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**The Responsibility to Protect,  
the Right to Assist and the Right to Resist**  
Craig S. Brown

**Human Security in the Republic of North  
Macedonia: A Necessity and a Challenge**  
Marina Mitrevska

**Identifying Evacuation Assembly Points:  
An Application at Latsia, Nicosia, Cyprus**  
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**Objective Limits of Peacebuilding Exercises:  
Professionals as a Bridge Between Communities  
in Serbia and Kosovo\* in the Practice  
of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence**  
Marko Savković



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## The Responsibility to Protect, the Right to Assist and the Right to Resist

Craig S. Brown<sup>1</sup>

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### Abstract

The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has come under heavy criticism following its invocation during the 2011 intervention in the Libyan conflict. The perceived unworkability of RtoP for future intervention to prevent atrocity crimes has formed the basis of continued development of the concept of the 'right to assist', which has emerged in the nonviolence literature as a means of responding to the needs and requests of individuals engaged in campaigns of nonviolent resistance. Although couched in the language of a need to respect bottom-up actors engaged in nonviolent resistance, the nonviolence literature from which RtoA has emerged indicates reasons to be cautious. Drawing on the developing critical nonviolent resistance literature, this study suggests that efforts to discipline and restrict resistance to nonviolent forms of conflict, and indeed to limit conflict to the terms established by external actors, seem to inherently afflict the concept of RtoA.

**Keywords:** Responsibility to Protect, right to assist, human security, nonviolence, nonviolent resistance

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### Introduction

Following the 2011 intervention in the Libyan conflict under the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), significant questions over RtoP's future workability have been raised. Within the nonviolence literature, one means of continuing the practical adoption of intervention as a means of avoiding 'atrocity crimes' has been the 'right to assist' (RtoA) nonviolent campaigns of civil resistance. RtoA's formulation predated NATO's Libya military intervention, although the campaign's dubious outcomes would seem to make the question over preventative strategies, such as RtoA, reasonable and rational to pursue. However, the assessment here is that, fundamentally, the premise of RtoA has thus far failed to escape the established criticism of RtoP and military intervention.

This paper first introduces the concept of RtoA, then situates it in relation to RtoP. It is apparent that at least on a theoretical or ideational basis, RtoA offers little that is new in its focus on prevention. This is because of the established acknowledgment in UN documents of the need for preventative action short of military intervention, as well as a requirement for action below that mandated by the UN down to individuals.

Subsequently, RtoA is placed in the context of the broader field of nonviolence, both in terms of the literature shaping the concept and the literature that may be applied in critique of RtoA's fundamental underpinnings. The former literature is that relating to quantitative, 'pragmatic-strategic' inquiry into nonviolence, which has resulted in an emphasis on key civil resistance variables such as nonviolent discipline. The latter literature is that



concerned with the critical nonviolent resistance field, which broadly perceives some of the former pragmatic-strategic literature as serving a disciplining function. Through introducing the critical resistance literature, this study contributes to exploring the suggestion that human security should be reformulated as a resistance strategy (Martin, 2017: 24; Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017).

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A further issue is raised relating to the concept of the civilian, which given the ongoing erosion in the boundaries between combatant and non-combatant in contemporary conflict is an important concern during both violent and nonviolent conflict. The conflation of 'civilian' with civilian resistance in certain areas of the nonviolent literature stands to further compound this erosion, particularly in the context of the increasing significance of complex modes of conflict that merge the boundaries of violent and nonviolent action, for example so-called 'hybrid warfare'. Some form of expansion of the application and coverage of 'civilian' may remove genuine popular resistance from the sphere of military manipulation and render participants some protection under RtoP. Nevertheless, the notion of 'civilian resistance' continues to pose troubling questions about RtoA and associated nonviolent dynamics' disciplining function.

## 'Right to Assist'

Over a decade ago, Ackerman and Rodal posited the 'right to help'—latterly the 'right to assist' in Ackerman and Merriman's (2019) parlance—as a right of external, cross-border support to be afforded in response to "the needs and requests for help of people denied universally accepted rights" (2008: 122). Given that I am considering some of RtoA's ambiguities, before embarking on a critique of the concept it is important to note that Ackerman and Rodal evidently do not question a 'right to resist' (2008: 112, 115), although they do believe that resistance which RtoA is relevant to should be nonviolent (Ackerman & Merriman, 2019: 20–22). Moreover, Ackerman and Rodal (2008: 122) and Ackerman and Merriman (2019:



22–23, 32) stress that RtoA should not be considered a strategy for interference or top-down, external control as indigenous, bottom-up civil resistance strategies should be respected. While not suggesting these positions are disingenuous, there are limitations and caveats posed on ‘legitimacy’ and capacity of nonviolent resisters through RtoA in terms of a reasonable right to resist oppression, which may be inherent in the move towards legalisation and enshrining of assistance in a right. The most obvious response would be that acknowledging RtoA would not remove the right to resist outside the parameters of strict nonviolence. However, Ackerman and Merriman’s (2019) assessment of the action permissible under RtoP seems quite restrictive itself, while the ultimate question is why assistance needs to be a right, given that informal action has always been undertaken in support of nonviolent resistance campaigns. If an authoritarian regime refuses this right, presumably that refusal places them in further transgression of ‘human security’ paradigms and IHRL, thus eventually risking military intervention.

It is important to note that RtoP’s remit is limited to the prevention of ‘atrocity crimes’, even if the action that the UN has outlined that may be taken to prevent such crimes is broad. Therefore, RtoA must be seen within this limited remit. Ackerman and Merriman acknowledge that the prevention of atrocity crimes is “an important exception to the principle of non-intervention”, which nevertheless depends on the UN Security Council, meaning that intervention can simply be vetoed (2019: iii, 2). They also argue that the 2011 armed intervention against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya under RtoP ultimately “resulted in significant loss of life. It did not stop violent conflict while Qaddafi remained in power, and it led to further violent conflict and regional instability after Qaddafi’s ouster” (2019: 2). Accordingly, Ackerman and Merriman posit RtoA as a crucial component of preventing the risk of atrocities through strengthening:

international coordination and support for nonviolent civil resistance campaigns demanding rights, freedom and justice against non-democratic rule. RtoA would:

1. engage a wide range of stakeholders such as NGOs, states, multilateral institutions and others;
2. bolster

various factors of resilience against state fragility; and 3. incentivise opposition groups to sustain commitment to nonviolent strategies of change (2019: iii).

Although RtoA in relation to the specific character of nonviolence during campaigns is significant to discuss, it is worth considering RtoA's impetus—as a form of intervention that is short of armed coercion, with a significant non-state component and an emphasis on prevention—in relation to the present understanding of RtoP.

### ***Right to Assist in the Context of the Responsibility to Protect***

Although Ackerman and Merriman (2019) focus on the significance of activity pertaining to pillar two of RtoP—international assistance and capacity rebuilding—and an emphasis on prevention over armed intervention, it is not apparent that the UN overlook such efforts, nor that the UN have purely focused on state action and responsibility. An emphasis on prevention appears in various significant documents relating to the UN's clarification of RtoP (United Nations General Assembly, 2009: 7; United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2011: 5). More significantly, prevention is linked to different sub-state activity, including the moral responsibility of individuals to protect: "those who refuse to look away or to participate, who shelter the vulnerable, and who speak out against the dehumanization of the targeted groups and for human rights and human dignity are exercising individual responsibility" (United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2011: 4). Such actions are considered as building societies resilient to violence and atrocity crimes generally, not just during armed conflict (United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2013: 3–4). Furthermore, the need for external assistance to be mindful of specific contexts and grassroots action has been acknowledged by the UN:



Bottom-up learning processes can provide essential lessons with regard to the methods of self-protection that have been developed and practiced at the village and even family levels in places of recurring violence and repression. These complement the emphasis, within the framework of the responsibility to protect, on prevention and helping the State to succeed, instead of reacting once it has failed to protect. Training, education and awareness-raising are natural areas for new regional initiatives and global-regional-national partnerships (United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2011: 5; 2012: 2).

Crucial here is that such sub-state initiatives evidently do not require a UN mandate or UN Security Council assent, which is Ackerman and Merriman's (2019) main issue with the workability of RtoP. While such efforts to avoid violence and ultimately atrocity crimes may be organised and undertaken in cooperation with the UN, for example in the case of Nonviolent Peaceforce (see United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2015), throughout history such actions challenging the worst instances of human behaviour have been individual, 'spontaneous' and by no means according with legal 'permissibility' (see Sémerin et al., 2011). This is especially the case when such atrocities actually have a legal foundation and resistance to them is illegal (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2019a, 2019b).

Clearly, such cases of legal atrocity differ from the legal protection that is sought through international law precisely to avoid atrocity crimes, although where this leaves RtoA is intriguing. What does and indeed can RtoA contribute, particularly in circumstances where international law stipulates that prevention is necessary, where RtoA seeks nonviolent intervention, yet states where this assistance is provided are likely to consider it illegal and an infringement of sovereignty? Ultimately, it seems to be the case that the UN's formulation of RtoP approves of preventative action without UN assent; a *right* to nonviolently assist nonviolent resistance campaigns would only legally enshrine this assistance



yet, given Ackerman and Merriman's (2019) criticism of armed intervention, provide no more robust measures in response to a state claiming interference than measures short of armed intervention (United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2012: 9) to hypothetically enforce the right to protest for civil and political rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)—a right Ackerman and Merriman believe is afforded greater protection than RtoA (2019: 27–28).

To my mind, when one thinks through these ambiguous legal implications and contributions of RtoA, one has to consider what precisely Ackerman and Merriman (2019) want to contribute through their conception of RtoA. This seems to make the issue of nonviolence and nonviolent resistance campaigns essential, with two main aspects to Ackerman and Merriman's position. First is civil resistance's superior capacity to avert civil war and the prospects of atrocity crimes compared to civil war and violent conflict (2019: 25–26). Second is the right to assist civil resistance campaigns as a way of strengthening capacity to avoid a descent into violent conflict, hence the risk of atrocity crimes (2019: 9). Ackerman and Merriman stipulate three baseline criteria for a campaign to receive assistance: "a. A campaign is committed to nonviolent discipline [...] b. A campaign's goals are consistent with internationally recognised human rights [...] c. The civil resistance campaign is separate from a registered political party" (2019: 20–22). As mentioned above, it is important to note that Ackerman and Merriman acknowledge the impracticality of a campaign guaranteeing nonviolence, the importance of context-specific circumstances (2019: 20–21), as well as the potential problems of external assistance such as delegitimising of a campaign (2019: 23–24). Ultimately, the significance of listening to and respecting local actors is emphasised (2019: 23–24). While this is positive to stress, certain indicators in Ackerman and Merriman's proposal, seen in the context of recent research on nonviolence which has been of a quantitative nature and



stressing the need for discipline, indicate some of the more problematic components of RtoA.

Essentially, RtoA seems to be being offered in a context that is inherently about regulating or avoiding risk, if not the avoidance of conflict generally (see Ackerman & Merriman, 2019: 34) then mitigating the unpredictability of conflict. This is indicated by some of the ‘concerns’ Ackerman and Merriman acknowledge and thus the intended audience, for example ‘concern two’: “is support for civil resistance synonymous with supporting regime change?” (2019: 22–23), as well as ‘concern four’: “What if external support contributes to societal instability?” (2019: 25). Responding to the latter, the researchers (2019: 26) rather tellingly quote the third sentence from this excerpt from Stephan et al. below (the full paragraph being even more revealing):

External actors must come to terms with the fact that progress in consolidating democracy may not always be linear and that civic actors may choose to engage in nonviolent, extra-institutional tactics to advance social and political change. However, the popular movements in the Middle East and North Africa have shown that we cannot assume that such movements immediately lead to clear social or political outcomes, stability, *or the kinds of political systems and leaders desirable to our governments. Because outside actors probably will not be able to prevent people from engaging in protests or other direct action* [emphasis added], particularly if they are suffering acute grievances, to minimize risk of violent instability they could invest in helping civil societies develop the capacity to organize nonviolently and maintain nonviolent discipline (2015: 11; see also Ackerman & Rodal, 2008: 122– 123).

Thus, as well as prevention of nonviolent conflict being suggested as desirable yet unfeasible and nonviolent conflict ideally being prosecuted in the USA’s interest (in this example), Stephan et al.’s paper seems to posit nonviolence as one indicator of who among diverse, networked and informal civil society actors may be identified as suitable for external donors to support (2015:



4–7; see also Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 27). This of course makes the nonviolent discipline of such actors important to those donors as a quantifiable and reportable variable, rather than being necessary at a practical level.

