of the evolution of scientific knowledge. Simply put, the rise of modern science has naturally brought with it the rise of a certain human science, the science of the human understood as an object, as a thing, the focus of study. The particularity of this epistemological novelty is that the sciences developed toward the end of the 19th century were minted for naturally occurring objects. Beginning with the ‘scientific revolution’ in astronomy, enormous changes took place in the fields of physics, chemistry, geology, biology and ecology, all on the natural side of reality.

The human sciences emerged essentially as an outgrowth – or perhaps a reaction to the natural sciences. With them emerged the ‘discovery’ of the human not only as the possessor of knowledge, but also as an object of knowledge.

The problem that emerges, as dramatically pointed out by Michel Foucault in the early 1970s, is that the rational, instrumental concepts and tools of the natural sciences adapt poorly to the irrational and non-instrumental qualities of human beings.

What is more, we have become aware of these limitations and the unease they cause us. The ‘human being’ is the invention of the modern scientific epistemology, and yet cannot stand up to it.

As Foucault puts it in the famous conclusion from *The Order of Things*:

... man is neither the oldest nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge. Taking a relatively short chronological sample within a restricted geographical area – European culture since the sixteenth century – one can be certain that man is a recent invention within it. [...] As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. (Foucault, 1973, pp. 421-422)



In short, the human, understood as a problem of knowledge, of science, is a very recent phenomenon, and a declining or disappearing phenomenon.

This is not meant as an alarmist proposition by Foucault. It is neither a prediction, normative claim, nor threat. On the contrary, it is a richly documented claim, based on a detailed analysis of the epistemological foundation of the notion of the human.

It is the first step in a wide-ranging set of theories about the nature of humanity in its meeting with a rapidly changing world of technology. It is the first sign of what might be considered the posthuman, the new forms and extensions of the human.

These forms and extensions touch on the premises that support the concept and practice of human security.

What is the posthuman?

It goes without saying that current reflexion and debate surrounding the application of the human security approach rests upon a strong assumption that 'the human' as an idea is stable, universally understood both by human security providers and human security beneficiaries, that it is an empirically observable reality unproblematically shared by all.

In other words – to return to the two fundamental freedoms – 'the human' that embodies the desire for 'freedom from want' and 'freedom from fear' is universal in both perception and action, and the experiences of 'want', of 'fear' and of 'freedom' are also shared in a similar way by all.

However, a number of anthropologists, ethnologists, psychologists, philosophers, political analysts, and others have come to question how unproblematic this premise of human security actually is. They point to numerous types and kinds of evidence that suggest that this assumption is a weak one, and that the humanity of humans is gradually evolving, that something called the posthuman can and should be identified and discussed.



Conceptions of the posthuman generally fall into three categories, with a wide range of nuances in between.

First, there are understandings of the posthuman that relate to physical enhancements to the human body, and which have consequences that reach beyond the body and to humanity itself.

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Second, there are a wide range of understandings of the posthuman that relate to changes in subjectivity, that is, that relate to the status of the humans as cognisant, self-aware actors in the world.

Third, there are a range of notions of the posthuman that begin with the increasing digitalisation of the self and our accelerated relationship to technologically-guided information flows and technologies.

Clearly, these three categories overlap quite significantly. In particular, it is on the basis of technological change that assertions about a posthuman subjectivity or morality are formed.

1. Technological enhancements

Firstly, the advent and increasing commonality of technological enhancements forms the basis for a certain entry into the posthuman. The bio-technological human has long been the object of science fiction and popular fascination, at the most elementary level. It concerns the supplementing of the human body with one or another technological appendage in order to treat an illness or injury, or, alternatively, to enhance the capabilities of the body in order to improve physical performance. This includes everything from mounting a simple prosthesis, to more complex in-body technologies, like pace-makers, artificial hearing devices, and the like.

Many would argue that such interventions in no way touch upon our humanity. Others would argue that bio-technological forms of palliative care, i.e. those that impact upon experiences of illness and wellness, necessarily intervene in our very humanity.



More complex interventions penetrate more deeply the division between human and machine. The advent of cybernetics – and perhaps even the imagination of it since the turn of the 20th century – has more radically collapsed traditional understandings of the human. Here, computer components are used to intervene in mental processes, thought-controlled technologies function side by side with technologically assisted ‘thought’ (Hayles, 1999).

How much of our physical bodies must be supplanted or lost before we should be considered ‘less’ than human? And how much can our physical bodies be enhanced before we become something ‘more’ than human? The examples are many: enhanced cognition, enhanced memory, better vision, hearing, touch, etc.