## RtoA in the Context of the Broader Nonviolent Literature

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Exploring this question of practical necessity further, it is first worth observing that the attempt to mitigate the unpredictability of conflict through the emphasis on nonviolent discipline has been joined with arguments for the superior prospects of nonviolent discipline in terms of resistance campaigns' success. Particularly over the previous decade, a notable trend in nonviolence research has been study of large-N datasets, particularly the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) datasets. Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013) suggested that with studies such as those by Schock (2005), Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), Shaykhutdinov (2010), Svensson and Lindgren (2010, 2011), Nepstad (2011) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), civil resistance research has taken a more "empirical and analytical perspective" (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013: 272; Nepstad, 2013: 592; Gleditsch et al., 2017: 268). A quantitative empirical approach, developing hypotheses and testing theory based on the available literature, has become a common trend in this regard (see Chenoweth & Schock, 2015; Bayer et al., 2016; Butcher & Svensson, 2016), with large-N studies also more prominent (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; Chenoweth & Stephan 2011; Asal et al., 2013; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Cunningham, 2013; Koren, 2014; Sutton et al., 2014; Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2015; Hegre et al., 2017; Gleditsch et al., 2017: 268; see also Schock, 2013: 286–287). A major finding was offered by Stephan and Chenoweth when they determined that 26 percent of violent resistance campaigns could be considered successful, compared to 53 percent of nonviolent ones (2008: 8; see also Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 6–7).



Accordingly, there has been greater focus on identifying variables such as nonviolent discipline that increase the prospects of success (Stephan, 2009a; Bamyeh, 2012: 56; Davies, 2014: 310; Ettang, 2014: 418; Khatib & Lust, 2014: 9), and research showing the disadvantages of violent ‘flanks’ (Schock, 2013: 282; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 202; Schock, 2015a: 13–14; Schock, 2015b: 310; Hallward & Norman, 2015b: 24; Chenoweth & Schock, 2015: 446–447). Stephan’s (2009a) edited volume considered cases of nonviolent resistance in the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region prior to the 2010/11 WANA revolutions, indicating the importance of three general “ingredients” that “may not be sufficient to guarantee success, though without all three it is unlikely that a nonviolent campaign will succeed [...] unity, strategic planning, and nonviolent discipline” (Stephan, 2009b: 311). The commitment to nonviolent discipline has subsequently been emphasised as essential during the 2010/11 WANA revolutions (Boesak, 2011: 4; Bamyeh, 2012: 56; Ettang, 2014: 418; Khatib & Lust, 2014: 9).

However, the emphasis on statistically proving nonviolence’s effectiveness may contribute to the instrumentalising of nonviolence, particularly in producing a set of outcome variables under the common heading of ‘democratisation’ (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994: 10–11; Stephan, 2009a: 3; Sharp, 2010: 2; Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Bayer et al., 2016: 758, 761), which is typically of a particular liberal democratic and neoliberal economic bent (Chabot & Sharifi, 2013: 18; Honwana, 2013: 91). A further aspect is that, as with Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011: 208) assessment, democratisation is clearly intended to be an institutionalised process, with nonviolent movements being seen as “credible negotiating partners” (2011: 11) and democratic transitions “driven by an interactive process involving elites and grassroots civic elements” (2011: 204). While Chenoweth and Stephan make an important qualification—“there is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all democratic structure”—they ignore this and proceed to use “the standard description in political



science” of electoral and rights-based liberal democracy (2011: 202–203). Garton Ash suggested that defining success as “to achieve consolidated liberal democracy” is acceptable, “so long as we are explicit about the nature of the exercise” because, “we are measuring achievement and outcomes *ex post facto*, by standards that seem to us valuable” (2009: 389–390). Regardless, this overlooks the power inherent within this exercise, as there remains a case of universalising what is valuable to ‘us’—the minority world (see Jackson, 2015: 20–21).

With such research providing the basis of RtoA’s development, evidently there is nothing problematic about expanding into a further research area for exploring non-violent and violent resistance through producing large-N studies (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 17). Nevertheless, certain disconcerting trends are continuing in quantitative assessments. Chenoweth and Ulfelder expressed the conviction that “mass episodes of nonviolent resistance” can be both predicted and generalised in terms of trends and characteristics (2015: 2), although they believed that existing conflict analysis and structural theories are ineffective for explaining their “complex systems dynamics” (2015: 21; see also Hoynes, 2014: 1–2). First, one may ask who generalisation and prediction benefit; Jackson suggested there is a real question over whether the aim of such civil resistance research is “normatively motivated by social justice”, or seeks to “furnish the authorities with greater knowledge for the purposes of deterring, preventing, suppressing or punishing nonviolent resistance movements which challenge the status quo” (2015: 20). I believe this question is partially resolved in favour of the latter position by my own analysis of how the WANA revolutions have been framed and the deeper change sought overlooked, replicating structural forms of oppression (Brown, 2016; Brown, 2019: 26–30).

Regarding the practical implications of RtoA’s push for nonviolent discipline, such discipline has been considered crucial because even minor violence can undermine nonviolent action’s dynamics while justifying heavy repression (Davies, 2014; King, 2009) While this is



convincing, my own research into the 2010/11 Tunisian revolution found that in the Tunisian context nonviolent discipline was not a particularly overriding concern, nor ultimately a necessary one. Protester violence in the specific context of Tunisia was accommodated and rationalised in stark contrast to the regime's violence by most Tunisians who I interviewed, including in self-defence, largely taking the form of destruction of state infrastructure and stone throwing, but also attacks on and in one rare instance of killing a policeman rationalised by one interviewee (Brown, 2018; Brown, 2019: 132, 201–202). During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, instances of stone throwing and other protester violence have been suggested as having undermined nonviolence (Davies, 2014: 310), although protester violence has been suggested as being significant during the Egyptian revolution (Case, 2018). It should be noted further that even in instances where the quantity of violence in a campaign is limited, it may have been crucial in certain instances, for example in the defence of Tahrir Square as an emancipated space during the 'Battle of the Camel' on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2011 (Basu, 2012; Bilgic, 2015: 280).

Although this does not reduce the significant role that nonviolence played and the broadly nonviolent nature of Tunisia and Egypt's revolutions, considerations regarding violence will be context-specific (see Brown 2018, 2019: 310–313; Reed & Foran, 2002: 339–340; Chabot & Vinthagen, 2007: 94). This reflects the acknowledgement in some of the more recent resistance literature (Vinthagen, 2015a; Baaz et al., 2018) via Naess (1974) that actions will often be context-specific in their effectiveness, including nonviolent action (Vinthagen, 2015a: 91). Indeed, there is some acknowledgement of the need for strategic and tactical creativity, flexibility and consideration of the specific context for the nonviolent movement and its actors among nonviolence's 'pragmatic-strategic' advocates (Ackerman & Krueger, 1994: 29, 35, 46–47, 51; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011: 221; Pearlman, 2011: 9; Bartkowski, 2015: 150; Schock, 2015a: 16). Nevertheless, there appears to be an emphasis on strong-arming evidence for universally appli-



cable strategic principles derived from (but not necessarily reflecting) Gene Sharp's work that have been successfully transferred and applied across countries via 'strategic learning' (Ackerman & Rodal, 2008: 117). Sørensen's (2017) rigorous critique of Ackerman and Kruegler's case study of Danish resistance to the German occupation during World War Two conveys their overlooking of case- and context-specific complexity. Her damning implication is that "for an applied field such as civil resistance, flaws in theories and models can have consequences for ongoing and future struggles", including the endangering of participants lives (2017: 132). Of further significance is that Lehoucq (2016) has suggested flaws in Stephan and Che noweth's (2008: 8) statistical data that skews the success rate of nonviolence (Lehoucq, 2016: 277–279, 284). The implications of this require serious contending with, albeit outside of this paper's focus (see Brown, 2019: 284); while not disproving the effectiveness of nonviolence, it conveys further the problem of quantification and the identification of certain variables for effectiveness and success, which evidently has implications for RtoA.

One qualification is that regardless of RtoA rhetoric regarding indigenous, grassroots dynamics, the external pressure to be nonviolent simply to receive assistance could override what seems tactically or strategically necessary on the ground in certain contexts. A 'full-spectrum' (non)violent campaign may have popular legitimacy and support and—regardless of whether this is workable in the specific context in terms of establishing durable social change and reducing violence over the long-term—shifting to pursue nonviolent discipline to accord with external requirements is, at the very least, an inherent external 'direction' of a campaign potentially at odds with reaction to developments on the ground.

Seeking to summarise the discussion so far, there is clearly a broad scope of action short of armed, military, violent intervention, in the same way there is clearly a broad scope of conflict and its outcomes short of the most heinous excesses. Of course, atrocity crimes must be prevented; there are also individuals such as myself



who would subscribe to the belief that any death during conflict is lamentable and should be avoided, and that nonviolent methods, particularly strategies inclusive of constructive resistance (see Sørensen, 2016), are the most effective way of building more equitable communities, respectful of rights and dignity and engaging in the nonviolent waging of conflicts. However, this is different to enforcing nonviolent discipline as requisite. This makes RtoA not simply another tool, or string to the bow of avoiding atrocity crimes, but seeks to mould the space of permissible conflict.

### ***RtoA and the Critical Nonviolent Resistance Literature***

Mindful of the longer quote from Stephan et al.'s paper above regarding the prevention of conflict and the influencing of change (2015: 11), such moulding can be clarified in the context of the emerging critique within the critical nonviolence literature. In this regard, resistance has been characterised as:

Processes of social change, different forms of resistance (everyday and organised) and violence (political and domestic) entangle and emerge as reactions to each other. Various resisting or violent practices constitute reactions or 'bi-products' of other practices, which thereby drive or provoke social change (Baaz et al., 2018: 7, 100).

With an emphasis on nonviolent resistance, the *Journal of Resistance Studies* exemplifies this developing strand (see Vinthagen, 2015c), which is linked to critical theory and Foucauldian theories' application to peace research (Patomäki, 1997a, 2001; Jackson, 2015), considering power, neoliberalism and resistance in a manner which Jackson suggests has typically been overlooked (2015: 31–37). Vinthagen (2015c) emphasised the importance of Foucault's ideas of power and resistance (2015c: 7), while Galtung's research is also drawn on to inform violence, resistance and power's interplay (Baaz et al., 2018: 102–103; Jackson, 2015: 31; Vinthagen 2015a: 65). This especially concerns



direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung, 1969; 1990: 292), alongside negative and positive peace, with the latter's focus on constructive activities.

One aspect of this critique relates to Jackson's suggestion that peace studies has generally perpetuated a Eurocentric, 'western' and top-down position that "violent conflict and injustice require 'peace', 'conflict management', and forms of liberal interventionism from external actors", typically "at the expense of social justice and local actors" (2015: 18; Clark, 2009: 2; Norman, 2015: 43–44; Vinthagen, 2015b: 262). There is of course an array of means through which nonviolent movements may receive and indeed request assistance (see Roberts, 2009: 18), not all malignant or concerning financing (Johansen, 2009; Dudouet, 2015: 169, 172-173; Julian & Schweitzer, 2015: 3), with an authentic acknowledgement of the requirement to respect local actors, institutions and culture being expressed (Dudouet, 2015: 171; Julian & Schweitzer, 2015: 3). A need for the peace research and nonviolence field to genuinely grapple with the implications of this seems to have been rejuvenated with a focus on resistance (Jackson, 2015: 18; Vinthagen, 2015c; Baaz et al., 2018), reflecting "the radical origin of peace studies and their commitment to emancipation" (Sørensen & Johansen, 2016: 84), as well as questions of critical theory's place in the peace field raised over two decades ago (Patomäki, 1997a; 2001; Jackson, 2015). Jackson suggested this calls for a reorientation towards "local agency and priorities, local and everyday forms of peace, the role of power dynamics in conflict and peace, structural violence, solidarity, antiviolence and social justice" (2015: 18), while "de-privileging the field's position, empowering the other, abandoning Eurocentrism and putting immanent critique, radical activism and other-led research methodologies at the centre of its practices" (Jackson, 2015: 18; Norman, 2015: 48–51; Sørensen & Johansen, 2016: 84; Baaz et al., 2018: 191–192).