How much will improved biophysical resilience through implants, gene therapy or gene modification make us free from the struggles for human security, for providing it and for experiencing it? How will it change our experience of those in need, or of our own need? What are the effects of bio-technical engineering on our humanity and on our humanitarianism?

2. Evolution of subjectivity

Secondly, we observe the posthuman in terms of the evolution of subjectivity. In the Enlightenment-based paradigm of subjectivity evoked a moment ago, the subject is equated with self-consciousness, autonomy, free will, judgement, self-regulation and, above all, rationality. The cognisant subject’s experience of the world is one of homogeneity, where the self-same subject regards other subjects as either possessing the same properties or, in the logic of colonialism or what we might call civilisationalism, what is regarded as different is simultaneously regarded as inferior. The accelerating experience of the other, of other races, peoples, cultures, genders, complicates our sense of self, in the best cases enriching it, in the worse cases destabilising it (Braidotti, 2013, p. 15).

These are the contextual qualities and historical facts



that, for better or worse, have stemmed from and in return supported the European, i.e. 'human', since 'the human' is first and foremost a European discovery. The human is the European baseline, the reality of the human subject at the height of its evolution of itself.

Yet advances in the human and social sciences and their study of consciousness have revealed a reality that is far more culturally, socially, and morally complex than the 17th-century innovators of the subject could have foreseen. In short, the 'human', seen from the point of view of subjectivity, has been destabilised and changed.

3. The digital self

Lastly, the explosion of information technologies, data gathering, transmission and storage practices continues to change our experience of the world and of ourselves, and many of the basic moral categories that have long determined and fixed the humanity of humans.

Just as Cartesian subjectivity is the pillar of the humanity in human security, protection of what today is called the 'data subject' with respect to personal data is a basic building-block of the European legal-ethical framework. And again, technological 'progress', the evolution of things foreign to us that become part of us, has always put these principles under pressure.

The rapid evolution of digital technologies increases this pressure. The knowledge core of self-knowledge is weakened, even damaged by the multiple presence of information, about us, on us.

We are not only split in relation to the knowledge that is held about us by others – massive, uncontrollable, fed into systems we cannot be aware of to engage in actions and activities for which we cannot account but for which we are held accountable.

Personal data has become the competitor for the self. On the one hand, there is the increasing identification of the person with its personal data, the so-called 'data zombies'. The digitalized properties of any person



increasingly take precedence over the non-digitalized properties, by virtue of their utility, generality, and ease of transmission. As a consequence, those aspects of the human – and human dignity – that are irreducible to digital form are devalued.

There is an increasing identification of data, primarily ‘Big Data’, with our social reality and the forces that govern our lives. By the same type of process of valorization of digital properties of social life relative to non-digital, the forms of social existence that are less immediately realizable through their non-digital forms become de-valorized.

These interwoven processes have a great impact on the notion of the moral self. While ethical and legal definitions vary, all seem to converge around the notion of self-worth, self-respect, and integrity, the basic humanist idea that human beings have implicit value. Human dignity is a self-consciousness, awareness of oneself as worthy. The ‘self’ is in this sense a core notion linked to the dignity of a natural person, and, as a consequence, of a data subject.

In practical terms, this implies that the task of creating an ethical framework for implementing human dignity as a fundamental right must not take ‘human dignity’ for granted. Protecting human dignity through data protection must mean asking the question of human dignity, and putting in place methods and procedures that will encourage and nourish such questioning.

Conclusion

Summarising these observations: the human is changing. What is understood and experienced as human is not what it once was. Human security, a deeply principled idea, should not be considered unchanged.

The question is not whether but how much human security is changed and whether the foundation and mission of human security is impacted by these changes.

Obviously, a number of objections might be made to these arguments.



One objection might be raised that those who are affected by the technological revolutions described in this article are not those that are commonly impacted by the need to invoke the concept of human security.

However, the norms of the technological human are imported to the field through the bureaucracies of development aid and security. It is only a matter of time before development and human security work will be saturated with the efficiency-giving technologies that have brought humanity to the edge of its meaningfulness.

Another objection to this reflexion springs from the heart of the human security approach. It says that, while human beings around the world display significant differences, it is the commonality which makes human security a significant approach. The common ground for the deployment of one uniform concept of human security in a range of settings toward a large range of human beings is the shared aspiration for 'freedom from want, freedom from fear'.

This is a strong argument, one which recalls the arguments against the human security approach based on questions about its post-colonial blind spots, its problems with portability and disregard for its own power structure.

And yet, the question we ask here is a different one. We are asking whether discontinuities in the human itself, in the concept of the human, but also in the perception and experience of humanity, are such that the core anchoring of human security will also be put under pressure.

Indeed, what are the human insecurities of the posthuman? What is the human security that can be delivered by the coming posthuman actors and agents of human security?



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