For this critique of RtoA, it is worth situating such challenges to the established peace field in the context of 'risk', which has an established place in critical analyses of RtoP. First, although Ackerman and Merriman note that



conflict is inevitable (2019: 34), ‘violence’ and ‘conflict’ are often conflated, both by researchers and international institutions, creating an assumption that all conflicts are objectionable and create detrimental outcomes, which has been roundly critiqued (see Sørensen & Johansen, 2016: 86–87; Sharp, 1973: 8; Rogers & Ramsbotham, 1999: 751; Jackson, 2015: 20; War Resisters’ International 2017). Second, reflecting Beck’s assessment of the identification and mitigation of “hazards and insecurities” as risk stemming from modernisation and globalisation (1992: 21, 29, 36; Bauman, 1997: 192–193), the development of the human security paradigm shifted the emphasis on territorial security to, as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty explained, “the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity” (2001: 15). The Commission proposed that RtoP lies with the “state concerned”, unless it is “unable or unwilling to fulfil this responsibility” (2001: 17), while emphasising the ‘responsibility to prevent’, necessitating effective early warning and predictive capabilities (2001: xi). Duffield identified human security as a “biopolitical category”, concerning the “more diffuse and multiform threat associated with alienation, breakdown and insurgency emanating from the nominal populations of Southern states”, and, “the ability of the people of former protectorates and colonies to enjoy complete and fulfilled lives” (2007: 112). Rather than human security’s concern with violence and questions posed by sovereign power and responsibility, extending RtoP to nonviolent action in the manner advocated through RtoA risks transgressing the reasonable ‘right to rebel’ among populations and to action against a sovereign power. It appears that instability and risk *per se* is what is being regulated, and this once again suggests that campaigns’ adherence to supposedly measurable nonviolent variables would expedite the prediction and control of nonviolent action and campaigns by external actors.

A strong example of these problematic aspects of the peace studies field is provided in relation to the West Asia-North Africa region and the 2010/11 WANA revolutions, with direct relevance to RtoP and RtoA. My own research



has confirmed some of these Eurocentric, patronising and orientalising features in relation to the region and recent revolutions, characterising not just peace research but common political research paradigms such as that of authoritarianism and democratisation (Brown, 2019: 26–30). Coupled with the inclination to mitigate risk, this necessarily builds an interventionist inclination towards the region's politics, or indeed external support for 'stability' in authoritarian regimes, both of which suffocate the right to rebel. RtoP has been invoked in relation to nonviolent campaigns and actions in the region, including by the prominent Bahraini activist al-Khawaja (2014; see also Bellal & Doswald-Beck, 2011: 8). If RtoA provides a nonviolent alternative to military intervention in this regard, it seems RtoP's existing issues concerning violent conflicts are no less applicable to nonviolent conflict. RtoA would likely run up against intervention selectiveness or 'disinterest' according to major powers' concerns, rather than multilateralism, which was made abundantly clear through NATO's military intervention in Libya, non-intervention against Syria's Al-Assad and muted response to the Gulf Cooperation Council's intervention to support the Bahrain regime. Thus, encouraging nonviolence externally on the promise of assistance seems practically dubious, rather than being a constructive and emancipatory nonviolence developed as a bottom-up process.

## Civil Resistance and Civilian Resistance

A further issue of relevance to RtoP and RtoA in the context of nonviolent civil resistance is its conflation with the concept of 'civilian'. In UN documents RtoP is not narrowly referred to in relation to civilians; rather, it is referred to in relation to 'populations': "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" (United Nations General Assembly, 2005: 30). This is crucial in the intention of leaving no individual or group as somehow a permissible target for atrocity crimes. It evokes the Red Cross commentary on the Geneva Conventions in the wake of transgressions during the 'War on Ter-



ror', which is explicit: "no possible loophole is left; there can be no excuse, no attenuating circumstances" (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2005). Indeed, the context of the War on Terror is important given the USA's blatant efforts to create a third category of 'unlawful combatant' outside of IHL protections or IHRL.

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Taking torture in particular in relation to US administrations' actions during the War on Terror, Waldron argued the torture prohibition to be the archetype of a policy ensuring that law is neither brutal nor savage, its removal possibly having a domino effect in demolishing prohibitions against 'lesser' offences (2005: 1726, 1729, 1735). Putting aside a question that even Clausewitz (1873) raised over whether one can realistically legislate away the brutality of war, given that war's true nature is an escalation to the extremities of violence in seeking the ultimate destruction of one's opponent, this 'slippery slope' may have been exacerbated by US actions, eroding the status of civilians and 'protected individuals' and combatants alike. The global War on Terror has exacerbated an evermore absurd (mis)application of the terms 'terrorist' and 'terrorism' by an increasing number of states to a growing array of opposition actors and their activities, based on the perception of the violence such a definition is perceived to justify. Thus, in 2011 Ben Ali, Gaddafi and Assad labelled protesters as terrorists even prior to the latter two revolutions' militarisation (Schraeder & Redissi, 2011: 7), attempting to justify 'exceptional' human rights' infringements to an external audience. At least in the instances of Tunisia and Libya, Ben Ali and Gaddafi came to be seen as 'friends' in the War on Terror; thus, the concept offered an evermore absurd and facile international mask for oppression (Bellamy, 2006: 124, 139; Foot, 2006: 139).

Evidently, states including the USA have committed war crimes and human rights violations prior to the global War on Terror (McCoy, 2006: 108, 112) and the USA's efforts to create a status of individuals outside of legal protection, while leaders such as Ben Ali, Gaddafi and Assad hardly needed such an enabling environment to engage in such violations. Rather infamously, Colonel



Lawrence Wilkerson of the US State Department stated: “There’s an aphorism in the CIA, that if you want good intelligence, send him to Syria, if you want him to disappear, send him to Cairo. [Morocco for] a little torture [...] fingernails pulled out [...] cigarette burn on the face” (Taylor, 2011; McCoy 2006: 117). Nevertheless, broad designations under ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in the post-September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 world have led to obfuscation of the boundaries of perceived permissible action under IHL.

The crucial point here is that defining individuals or groups as terrorists has become a potent (and absurd) means of justifying violent suppression, including outside of IHL or IHRL norms and including targeting of nonviolent actors and civilian populations. Concurrently, there has been some conflation of the term ‘civilian’ with those engaging in civil resistance (see Stephan, 2009a). For example, in order to qualify in the NAVCO analysis as a “nonviolent episode” or campaign it “must have been prosecuted by unarmed civilians who did not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of their opponent” (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013: 418; Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013: 271; Chenoweth and Ulfelder, 2015: 13). In the context of the 2010/11 WANA revolutions and the instances of the ‘terrorist’ label’s application noted above, it was opposition broadly adopting civil resistance (at least initially) who were being denounced as such. This exemplifies that nonviolent resistance and resisters are not immune from practically baseless yet symbolically loaded designation.

In this WANA context, one should consider the phrase ‘Civilian Jihad’, adopted by Stephan (2009a) from Khalid Kishtainy (2002) to “describe a form of political struggle whose “weapons” include boycotts, strikes, protests, sit-downs, humour, and other acts of civil disobediences and non-violent defiance” (Stephen, 2009a: 1). Kishtainy’s (2002) arguments for the term’s adoption are superficially convincing, having explained the intention of rescuing jihad from its violent associations, while attempting to encourage nonviolence’s appeal to an Arab audience (also Stephan, 2009a: 6, 11). Nevertheless, this aim would be more effectively fulfilled by extending familiarity with



appropriate definition, understanding and awareness of the concept of jihad *ab intra*, rather than prefixing the term with a word inferring nonviolence (see Satha-Anand, 1993; Mohideen, 1993; Abu-Nimer, 2015: 41).

Thus, one wonders whether this terminology falls in to the common external perceptions of the region, where adopting ‘civilian jihad’ is actually as much for external audiences and forces as it is for indigenous audiences to learn about alternatives to violence. Stephan’s volume itself indicated that there is hardly a need for resistance movements, well-established in using nonviolence, to learn about its utility. Thus the supposed monopoly of jihadist forces on militancy is an assumption itself. While ‘civil’ in relation to civil resistance has rather been determined as relating to “a citizen or society, implying that a movement’s goals are ‘civil’ in the sense of being widely shared in a society”, with actions being “non-military or non-violent in character” (Roberts, 2009: 2; Hallward & Norman, 2015a: 7), Stephan gave a definition of civil resistance as “Widespread and sustained activities by ordinary civilians against a particular power, force, policy or regime” (2009a: 1). It is not convincing why this and various commonly used nonviolent terminology cannot simply be applied to the WANA region, rather than risking a further entrenchment of Middle East exceptionalism. There is of course a chance that this emphasis on civilians undertaking nonviolent action is a further justification for ‘protection’, intervention and ‘assistance’ in the region. Essentially, conflating the status of civilian with civil resistance risks further undermining civilian neutrality under international law, rather than absolving participants in nonviolent actions of a state or regime’s violent excesses in response.

While the connection of civilians to nonviolence likely stems from the latter concept’s association with governed *citizens’ withdrawal of consent* (Gandhi, 1961: 7; Sharp, 2010: 31), a regime’s legitimacy often remains ambiguous. Much of this ambiguity rests on external perceptions and factors, one might say realpolitik, which potentially has a crucial influence on nonviolent campaigns (Davies, 2014: 302). Thus, considering the



previous support given to authoritarian regimes by major powers, which has proven a considerable hindrance to grassroots movements (Zunes & Ibrahim, 2009: 95; Zunes, 2011: 403), would be more meaningful. If analysts of nonviolence are increasingly showing its effectiveness through quantitative analysis, that others are advocating intervention that may only regulate or control indigenous and grassroots campaigns is highly questionable.

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## Conclusion

In emphasising the prevention measures that are an aspect of RtoP, RtoA focuses on an area of positive and crucial activity, averting those actions that reflect the worst of humanity, and indeed seeking an end to violence more broadly. While of worthy intent, it is difficult to see what RtoA fundamentally adds to nonviolent action and more generally the ‘just’ waging of conflict. Bottom-up, indigenous nonviolent resistance has been and is pursued worldwide irrespective of its legal permissibility within a state—this is inherent in civil disobedience—and assistance has been offered by an array of external actors in certain conflicts irrespective of its legality in the ‘donor’ or recipient state. Somehow enshrining this broad spectrum of morally permissible actions to assist within a legal protection risks legally defining and restricting what is and is not permissible under one’s right to resist, irrespective of circumstances. Whether intentionally or otherwise, this can also channel what forms of resistance actors pursue in order to receive official assistance from civil society, the state or international organisations.

Thus, this may compound the problem whereby, as in the case of Bahrain and the appeal of Al-Khawaja (2014), activists believe they can tick the box of nonviolence and then lobby for international intervention or assistance as a rapid and swift resolution to their regime issue. Bahrain is a highly pertinent example; in the current international system, the right to assist the Bahraini opposition in 2011 would have been extremely unlikely (then or in other cases in future) to have been deferred to over



dominant external state powers' preference for stability. Any expectation of help upon adherence to nonviolent discipline simply to trigger a formalised right to assist (or protect) is naïve and liable to leave a campaign high and dry; in a context such as Bahrain, this can make external calls for nonviolent discipline dangerously misleading (Sørensen, 2017: 132) when not grounded in understanding of the context of action (Vinthagen, 2015a: 91; Baaz et al., 2018: 11, 13).

It is important to emphasise that in many instances, a nonviolent civil resistance campaign would be far better off pursuing a strategy and tactics reflective of the specific context. The risk of a descent into brutal violence and perhaps even atrocity crimes on both sides is possible even from an initially nonviolent campaign, as the Syrian revolution since 2011 indicates. In fulfilling the broader context of RtoP in terms of human security—which the UN itself acknowledges falls on every individual as well as the collective—nonviolent resistance inherently reflects diversity, pluralism and dignity when being both without violence and against violence (Vinthagen, 2015a: 218), both born of and reflective of the specific context and circumstances of action. Despite the rhetoric of RtoA seeming to acknowledge as much (Ackerman & Merriman, 2019), its inherent and strict characteristics seem to pose too great a challenge of contrary, disciplining and potentially dangerous outcomes for resistance campaigns. Mindful of the suggestion in this journal that “the contemporary model of human security needs to be reconstructed as a strategy of resistance” (Martin, 2017: 24; Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017), respect and support from external actors for bottom-up efforts at pursuing human security should continue with broadly informal acts of solidarity. One crucial effort in that regard would be external assisters' acknowledgement and resistance against structural violence ‘at home’, pressuring their governments not to openly or tacitly support authoritarian regimes.



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## **Human Security in the Republic of North Macedonia: A Necessity and a Challenge**

Page | 36      Marina Mitrevska<sup>1</sup>

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### **Abstract**

One of the most popular concepts nowadays is the concept of human security. It is a concept that has attempted to redefine the global security agenda and is perceived as a revolutionary act that shifts the focus of interest from the security of states to the security of the person, the security of the individual in the society. The idea of the concept is to establish human security by monitoring the indicators of human life disruption (economic security – freedom from poverty, unemployment; personal security, political security, etc.). The aim of the paper is to prove the necessity to develop the human security concept in the Republic of North Macedonia through scientific elaboration and practical implementation. Therefore, the content of this paper is meant to analyze threats to human security, specifically through examples of poverty and unemployment, to differentiate separate categories of human insecurity and to show/point out that the concept of human security should be comprehensive and directed to the freedom from fear and freedom from poverty.

**Keywords:** security, threats, human security, poverty, unemployment

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## Human Security in the Republic of North Macedonia: A Necessity and a Challenge

### Introduction

Nowadays, the security paradigm is faced with challenges, problems, threats and processes, and the new millennium, compared to the past, has significantly gained new specifics and features. In this context, important objective factors (geostrategic, military-political, security, environmental and other factors) that determine the security realities in individual states have also considerably changed (Mitrevska 2016: 21). All of these changes are strongly influenced by the processes of globalization, which, in turn, put countries in front of new challenges and problems. In these conditions, it has become evident that the enthusiasm for the construction of the New World Order and the peace dividend after the fall of the Berlin Wall lasted very shortly and the new millennium humanity brought with it the legacy of old problems and methods of solving the most pressing global, regional or national problems. In those circumstances, if anything changes, it is the rhetoric that justifies the actions and concepts that should demonstrate (and prove) a level of innovative and creative thinking among the most important actors (Ванковска, 2006: 413-414). This time, the most interesting are the concept of human security, conflict management, humanitarian interventions and so on. There is no doubt that one of the most popular and, at the same time, the most influential concepts today is the concept of human security (Burges, 2007: 31). There are a number of reasons for this. First, the generic link between the concept of human security and that of security understood in the most general sense. In fact, they are closely related, and the basic link that connects them is the 'process of securitization'. Second, human security shifts the focus of interest from traditional security to the security of the person, the security of the individual in the society. Third, human



security recognizes that personal protection of the individual and preservation of their integrity do not come primarily from the protection of the state as political elite, but from the approach to personal well-being and quality of life. Fourth, it is increasingly clear that the needs faced by the common man should be recognized, which reflects a growing consensus. Hence, security can no longer be narrowly defined as the absence of armed conflict, among or within states, because the pursuit of this variant would mean ignoring serious problems such as massive human rights infringement, forced large-scale displacement of civilians, terrorism and environmental disasters as direct threats to human security. Even in today's practice, the consequences of such direct threats to human security comprise far more than absence of violent conflict. They include human rights, affordable education, health care, and the belief that every individual has the opportunity and chance to fulfil their potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty and increasing economic growth.

Thus, it has become obvious that from the people's point of view, security represents protection from disease, hunger, unemployment, poverty, crime, environmental endangerment and so on. That is why the view is justified and the key questions asked in security analyses are the following, which further determines not only the discourse, but also the solutions to the problems posed (Møller, 2000: 37). *Security for whom?* The answer is that human security implies security of the individual. While to the question: *Security for what values?*, the explicit answer is that human security values include an acceptable quality of life and guarantee of basic human rights. However, it, at least, implies basic needs such as stable economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, stable development and social equality. That is why we can argue that the fundamental values of human security are freedom from fear, and freedom from lack of equal opportunities. In particular, the central value in the conception of human



security is the liberation from threats to human rights, security and human life.

Regarding the question: *What are the threats to these core values?*, we could, above all, list the income gap between the rich and poor countries, internal conflicts, ethnic conflicts and migration, transnational crime, environmental degradation, insufficient economic and volatile development, and so on.

And finally, regarding the question: *What means of security?*, we can critically warn that human security can be achieved through development, not ... weapons. In particular, in order to revive the new security concept, it is necessary to take some rather radical steps: the concept of human development, which will emphasize equality and continuity, building peace that will underpin the human security agenda, and so on.

Hence, Asberg and Wallensteen's<sup>1</sup> view is quite justified that the determination of security content depends on three essential elements, namely: core values (relating to aspects of what we want to provide), threats are the ones that show what challenges and dangers these values and capabilities are exposed to (resources and actors that can tackle threats, that is, guarantee security).

In this context, it can be concluded that, according to these authors, the understanding of security is not possible without considering all three elements together, as well as their interrelationship. Hence, the ultimate goal of human security should be sought in the overlap of conditions for the development of individual abilities and the creation of a society free from structural violence, such as poverty and discrimination. In other words, we should strive to build a society that respects individual human rights, economic development and social justice. Certainly, these are goals that cannot be achieved by the use of military means and militarized methods, but only by the development of the society through all spheres (economic, social, human rights, rule of law, etc.).

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<sup>1</sup> See more in: Asberg & Wallensteen, 1998: 169.



For the developing countries, such as the Republic of North Macedonia, economic growth is an imperative rather than an alternative due to several reasons. First, achieving economic growth is important in order to address the challenge of increased poverty, as well as for the accumulation of the necessary resources for human development. Second, human development is not possible if the foundations of human security are unstable. This is due to the fact that human security refers to a number of security types, which mutually correlate closely, such as economic, health, political, environmental, food security and so on.

## **Challenges Related to Human Security in the Republic of North Macedonia**

The question of how much we, as individuals, are truly safe and free in the Republic of North Macedonia will be raised in the context of the analysis of the poverty and unemployment index. To begin with (at least slightly) a more substantial elaboration of poverty and unemployment, one must first explain the essence of two things: first, poverty is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon. Second, persistently high unemployment rate is a key indicator of poverty in the country. Citizens, above all, want to live a better life. In that sense, the most important goal of economic policy is always – except in case of war, natural disasters, and the like – to increase the standard of living or improve material well-being (Uzunov 2019: 78).

However, a further explanation is needed here – poverty is more than purely material aspect and fundamentally represents the lack of opportunities for human development. Since 2010, the Laeken indicators have been applied in the Republic of Macedonia for its measurements, and they consider poor those persons whose income is less than 60 percent of the median equivalent value. Although there is a definition that is compatible with the European standards, it still focuses on income shortages and also includes living conditions such as: lack of home, clean water, access to electricity, sanitation, schooling conditions, health care,



transportation and the like. According to the data, in 2015, the poverty rate in the Republic of Macedonia was 21.5% (State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia, 2019), while in 2016 it was 21.9%. In 2017, the poverty rate in the Republic of Macedonia was 22.2% and in 2018, it was 21.8%. A clearer picture of poverty in North Macedonia can be obtained from the analysis of poverty and social exclusion indicators (final data 2013-2018).

- At-risk-poverty rate of population in 2013 was 24.2%, in 2014 it was 22.1%, in 2015 it was 21.5%, in 2016 it was 26.9%, and in 2017 it was 22.2%, and in 2018 it was 21.8%.
- Number of persons below at-risk-of-poverty threshold, in thousand persons in 2013 was 504.2, in 2014 it was 457.2, in 2015 it was 445.2, in 2016 it was 453.2, and in 2017 it was 460.3 (State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia).

The above stated indicators show that out of 21.5% in 2015, the poverty rate in 2016 increased by 0.4%. There is a slight decrease in the poverty rate by 0.3% in 2017.

The reasons for the high poverty rate are partly due to socio-economic factors, the lengthy transition process, low economic activity and high unemployment rate. Furthermore, factors related to the lack of strategic measures, operational plans and actions to reduce poverty also have an impact. Despite a slight decline, there is still a high poverty rate in the Republic of North Macedonia. These data show that the state should pursue an active policy aimed at reducing poverty and increasing the quality of life.

Therefore, in 2010, the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia adopted the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction and Social Exclusion in the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2010-2020. The National Strategy outlines the various aspects and impacts of the phenomena expressing poverty and social exclusion. The main strategic goal of poverty reduction and social exclusion in the Republic of Macedonia aims at the following:



- Reduction of poverty and social exclusion in the Republic of Macedonia through better utilization and strengthening of the available human and material resources;
- Improving the living, working and social conditions of all citizens;
- Systemic and institutional interaction aimed at faster development, higher standards, better quality of life and development of mechanisms for social inclusion of vulnerable categories, and, above all, the vulnerable categories of citizens in the local context.

Moreover, the goals, measures, and activities in the Strategy are aimed at achieving the main strategic goal, aligning policies in specific areas of inclusive growth, and concentrating on the following areas: employment and entrepreneurship strengthening, adapting education to the labour market, social and child protection and building a new social model, promoting health care and long-term care, transport, communications and housing, activating and strengthening local authorities and supporting vulnerable groups.

Equally important are the basic principles defined in the National Strategy for Poverty Reduction and Social Exclusion of the Republic of North Macedonia, and they are based on integrity, which implies a multidimensional problem that requires a multidimensional solution. Furthermore, they include prevention, understanding of what can be undertaken, inclusion and commitment, which in turn implies joint efforts of central and local government, public institutions, business community and relevant non-governmental organizations in identifying the content of specific policy development needs, programs and projects. It should be done separately for vulnerable groups and it should consider the encouragement needed to successfully tackle social problems, so it is necessary for the government to encourage all social factors and create a culture of 'self-help' in individuals and groups.



The next step of North Macedonia that deserves attention in the fight to reduce poverty and promote an inclusive society is the Macedonian Anti-Poverty Platform, which, as a member of EAPN has introduced a measure called 'Minimum Dignified Income' (MDI) (Македонска платформа против сиромаштија, 2012). This European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) is campaigning for the introduction of an adequate minimum income measure under the motto 'Adequate Minimum Income. Everyone deserves a dignified life.' Minimum dignified income is a payment by the state to people who cannot work or have no access to decent work. This contributes to well-being and dignified life, representing the key instrument in preventing poverty and social exclusion, as long as resources are sufficient to get people out of poverty.

Next issue for an argumentative debate regarding the issue of human security in the Republic of North Macedonia is the unemployment. The fact is that the Republic of North Macedonia is in the group of countries with the highest unemployment rate in Europe. The unemployment is mainly structural with a high rate of long-term unemployment and a low level of education among the unemployed people. Specifically, the percentage of long-term unemployment in 2015 was 81.5%, in 2016 it was 80.9%, in 2017 it decreased slightly, and it was 77.9%. Whereas, the long-term unemployment rate in 2015 was 21.3%, in 2016 it was 19.2%, and in 2017 it was 17.4%. From the data analysis we can see that although the unemployment rate decreases, the percentage of long-term unemployment is significantly high (State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia).



Unemployment rates of the population aged 15 and above according to age, by years

	2015 Total	2016		2017	
		Total	2016	Total	2017
15-19		46.1		58.9	58.0
20-24		47.6		46.1	44.6
25-29		39.0		35.2	33.9
30-34		25.0		23.2	23.6
35-39		22.9		20.6	16.9
40-44		19.6		18.6	17.2
45-49		18.7		17.8	14.9
50-54		21.0		16.3	16.4
55-59		21.5		18.6	18.6
60-64		19.3		16.1	12.8
65 и поголеме		0.0		1.1	1.2
15-24		47.3		48.2	46.7
55-64		20.9		17.7	16.6

Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia (2019)<sup>2</sup>

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2 The total unemployment rate represents the share of unemployed persons aged 15-64 in the total labour force. The labour force comprises the total number of employed and unemployed



The improvement of employment in the Republic of North Macedonia depends primarily on the implementation of macroeconomic policy and stronger economic growth and investment. By combining existing activities with certain new measures, the Republic of North Macedonia is striving to control the problem of unemployment, poverty and inequality. Therefore, in 2015, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia adopted the National Employment Strategy for the period 2016-2020.<sup>3</sup> The main objective of the National Employment Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia 2020 is "to increase employment, quality of jobs and productivity, with a particular focus on vulnerable population groups" (National Employment Strategy in the Republic of Macedonia, 2015). According to this Strategy, several activities should be fulfilled such as: increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of employment policy, with particular support for vulnerable categories of population improving the capacity of the private sector to create jobs, education producing knowledge and skills according to the need of the employers. In addition, the Government of the Republic of North Macedonia has set out a number of measures and has undertaken certain activities<sup>4</sup> aimed at economic growth of the country, opening new jobs, improvement of living standards, which should directly influence the improvement and recognition of the concept of human security and human development.

The latest reports from the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia (as in the period of writing the paper) show that exactly in 2018 we have a record foreign direct investments of EUR 625 million, almost 4 times more than in 2017 and more than in 2012, 2013

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persons. The indicator is presented as the total unemployment rate, by age group, according to the number of unemployed persons in relation to the overall work force of the same target group.

3 The Strategy is prepared with the support of three international institutions: The International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank and the UNDP.

4 The official state policy relies on the following postulates: education (compulsory primary and secondary education, etc.); health care (renovated and new hospitals, new equipment, etc.) employment (support by the Government through the Employment Agency with the project for self-employment, creating conditions for foreign companies to invest their capital in our country, thus employing the unemployed citizens).



and 2014 all together! This is just one signal that, in the coming period, government measures should contribute to poverty reduction and unemployment in the Republic of North Macedonia.

## Conclusion

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Through the example of poverty and unemployment, we have captured only a fraction of the concept of human security in the Republic of North Macedonia. Insufficient, yet necessary to point out through these two examples is that human security must be based on fundamental understanding and that the Government of North Macedonia must maintain the primary role of ensuring the survival, life and dignity of its citizens. Therefore, the concept of human security is an invaluable tool in helping governments identify critical and natural threats to the well-being of their people and the stability of their sovereignty. Certainly, all this can help the government and the international community make better use of their resources, develop strategies and strengthen the protection and authorization framework needed to ensure people's safety and promote peace and stability at every level: locally, nationally, regionally and internationally.

In this respect, research proves that security is a social construct and a consequence of factors acting at different levels (locally, nationally, regionally and internationally) and affecting (in)security. It is this characteristic that gives it the breadth so that security is perceived as a shared value and implies that both the state and individuals are equally important security entities. Hence, human security is based on all progressive ideas and concepts created in the course of humankind, and the innovation it offers should be sought in the altered conditions in which the individual exists. Therefore, one should not forget the "legitimate care of ordinary people who seek security in their daily lives". This is the case because people are at the centre of human security, or, to put it in another way, it is an imperative to build 'one society for all', but only if we take into account the genuine description of security 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'.



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## Identifying Evacuation Assembly Points: An Application at Latsia, Nicosia, Cyprus

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### Abstract

The occurrence and magnitude of real-world threats and challenges are difficult to predict in time and space, as they often cause new, unexpected situations, making them extremely difficult to manage. The present paper explores how applied human security could allow for a coordinated and secure allocation of population in emergencies. The use of new technologies could provide capabilities and tools for policy/decision-makers and first responders in order to facilitate such allocation endeavours. Cases demanding an organized evacuation in urban areas (large or small) are when disasters occur or are estimated as highly probable to happen in the near future. The identification of proper Emergency Assembly Points – EAPs plays a significant role in almost all crisis and disaster management situations, particularly in efficient and effective planning and responding.

**Keywords:** applied human security, geospatial profile, terrain analysis, disaster management, GIS

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## Identifying Evacuation Assembly Points: An Application at Latsia, Nicosia, Cyprus

### Introduction

Sustainable development is intimately connected to human security, one dimension of which is the risk due to natural disasters. At the same time, human interventions in the environment, be it at the scale of individuals, communities, or nations, can enhance the existing or generate new disaster risks. On the contrary, it contributes to a significant reduction in disaster risk. Considering security stakeholders, policy/decision-makers, and especially first responders in the field, this poses a real challenge in terms of security provision. Compensatory disaster risk and crisis management, such as disaster preparedness, civil-society resilience, and response stand alongside development planning. Furthermore, it focuses on the amelioration of existing vulnerability and the reduction of natural hazards that have accumulated through past development pathways. Compensatory policy is necessary to reduce contemporary risk. At the same time, the prospective system is required for medium- to long-term disaster risk reduction (UNDP, 2004). In this context, several decisions and preparations about how to inform, allocate, and organize the movement of possibly thousands of people should be made. The responsibility for such choices remains with the State: "Governmental security stakeholders retain the primary role and responsibility to protect their citizens" (United Nations General Assembly, 2012).

Until now, governmental (public) security stakeholders have considered/treated individuals as a collective, unified, and indivisible whole, termed society or community. This approach has a negative impact on people's security 'mentality' which reflects their roles and responsibilities from minor to significant security incidents. Moreover, in the context of planning against crises/emergencies, individuals most often have a neutral or negative



participation attitude. This attitude leads stakeholders responsible for policymaking, or even first responders, to consider individuals more as victims than as equally capable stakeholders in terms of emergency response (Chrysoulidis & Kyriakidis, 2018).

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Additionally, it is imperative to highlight the fact that except for the direct benefits of protecting human lives by providing safe areas, there is another essential impact to be exerted by the organized and informed/prepared individuals beyond evacuation plans in pre-determined areas. This positive impact is connected to enhancing individuals' security mentality and social resilience. Both are vital at all levels of stakeholders, from individuals to State, to overcome all types of crises and emergency incidents. The main complication of planning begins with human nature. People tend to act habitually and in stable ways over time. Additionally, there is a strong possibility that they may not even react when circumstances arise, even when their own life is directly under threat. Last but not least, new technologies play an important role and, in particular, may facilitate individuals, even in an unconscious way, to become more active and obtain or increase their security mentality that includes all safety and security issues.

The above implies that authorities of public security should start considering and involving individuals in the planning process. A very first step in this direction could be to inform them about the variety of threats that might occur and endanger them based on their location. In that direction, authorities can indicate to individuals the pre-chosen EAPs (safe areas), where during ongoing emergencies population has to move on, usually only after responsible authorities have asked/informed them to go. Furthermore, following specific procedures and taking into account individuals' particular needs can construct a useful tool/method which will create/enhance the security mentality of the population. For society, the aftereffect of improving a specific mindset of security is the development of social security culture (CPNI, 2018). Also, it increases social resilience and translates it into an efficient and effective response of a society to



emergencies. The new technologies, like Geographic Information System – GIS and remote sensing combined with GIS, are some of the many technologies that could be used to strengthen further individual mentality and physical security. Independently of how people will evacuate the affected area, the primary consideration remains where these people should resort to and be safe. The identification of appropriate secure areas relates both to physical geographical factors (terrain analysis) and to human geographical factors (population characteristics). Both physical and human environment characteristics comprise the Geospatial Profile (see below).

A significant issue in population allocation during emergencies is the identification and determination of safe areas/destinations, named Emergency Assembly Points (EAPs). Different factors and criteria should be taken into consideration by the public security stakeholders, who are responsible for planning and executing the evacuation of the population. For instance, depending on whether they possess a car or not, people from the affected regions may evacuate the area by vehicle, foot, or other public means (provided by the authorities). Nevertheless, we should be careful if there are some individuals or groups of people who are not able to evacuate on their own (e.g. patients in hospitals, older people, people with disabilities, children in school hours, and others). Special provision regarding the use of transportation means or ambulances is needed, it is vital to evacuate these vulnerable population categories out of dangerous areas. In urban areas, it can be assumed that evacuation by vehicle will be the leading choice of most of the people who will decide to evacuate themselves during or before an emergency occurs.

In the next section, the concept of applied human security is introduced, along with the framework in which the proposed methodology for EAP identification has been developed. This second section also presents the necessary definitions and concepts regarding both physical and human environment. The third section offers the data used to illustrate the application of the proposed



methodology regarding EAP identifications. The fourth section presents the final results, showing the selected EAPs in map format. The last part recommends the actions that should be taken by state security stakeholders and concludes presenting the benefits of new technologies in human security that could be enhanced in combination with the use of personalized human security concepts.

## **Methodology**

Security authorities/stakeholders at all levels have the responsibility/duty to respond to the rapidly and continuously changing operating environment, to provide societies with the public good of security. They are called on to play exigent multidimensional roles. Their ultimate mission is to ensure the lives of citizens, the establishment of citizens' security feeling, and proper management of available resources to succeed in their mission. Demanding roles which they are called to respond to involve them in diverse and complex fields (urban/residential areas, forests, rocky-mountains, marine areas), emergencies/situations which they have to accomplish/deal with, hazards/natural disasters (fires, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis), internal security issues (asymmetric threats – terrorism, irregular/mass refugees flow), man-made disasters (industrial accidents, mature pollution – degradation). These are only some of the many unexpected situations that they have to respond to effectively and efficiently, accomplishing their missions. For their success against these challenges and threats, it is necessary to use/integrate new technologies with the benefits resulting from their use. It will allow security stakeholders to achieve efficient and timely decision-making processes in the planning phase and ongoing emergencies/issues by identifying proper EAPs.

Security stakeholders consider contemporary urban environments as multidimensional and complex. Within an emergency response context, complex environments require extensive understanding, analysis, and continuous situation assessment. Security safeguards should be able



to determine the identity, socio-economic status, cultural background, and other elements of individuals and groups which might be at risk due to potential threats. New technologies, such as Geographic Information Systems – GIS, remote sensing, and geospatial data analytics, provide the required toolbox. They provide capabilities for the identification and analysis/modelling manners/procedures that should be considered during the evacuation into Emergency Assembly Points. Applied human security implements new technologies' capabilities combined with theoretical knowledge.

Up-to-date bibliographies regarding security studies approach the issue of human security by focusing mostly on theoretical analysis, and, second, on how the applications can enhance it. The interest of the researches mainly lies in how and by which factors human lives are influenced and threatened. Regarding the fact that there are numerous HS definitions and approaches, we can conclude that the concept of human security is concerned with both approaches, theoretical and academic. Also, it indicates the need for a deeper approach to this issue, grounded in practice and covering equally the governmental policy-decision making authorities and first responder. In order to protect human lives effectively, security stakeholders must deliberately identify and prepare for the distinct threats.

Moreover, it should be taken into consideration that every threat has unique characteristics relevant to the location where it occurs which are changing (speedily) over time. The fact is that even when the same danger arises in the same area, it has different impacts over time. It becomes easily understandable that EAP is perhaps the only benchmark that provides a stable base to start with the crisis management planning and enhance human security.

The chosen applied methodology in the current paper, primarily based on physical terrain analysis and, second, on human terrain analysis, in an order which is based on specific criteria to identify the proposed/selected areas. Identified/selected areas must offer safety and security combined with a well-established road network. The



chosen locations must have more than one exit and entry points/routes. Additionally, the chosen areas must have a suitable size according to the evacuated population. Also, the selected areas should identify the spots/locations which are vulnerable to other potential threats (like dams, forests) and characterize them as unsuitable for sheltering people in case of evacuation. The essential first step is to take into consideration equally physical and human characteristics, regarding both area/location and population, and finally to succeed and enhance security provision.

### ***Physical Environment***

Impacts of physical environment originate from studies on the vulnerability (Lukacs & Bhadra, 2012) and capacities (Hansford, 2011) of individuals towards natural hazards (Papathoma-Köhle *et al.*, 2007) and other environment-based emergencies. There are specific physical environment factors that influence the way and the level of a person or group of people who are affected (by reducing or increasing the individual's capacities and vulnerabilities). Factors, namely, are the precise position details of that person or group of people – Coordinates, Elevation, Slope, Hydrology of the Area, Land Cover – Land Use, and others. Physical terrain differentiates from place to place, as well as over time. Identification of suitable EAPs has to follow specific chosen criteria. Physical terrain characteristics, in combination with human terrain analysis and features, will allow us to identify the desired proper areas and use them as EAPs. Methodology will be applied based on the process and merging of different layers and datasets from variable sources, as below:

***CORINE Land Cover/Use.*** CORINE Land Cover (CLC) inventory was first used in 1985 (reference year 1990). It is a land cover classification system that is composed of a variety of applications, underpinning various community policies in many different domains of the environment. Also, in other fields, e.g. agriculture, transport, spatial planning, safety, security, and others. Several updates were



produced in 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2018 (CORINE Land Cover, 2018). It consists of an inventory of land cover in 44 classes. CLC uses a Minimum Mapping Unit (MMU) of 25 hectares (ha) for areal phenomena and a minimum width of 100 m for linear phenomena. CLC is a 3-level hierarchical classification system and has 44 classes. The third level is the most detailed level. There is an extra class that is not included in 44 classes, one of no data. In the present paper's study area, only 11 out of the total 44 CLC classes are identified. CLC is one of the layers which will be used to detect impacts (negative or positive) regarding both land cover and sheltering of the population in an evacuation. CLC could make it impossible and even dangerous to use an area because the land cover/use type may NOT provide the proper conditions.

**Digital Elevation Model – DEM.** Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) Global Digital Elevation Model Version 3 (GDEM 003) can be found and downloaded as open-source data, with free license policy (ASTER Global Digital Elevation Map Announcement, 2004). DEM can be used to determine terrain attributes such as elevation at any point (pixel), slope, and aspect. Today, most GIS applications depend mainly on DEM. By processing DEM, we can find the size of the selected area in combination with its slope and altitude. Moreover, we can create the hydrographic network (a total of water bodies and streams in an area – rivers, lakes, swamps, and water reservoirs), which plays an essential role in selecting an EAP. It is critical to choose an area with proper slope and altitude that will offer the desired protection to the evacuated population. Otherwise, for instance, in case of an ongoing flood or heavy rain in combination with proximity to a neighbour stream, other potential dangers can threaten the evacuated population. Many different factors should be taken into authorities' consideration regarding DEM. For example, in case of shelter establishment after an earthquake, the slope should not be too steep, as it may cause problems in establishing the necessary facilities.



## ***Human Environment***

Human environmental factors that are connected to our research arise mainly from the answer to the question – which factors affect the individual in the decision-making process; We should focus on the behaviour of a person or group of people during crises and other threatening socio-economic phenomena (Arru & Negre, 2017). Categories of human-environment elements are: socio-economic status (SES) (age, sex, nationality, religion, residence place, level of education, civil status (married with children, divorced), income (wealthy, car owner) and occupation), health condition, government or other role (civilian/civil protection/local or federal enforcement/Armed Forces). Additionally, all man-made structures are considered as part of the human-environment even if they are in direct connection to physical environment features, e.g. road networks, which play a highly significant role in our methodological approach and analysis below.

***Open Street Map – OSM.*** Open Street Map is an open-source, free, editable map of the whole world that is being built by volunteers (OpenStreetMap, 2006). A road network is an essential factor for the final identification of suitable areas for EAPs. It is crucial not only for the classification of the roads which provide the necessary access to the EAPs, but also for the precise calculation of the number of routes in the specific area. Ideally, more than one entry and exit route/point is a minimum factor for designating an area as an EAP.

## ***Geospatial Profile***

The necessity for using new technologies in the security domain which are specific to human security relates to the current environment where security stakeholders have to act/operate. Moreover, an equally important factor is the fact that classical approaches/solutions to modern threats/problems seem to be incompetent in responding in an accurate and timely manner. This failure is recorded due to the lack of analysis of the natural environment in close interaction with the human environment.



Furthermore, in current approaches, researchers do not take into consideration the dynamic evolution of natural phenomena. These phenomena are always changing based on many rapidly evolving variables (complex environment). Also, it is vital to deal with all modern threats in combination with the unique geospatial profile of each individual. Geospatial profile (spatial identity) (Figure 1), refers to the characteristics/elements of each person, based on two pillars comprising the physical (natural) and human environment (Chrysoulidis & Kyriakidis, 2018).




Figure 1: Geospatial profile's constituent elements

Geospatial profile is dynamic because its constituent elements change continuously over time (short- and long-term). Also, the geospatial profile is person-specific since its constituent elements are unique for each person. Furthermore, the spatiotemporal ‘identity’ of each human being can be considered. Geospatial profile enables us to combine equally human and physical terrain in order to succeed in a holistic approach in the whole process regarding the population evacuation. Not only by identifying the most suitable areas (physical dimension), but also by determining how the population can be prepared to successfully and safely relocate to EAPs.

Moreover, under some parameterization of the constituent elements, the geospatial profile could be used in an aggregated or mean sense to characterize



groups of people, organisations, communities, regions, and generally well-defined structures with spatial characteristics. Aftereffect of that capability at the local level of municipalities (where all the necessary data already exists) makes it feasible to inform all the residents personally, about where and how they should arrive at EAPs. In this procedure, by using the geospatial profile, authorities are forced to consider all the unique personal characteristics of each person for the planning and response phases.

## **Data**

ArcGIS ESRI (ArcMap 10.7) software is being used in the present paper for the processing of the selected datasets and construction of the desired data layers. ESRI's software ArcMap offers the users the capability to use specific tools for the desired geographic transformations of the data. That means – to translate coordinates from one geographic coordinate system to another. When the user adds a layer to a map with a different geographic coordinate system, a warning from software comes up, and the change to the coordinate system is applied automatically. Furthermore, the user can define the data with the proper and desired coordinate system, which is the same for all the selected data layers. In our study, in order to succeed, we used higher accuracy and high-quality data and worked on a projected coordinate system. Projection is a mathematical transformation that takes spherical coordinates and transforms them into an XY (planar) coordinate system. Projections are determined based on the needs of the map or data analysis and the area of the world. In this paper, the chosen study area is in Cyprus, where the projected coordinate system is the WGS 84 / UTM zone 36N. That is suitable for use between 30°E and 36°E, northern hemisphere between Equator and 84°N, onshore and offshore. The states that are suitable for this projected coordinated system are Belarus, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Moldova, Norway, and the Russian Federation. The WGS 84 / UTM zone 36N uses the WGS 84



geographic 2D Coordinate Reference System – CRS as its base CRS and the UTM zone 36N (Transverse Mercator) as its projection. The WGS 84 / UTM zone 36N is a CRS for large- and medium-scale topographic mapping and engineering survey.

For small-scale evacuations (buildings, neighbourhood) inside the residential areas, open spaces/areas are used as assembly points. These areas are in proximity to the incident and always inside the boundaries of the urban area. As a result, these areas are mainly parks, stadiums, public open fields, and others. All these points are suitable to evacuate a small number of people in case of minor, limited in size incidents with limited impact only on a specific and small number of individuals. In this paper, we focus on mass populations' evacuations, considering how we can evacuate an entire town or city.

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*Figure 2: Latsia municipality bounds*

The study area is Latsia municipality (fig. 2), and our research task is to identify suitable EAPs inside the municipality's boundaries. The use of well-determined boundaries, such as the political boundaries of the municipality, allows us to standardize the method of evacuation area. The identification is based on the recognized political

bounds avoiding overlapping EAPs. Moreover, it offers the methodology of a reference starting point. In case of the absence of proper areas found on our predetermined criteria, we could search for suitable places out of the specific municipality's bounds in another neighbouring municipality. In both situations (small or large evacuation, in or out of residential area), the ultimate task remains to prevent the loss of human lives and people injuries. Extraordinary or preventive evacuation is organised, it could be described as a complex process involving actions



for rapid and safe removal of people to secure areas, as far as possible from the threat (Southworth, 1991).

Corine Land Cover – CLC in the selected study area (Fig. 3) involved 11 land cover categories from the total 44 that CLC used to categorise the different types of land cover.

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



Figure 3: Latsia municipality CORINE Land Cover with 3-digit codes

The following is to identify which of these 11 types of land cover/use are suitable to be chosen as suitable potential EAPs and which are not. Based on Figure 3 categorization, categories 111, 112, 121, 122 and 142 are not ideal as they belong to residential areas or contain continuous human-made structures. Classes with codes 223, 242, 311, 323 and 324 are rejected because of the type of vegetation (could be chosen in case no other proper area can be found), which covers those areas and prevents the gathering of the population. Code 211 is recorded as the non-irrigated arable land, and it is the preferable type of land cover. This type/class of CLC offers the optimum characteristics for an evacuation area regarding the land cover and use. We could easily understand that the choice of the proper area depends on the analysis criteria. These are different for every situation, depending on risk analysis factors and potential threats that are different in every place and time.

Following the process of the Digital Elevation Model – DEM (Fig.4), the areas to be rejected were identified – the hydrographic network with its streams. Depending on the stream order (stream order based on the Strahler



method), it plays a negative role combined with most potential threats. Moreover, the population should avoid being in proximity to streams, rivers, and generally water bodies. For these reasons, we have to reject areas where rivers or streams have been identified. Additionally, we should add a buffer zone around the water bodies farther from their bank-full width up to topographic floodplain. By making these extensions, we ensure the avoidance of the threats from potential future floods. Selections of streams will follow the highest order following Strahler streams ordering. This order is one of the methods for classifying the hierarchy of natural channels in a watershed (Strahler, 1957). DEM, by the proper process, allows the construction of slope and altitude maps (fig. 4). Both the slope and altitude should be under our consideration in the whole process as each situation that can affect our decision about the selection of proper EAPs depends on them.




*Figure 4: Latsia municipality DEM, hydrographic network and slope maps*

The last step for the identification of proper EAPs is to allocate equal population to the selected areas. Method for an equal division of the population is based on Thiessen polygons, a tool of ArcGIS software. This tool is used to divide an area covered by the input point features (in our case, the selected EAPs as point features and Latsia municipality residential area as the selected area for the division) into Thiessen or proximal zones. These zones represent full areas where any location



within the zone is closer to its associated input point than to any other input point. By using the Thiessen tool/method we can succeed in dividing the residential area equally, based on the proximity to the areas selected as EAPs. A disadvantage to this approach is the possibility for a building to belong to two different areas. For this reason, it is necessary, after the use of the tool researcher, to check the area and provide the necessary corrections manually. By overlapping, the created layer with the road network makes it possible to connect the divided areas with the roads (Fig. 5), which the population has to follow to arrive safely at specific EAPs.



*Figure 5: Latsia municipality road network, categorization form OSM*

## Results

### *Corine Land Cover*

Processing Corine Land Cover datasets will result in the creation of the final CLC map. The final map allows us to identify proper areas for EAPs (fig. 6).




Figure 6: Latsia Corine Land Cover Map with suitable areas for EAPs

### *Digital Elevation Model*

DEM's process creates the desired datasets of the Latsia area, slope, and hydrology maps.

**Slope Map.** A slope map can be produced by using the ArcMap toolbox, the proper tool following a specific order/path (ArcToolbox → Spatial Analyst Tools → Surface → Slope). DEM format named raster consists of pixels. We choose between percentages or degrees ( $100\% = 45$  degrees). With that order, we succeed in transforming the altitude map to the slope map (Fig. 7) in raster format. In our method, slope plays an important role. Areas with a slope of over 6% do not indicate them as normal vehicle mobility areas (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, 2001).







Figure 7: Latsia slope map with a suitable slope for EAPs

**Hydrological Map.** Hydrological map is produced following the Strahler stream order method. Stream order is a method of setting a numeric order to connect them in a stream network. Strahler stream order is a method that allows us to identify and classify types of streams based on their number of tributaries. Regarding this method, when two first-order streams unite (come together), they form a new second-order stream. The same occurs for the next orders when two second-order streams come together, they form a third-order stream. Latsia's area belongs to the sixth-order stream area. In Figure 8, after the processes are illustrated, streams only from the third to sixth stream orders are included. The first and second stream orders are deleted because they do not influence the terrain to be used as EAPs. The surface, which is covered by the third to sixth stream orders and 10m around the streams (fig. 8), will be identified as a non-suitable area for EAP.



*Figure 8: Latsia Hydrological Map and the same map with 10m buffer zone (red colour)*

### ***Identification of EAPs***

The final map can be produced by overlapping the layers from Fig. 6, 7 and 8. It is possible to identify proper locations for EAPs now, based on the chosen factors. Sixteen polygons, areas (Fig. 9) are finally selected after the rejection of areas with red and yellow colours (not suitable). Calculating geometry in ArcGIS allows us to find the area and perimeter of our polygons (Fig. 10). The size of the selected areas is an essential factor for the final choice and planning. Each polygon should have the proper size in relation to the population. Areas with only one route can be used as secondary alternative locations in cases of limitations considering the space or can be used for other reasons different than facilitating population.





*Figure 9: Latsia final map after merging maps from Fig. 6, 7 and 8 (red and yellow colours –no proper locations)*

Table

EAPsSurface

FID	Shape *	Id	Area (sq m)
0	Polygon	0	248997,53
1	Polygon	0	858411,57
2	Polygon	0	203205,66
3	Polygon	0	388418,88
4	Polygon	0	226784,28
5	Polygon	0	728015,37
6	Polygon	0	312567,64
7	Polygon	0	172211,15
8	Polygon	0	137221,85
9	Polygon	0	38393,59
10	Polygon	0	63665,29
11	Polygon	0	45674,84
12	Polygon	0	49381,15
13	Polygon	0	119481,88
14	Polygon	0	144882,47
15	Polygon	0	67310,55

0 ▶ ▶ | (0 out of 16 Selected)

*Figure 10: Polygons (evacuation areas) size in square meters (Area column)*

Examining the existence of a well-established road network and the accessibility to the selected places is the last phase for the identification of proper EAPs locations (Fig. 11). Sites have to be linked with a minimum of two roads/routes. In case of an unexpected incident, areas must have two escape routes to avoid the chance of



population being trapped or must have a straightforward approach to the area using it as an entrance point.



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*Figure 11: Finally selected polygons and the rejected ones (in red colour) with only one connecting road*

FID	Shape *	code_06	ID	remark	area Sq Km	Shape Leng	Shape Area
0	Polygon	111	EU-1891331		0,278114	2893,83222	278328,302968
1	Polygon	112	EU-1891678		0,309758	16335,67145	3741537,4457
2	Polygon	112	EU-1891694		4,92737	18641,904042	5199060,2508

*Figure 12: Table of polygons with residential Corine Land Cover codes (111&112)*

Latsia municipality's total population is 16,774 (Statistical Service, 2019), according to the residential polygons table (Fig. 12), and the area size is 5.52 km<sup>2</sup>. The total area consists of two different CLC codes, and that means each of them has a different population density. The code area 111 has the size of only 0.28 km<sup>2</sup> in total 5.24 km<sup>2</sup> and for this reason we can consider that these different codes have the same population density. It is possible to find Latsia's municipality density by calculating the data regarding the area and population sizes. After that, the numbers are put into the population



density formula: Population Density (PD) = Number of People / Land Area. The formula gives us  $PD = 16774 / 5.52 \text{ km}^2 = 3.039 \text{ per/km}^2$ . The residential area will be divided by using the Thiessen tool in equal five parts (Fig. 13).

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


*Figure 13: Residential areas (codes 111&112) divided equally by using the Thiessen tool*

Furthermore, in evacuation areas, shelter size in camps and areas per person are vital in the planning phase. Crowded conditions lead to increased morbidity, stress, and other negative emotions/situations. The provision of adequate space, both outside and inside shelters, is an essential requirement. A minimum surface area of  $45 \text{ m}^2$  per person, including household gardening space, should be allocated.  $30 \text{ m}^2$  per person will be necessary for roads, footpaths, dining facilities, sanitation, security, firebreaks, administration, water storage, distribution points, storage of relief items, and of course, plots for shelter (UNHCR, 2019). If we calculate the needed area for Latsia municipality population, the result will be  $1.258.050 \text{ m}^2$  ( $45 * 16774 + 30 * 16774$ ). The selected area size, based on Figure 11 results, is  $3.017.534 \text{ m}^2$ . In this case, Latsia's population can be evacuated inside the municipality's boundaries as there is more than twice larger area than is required. In the last phase, the physical



environment combined the evacuation areas with the population. In this way, we can succeed in dividing the people to different EAPs by following different routes. EAPs and populations are connected by the same colour of the circle and number (fig. 14).



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*Figure 14: Final map with corresponding residential and evacuation areas combined with the road network*

## Conclusion and future work

Nowadays, new technologies such as Geoinformatics, Spatial Analysis, Geographic Information Systems, Data Science, and Analytics provide the required toolbox which is necessary in order to identify and analyse/model the characteristics of each individual, to accomplish the personalisation of his/her security.

A recent unfortunate example of deadly and catastrophic impacts because of the lack of coordination and synchronization between state security stakeholders and the unavailability of reliable information caused the death of 100 persons in a massive wildfire, in July 2018 in the seaside village of Mati, Greece's east coast, not far



from Athens (Greek senior officials charged over deadly wildfires in Mati, 2019). The outcome of the catastrophe could have been different if the responsible public security stakeholders had predetermined the necessary measures in case of emergency EAPs. Furthermore, EAPs could change the outcome even for threats of low probability and high impact (black swan) (Taleb, 2007), for instance, threats like a tsunami incident, in the context of crisis and disaster management, and generally for helping with the very last moment changes in operational plans/strategies.

Additionally, another critical gain from using new technologies is providing the capability/opportunity to an individual to be aware of where they should evacuate based on his/her geospatial profile (specify vulnerabilities and capabilities). At the same time, we become responsible for potential threats (before they become threats). This responsibility can be considered as a starting point for a person to acquire a security mentality. Aftereffect will be the crucial security culture, the resilience of the society, and civil preparedness.

Further use of geospatial profile in order to succeed in personalizing human security will help us take a holistic and more profound approach to the population evacuation process. By the implementation of geospatial profile and personalized security, at the level of municipality, authorities should inform all the residents personally where and how they must arrive at the predetermined EAPs. In this procedure, security stakeholders should take into consideration all the personal and unique characteristics of individuals. (Fig.15), where all the necessary data already exists and is available to the local authorities. The aftereffect of this procedure will be effective and efficient planning, considering the vulnerable population. For instance, security stakeholders in the planning phase can calculate and have buses and other vehicles/means to evacuate pupils, disabled or old people, and different vulnerable categories. For that reason, to succeed in achieving a holistic approach to evacuation planning it is essential for authorities to take into consideration both the human terrain and physical terrain features.






Figure 15: Final map with human-environment dimensions' factors

Personalised human security refers to safety that assesses the geospatial characteristics of each person and applies accordingly to these. Each person has a unique geospatial profile (identity). This identity is spatiotemporal and is formed by the natural (physical) environment in which a person operates and interacts. Moreover, the culture that the person advocates considering its continuously changing nature has the essential role. In order to succeed in personalized functional security, it should be combined with customized information, achieving better results than a mass information approach. Personalized information can be timely, reliable, offer confidence to populations, allow the mitigation of collateral damages in crises, and generally has a positive impact on stakeholders (first responders, policy/decision makers).

Applied human security can act as a bridge connecting academic research with policy-making actors in the field. In this direction, the identification of EAPs provides a very first step/primary tool or method towards security and extending applied human security.



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## **Objective Limits of Peacebuilding Exercises: Professionals as a Bridge between Communities in Serbia and Kosovo\* in the Practice of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence**

Marko Savković<sup>1</sup>

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### **Abstract**

From 2012 on, BFPE, along with a number of other civil society organizations, used the space opened by first agreements on normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, by supporting as concrete peacebuilding efforts expert symposiums, presentations of accomplishments of outstanding individuals and study visits. In doing so, the organization encountered several key challenges, some of which proved difficult to overcome. By reaching what we understand “objective limits of peacebuilding” it learned valuable lessons which may inform similar activities planned in the future.

**Keywords:** Serbia, Kosovo, BFPE, peacebuilding, normalization, human security

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# Objective Limits of Peacebuilding Exercises: Professionals as a Bridge between Communities in Serbia and Kosovo\* in the Practice of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence

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## Introduction

There is a persistent and pervasive point of view, mainstreamed in Serbia's public opinion, that Albanians and Serbs are incapable of building functional relationships because of, first, a difficult shared history, where the sides took turns in dominating each other; second, fundamentally opposed foreign policy interests, where one side is fighting for recognition(s) and the other has invested a tremendous amount of effort in revoking them; and third, the language barrier (a problem mostly between younger generations<sup>2</sup>) that makes communication and thus experience sharing slightly more difficult than it was the case with other nations in former Yugoslavia. Little is known of shared customs, cultural preferences and similarities (after all, we do inhabit the same "space"), other than in anecdotal form.

Following the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and Serbia's – at the time – protracted efforts to prevent it, the dynamics somewhat changed. The public in Kosovo<sup>3</sup> briefly moved its focus away from the aftermath of an interethnic conflict and peacebuilding to the context of state- and nation-building. Official Belgrade tried to find a formula to keep its European aspirations alive, following the mandate won by pro-European parties in 2008; accession to the European Union was soon conditioned upon the normalization of relations with Pristina. The "Brussels dialogue", as it came to be known, started in

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2 Most Albanians in Kosovo under the age of 30 do not speak Serbian (Serbo-Croatian), the mandatory official language in former Yugoslavia. The same can be said for ethnic Serbs, who do not read or speak Albanian, despite the obvious benefits.

3 \*This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.



earnest on 8–9 March 2011, following the International Court of Justice (ICJ)'s opinion of October 2010 (Janjić, 2015), the UN General Assembly's Resolution, and EU Council decision, first as a "technical" process led by high-ranking civil servants, and then, a "political" one as well, with prime ministers meeting. This dichotomy would continue – in the EU parlance, "technical dialogue" is led between Belgrade and Pristina, while the "political dialogue" is one that should result in a "comprehensive, legally binding agreement" on "normalization of relations" between Serbia and Kosovo<sup>\*4</sup>. For Serbia, and to a lesser degree Kosovo<sup>\*5</sup>, the two processes – normalization of mutual relations and European integration – have by March 2012 and yet another decision of the European Council become inseparable (Janjić, 2015).

This context of normalization, which came about gradually, followed the signing of the first technical<sup>6</sup>

4 This phrase was used for the first time in the European Commission's important communication *A credible enlargement perspective for and an enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans*, published in February 2018 (European Commission, 2018: 7, 8, 18).

5 We say "to a lesser degree" since Kosovo\* faces another important hurdle: five EU members still do not recognize its UDI, making any consensus-based decision on its progress and eventual membership difficult. Also, as of 2019, its citizens (and those of Serbia who possess documents issued by Belgrade but have residency in Kosovo\*) still need a visa to enter the EU; a deeply divisive issue, with many local intellectuals accusing Brussels (or, in this particular case, EU capitals – Den Haag and Paris) of "xenophobia"; and many experts from the region calling EU's lack of a common approach on the matter of the visa regime – shortsighted.

6 Over time, a somewhat unclear distinction was established between "technical" agreements and those stemming from the "political dialogue". Among technical agreements, we count those on the freedom of movement; a civil registry book; a cadastre; university degrees; customs stamps; integrated border/boundary management (IBM); regional representation and cooperation; energy; telecommunications; vehicle insurance; the Mitrovica bridge; and another group called "principles governing normalisation" – integration of the judiciary; law enforcement; integration of civil protection corps; and the Association of Serb Municipalities. The original "political one" is the Brussels Agreement (*The First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations*) of April 2013.



agreement, on the freedom of movement, back in 2011. In this way, the first precondition, the ability to freely cross the border/boundary<sup>7</sup> and visit places on the other side, was met. Despite occasional flare-ups, this particular regime has not been interrupted, and is seen as one of the process's greatest accomplishments.<sup>8</sup> Within the two communities there was positive curiosity to break out of the vicious circle of conflict, but a concrete interest as well: regional cooperation was seen as one way to facilitate good neighbourly relations, understood as a prerequisite for membership in the EU. Also, with many regional networks established, it was understood that bilateral projects and activities make for a logical next step.

All this was in line with the idea of incremental, small, step-by-step progress: paraphrasing, "let trade kick in, and the rest will sort itself out" was one of the cornerstones of the EU's approach to the issue.<sup>9</sup> In support came CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Agreement): in a little over a decade, Serbia's exports within the free trade area of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Moldova, North Macedonia and Kosovo ("Kosovo (UNMIK)" as the designation goes<sup>10</sup>) reached

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7 While Pristina uses the term "border", Belgrade insists on "boundary" (the literal translation from Serbian would be "the administrative line").

8 This regime is in the best interest of both sides. While Serbia's citizens would be able to travel freely to their places of residence, Kosovo citizens would be able to reach EU and in particular Western European countries without difficulties. Not even the introduction of the 100% tariffs regime in November 2018 by Pristina affected it, as Belgrade restrained from retaliative measures. Findings from focus groups organized by the Kosovo-Serbia Policy Advocacy Group (KSPAG), a consortium of eight civil society organizations, support the claim of free movement of people as the single greatest achievement of the technical dialogue. These findings will be first presented to public and then published in January or February 2020. For more detailed information see next link: <http://k-s-pag.org/>.

9 This has not changed; see, for example, EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn's statement from 3 December 2018, one month following the introduction of the 100% tariffs (Hahn: I put forward free trade ideas before Kosovo\* and Serbia, 2018).

10 For more detailed information see next link: <http://cefta.int/cefta-parties-2/>.



€3 billion – against €800 million in imports – resulting in a significant trade surplus. Out of these exports, in 2017, close to 500 million<sup>11</sup> were destined for Kosovo (Vujadinović, 2018). Multinational companies, like Coca-Cola, Nestle or Phillip Morris, but also brands recognized throughout the region (Bambi and Štark confectioneries and Hemofarm pharmaceuticals), led the way. They were, however, followed by an increasing number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that saw an opening, first as suppliers to Kosovo's burgeoning construction industry<sup>12</sup>, and then in other sectors as well. For instance, in Raška District with Kraljevo as its centre alone, there are approximately 500 SMEs and individuals that provide goods and services to Kosovo (Kosovo-Serbia Policy Advocacy Group Consortium (2019). Businesspeople were followed by artists – actors, writers – and then, civil society activists. Also, out of public view, the very first “track II diplomacy”<sup>13</sup> events began to unfold, with MPs representing two societies meeting and discussing difficult issues for the very first time.

From the standpoint of what is considered a “working definition” of human security (Alkire, 2003: 2-3), Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE)’s activities were organized with the awareness that “people and communities are affected by events beyond their control” (*Ibid*). These events, difficult to foresee, were acknowledged in our project applications not as “threats” but rather as “risks”. The actors that we expected to

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11 €471 million to be exact (Srbija bi mogla da izgubi milione evra zbog mera Kosova, 2018).

12 Companies from Sandžak (Raška) region of South-Western Serbia were first to offer services of transporting goods, almost immediately following the cessation of hostilities (Međedović, 2019).

13 Track II diplomacy or “backchannel diplomacy” is the practice of “non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals” (Diamond & McDonald, 1991: 1). Arguably the single most successful such initiative is led by yet another NGO, the Council for Inclusive Governance (CIG) with representatives in Belgrade and Pristina.



work with, as it would become evident later, paid little respect to the concept in the first place; on the contrary, by resorting to inflammatory rhetoric and threats, official Belgrade and Pristina “hijacked” the normalization process and contributed to a context not conducive to organizing activities that would be people-centred, as Alkire stipulates (2003: 4).

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Although both Serbia and Kosovo\* are post-conflict communities, none of our participants (at the time, at least) had to fear for his/her life, or had their livelihood or dignity threatened; rather, they felt “frustrated” with being “stuck” in societies that are stagnating, held hostage by opportunistic and short-sighted political elites. This context was understood to be a critical impediment to human development, which is why many of our participants considered leaving, typically for one of societies in the West. One of BFPE’s goals is to, ultimately, tie these and other individuals into a “human infrastructure” that would help complete the process of European integration as well as democratic consolidation of Serbia (and the Western Balkans). Therefore, we did try to support those individuals who excelled in their environments and were curious to meet their peers. In that sense, our activities corresponded to what is considered the “vital core” of human security – the “freedom people have to do and be” (Alkire, 2003: 3). We – along with a significant part of civil society in Serbia – were hoping to shift the focus from “territories” to “people” and their needs, again in line with the contemporary understanding of human security, just as the first proposals on the final settlement of the Kosovo issue started to arise.

## BFPE projects and activities

The Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence (BFPE) joined a number of civil society organizations from Serbia that started developing project proposals with the aim of establishing connections and bringing people from the two societies closer together. In doing so, the organization was greatly aided by the personality of its founder and President, Sonja Licht. Her personal track record takes us



back to the early 1980s, when her engagement was well recognized in both communities, first as an activist within the nascent civil society and then as the first Executive Director (then President) of the Soros Foundation (the Fund for Open Society) in Yugoslavia. As the conflict escalated, she led the Foundation's efforts aimed at providing medicines to internally displaced persons. Throughout the 1990s, she kept open the communication with leaders of Kosovo Albanian political groups who, in their struggle against Milosevic's regime opted for non-violent resistance. Later on, she supported the Council for Inclusive Governance (CIG) in its track II diplomacy efforts and has insisted on keeping at least one panel in the program of the Belgrade Security Forum that would be exclusively devoted to Belgrade-Pristina relations since the event's inception in 2011.<sup>14</sup> Finally, from 2012 to 2015, BFPE implemented the project "Regional Academy for Democracy"<sup>15</sup>, which included 21 politicians from Kosovo\* among 150 younger generation politicians from the region of the Western Balkans (aged 40 or under at the time of selection). All this contributed to the organization having an excellent network of contacts, which is a prerequisite to any meaningful engagement with the other side.

This engagement was not difficult in terms of conceptualization as much as implementation. Not from the viewpoint of finding partners: numerous skilled people with open views have worked in civil society in Kosovo\* then as now; rather than fear of people's reaction once reading the call to connect with those on the other side. To avoid the most sensitive "legacy" issues, the first attempts were considered in two policy fields deemed less controversial: local development and environmental protection. From 2012 to 2015, BFPE implemented two such projects: "Local Networking

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<sup>14</sup> The introduction to the 2019 panel, including an overview of previous panels held from 2012–2018, may be found at the next link: <http://www.belgradeforum.org/session/plenary-panel-3-belgrade-and-pristina-normalizing-comprehensively/> (Accessed 11 October 2019)

<sup>15</sup> For more detailed information see next link: <http://radwb.eu/>.



for Sustainable Development (LNSD)" and "Promoting Youth Employment through Social Partnerships and Cooperation (YESPC)". The organization's efforts were recognized by the European Union (its Delegation in Serbia), the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), and the Balkan Trust for Democracy (BTD), three donor organizations which supported both projects.

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LNSD had three specific aims: "democratic dialogue on (...) sustainable development; building human capacity through raising awareness and knowledge among representatives of local governments<sup>16</sup>, civil society organizations (...) academic and business communities; and to initiate and develop communication and cooperation between decision-makers in local communities in Serbia and Kosovo\*".<sup>17</sup> It engaged 30 participants (15 from each community), who attended four seminars (one in Belgrade, Niš, Peć/Peje and Prizren) and a study visit (to Rijeka, Croatia). Each event followed a similar pattern: introductory lectures were followed by an on-site visit (i.e. in Rijeka, they visited the County Centre for Waste Management in Marišćina, the Viševac waste deposit site and the Sovjak toxic waste deposit site, as well as the Rijeka Commercial Harbour) (Mihailović, 2014). While attending the final event in Prizren, they worked on a number of recommendations (seven in total), which were then compiled into a policy paper by Darinka Radojević on behalf of BFPE and addressed to their respective governments (Radojević, 2014). Furthermore, participants prepared a draft project proposal ("Elements for a Concept of a Regional Project"), which dealt with the issue of wastewater and pollutants near the Ibar river and envisaged cooperation between five municipalities (Raška, Kraljevo, Rožaje, Kosovska Mitrovica and Leposavić). The YESPC project

16 Project was later marketed as the "the first initiative where local self-government representatives from Kosovo and Serbia met and worked together on questions of sustainable development".

17 For more detailed information see next link: <https://en.bfpe.org/programs/local-networking-for-sustainable-development-lnsd/>.



that followed “relied on the results” of LNSD; it was only then that BFPE “decided to initiate a project that would tackle another crucial challenge shared by both societies – dramatic youth unemployment rate” (Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, 2019). Namely, as of 2014, almost 50% among those aged 15–24 in Serbia were unemployed, while in Kosovo\* this rate went as high as 60%. Apart from the long-lasting effects of the global economic crisis and the pre-existing structural weaknesses in education and the labour market, this unemployment rate could also be attributed to “a serious lack of coordination in the employment policy cycle as a key multi-sector policy for economic growth, welfare and social cohesion”.<sup>18</sup> Here, BFPE benefited from the experience gained from previous projects dealing with the issue of youth unemployment (2014) and support to the establishment of the National Qualification Framework in Serbia (NQFS)<sup>19</sup>, long understood as necessary for linking the education and labour market(s) of the country.

The two projects we have described led to the most ambitious P2P project yet. In cooperation with three partners, TransConflict from Belgrade, Democracy for Development (D4D) from Pristina and NGO Aktiv from Kosovska/North Mitrovica, and again, with the support of the EU (administered through its Delegation in Belgrade), BFPE started implementing the project “Changing Minds: Trust through Innovation”. The main goal was to contribute to the establishment of stable relations between Serbia and Kosovo\* by nurturing professional relationships that go beyond the boundaries set by day-to-day politics (and the struggle for de/legitimization of statehood) and actually enable us to overcome day-to-

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18 “Some of the main challenges facing youth in Serbia and Kosovo are: lack of competences required in the labour market due to poor quality of education and training in relation to labour market needs; lower key competences in comparison to EU peers after primary and secondary schooling; lack of access to capital (financial, physical or social); employer discrimination and inadequate job matching” (Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, 2019).

19 For more detailed information see next link: <https://bfpe.org/programs/nqfs/>.



day challenges of life. To that end, cooperation between different groups of professionals was initiated: architects and urban planners; visual artists (particularly those interested in photography as a powerful medium) and writers; IT start-up owners, developers and “digital entrepreneurs”<sup>20</sup>; and women entrepreneurs.<sup>21</sup>

The project partners envisioned a series of activities aimed at breaking down prejudice, building trust and fostering cooperation by utilizing a people-to-people (P2P) and business-to-business (B2B) approach. It was also decided early on to showcase individuals from Kosovo\* who have exhibited excellence in certain fields of human activity to public opinion in Serbia.<sup>22</sup>

As of October 2019 (the project concludes on 31 December 2019, with the possibility of an extension), the partners have managed to organize five expert symposiums: the first, intended for architects and urban planners, in September 2017; the second, for photographers, in May 2018; third one, for writers, in March 2019; fourth, bringing together ecologists in May 2019 (all in Belgrade); and the fifth one, experts in the field of active tourism from 1 to 3 October (Tutin).

The problems experienced by citizens in all three

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20 As business and society continue to be transformed by digital technology, these new entrepreneurs in Serbia and Kosovo\* are setting up businesses, hiring people - who would otherwise leave - influencing changes in laws and practices, representing one of the fastest growing exports.

21 The first network of women entrepreneurs was set up by Transconflict and D4D in 2014 through a UK Embassy-backed project. In September 2014, 90 businesswomen met in Pristina and decided to set up the Forum of Businesswomen from Serbia and Kosovo. The most successful, leading businesswomen were asked to take on the role of Ambassadors of Women Entrepreneurship (Empowering female entrepreneurs in Serbia and Kosovo, 2014).

22 In the original project proposal, submitted in June 2016, the activities were planned to take place in both Serbia and Kosovo\*. However, the EU decided to change the propositions of the competition so that all activities were to take place in Serbia (proper). This altered the focus a bit and more than likely affected the project's overall reach.



cities were the reason why the partners decided to bring architects and urban planners from Pristina, Belgrade and Mitrovica together. The way public spaces are (mis) used, illegal (over)construction, lack of sustainable public transport and communal chaos were easily understood and shared as a common problem in the perception of all participants. The field visits and exchange of opinions that followed were therefore the single most valuable part of the symposiums.<sup>23</sup> Photographers (from the same three cities) had the opportunity to take part in a master class led by their colleagues active in the Netherlands-based ForHanna Foundation<sup>24</sup>. Following a rigorous selection process, in which aspiring authors had to present their previous work, they attended the master class in Belgrade's Parobrod venue, where Dutch colleagues worked with each of them, showing them ways to improve their work. Next to the master class, there was an exhibition of the work by Dutch photographer Willem Poelstra, whose associates were instrumental in setting up the event. The photographs were accompanied by oral histories of victims of the war in Kosovo, Serb and Albanian alike.<sup>25</sup> Last but not least, Tutin showed how some of the often overlooked actors, the ones that comprise "traditional" civil society – like mountaineering societies – can be more effective in building lasting bonds and brought together over a concrete project. In the case of this isolated and poor municipality (even by the region's standards), this was building a base (or mountain) camp, followed by an even more ambitious project, a *via ferrata* for those interested in experiencing alpinism in a safe environment.<sup>26</sup>

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23 In Belgrade, architects and urban planners visited the controversial Belgrade Waterfront development, and toured New Belgrade as an example of a planned city.

24 For more detailed information see next link: <http://www.forhanna.com/>.

25 For more detailed information see next link: <http://www.forhanna.com/project/willem-poelstra/>. Poelstra, who has since passed away, first held the exhibition "For Hanna, Future Stories from the Past" in Pristina in 2016.

26 One of the most successful projects of this kind is "Via Ferrata Berim", set up by "Outdoor in" organization. One of its founders and key individuals is Dragiša Mijačić, also an expert in



The partners resorted to another innovative method – hackathons. These events offer an excellent platform for collaboration: IT experts and enthusiasts would come together and work on new applications (or “tools”) with a socially conscious “twist” to everyone’s benefit. The Hackathon was held at an existing IT hub in Belgrade – Startit – which already serves as a rallying point for the community and a general place of collaboration and inspiration. The focus was more on understanding the context, problem-solving and developing applications than selling the applications in one of the stores available online for a profit. The participants were divided into teams and assisted by a mentor, an experienced IT professional and given 48 hours to come up with a societal problem and a solution. One app, for instance, was meant to help tourists visiting the region for the first time to learn more about the monuments built in former Yugoslavia; another was meant to enable small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) find their match in a given field.<sup>27</sup>

We have mentioned women entrepreneurs as another all-important target group. The reason for including them was manifold: first, previous experiences have shown that women are pioneers of cooperation, less obsessed with rigid formulations of what is and what is not allowed. Second, because of their less than advantageous position in both societies, they had to work harder to overcome prejudice and build their businesses. Third, they had the potential of inspiring – and perhaps hiring – other women, who would follow in their footsteps. The first

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local development and director of civil society organization INTER (Institute for Territorial Economic Development), who used all his experience and networks to build an example of inter-ethnic collaboration; a “peace-building exercise”, in his own words. It was upon Mijačić’s suggestion that BFPE proposed active tourism as the topic of one of the symposiums to its partners. For more detailed information see next link: <http://www.ibarski-kolasin.org/turistica-ponuda/via-ferrata/298/via-ferrata-berim/>.

27 Success of this particular method encouraged BFPE to use it in its other projects. For instance, “Dialogue for the Future”, ongoing since March 2019, next to 4 seminars also envisages 2 hackathons (Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, 2019).



activity within the scope of the project that the partners helped organize was to participate in the Regional Fair of Western Serbia (SPREG 2018) in Valjevo held from 29 to 31 March 2018. Together with their colleagues from the host cities, Šabac and Čačak, guests from Pristina and Mitrovica had the opportunity to present their products and services at one of the stands that had been booked especially for the occasion. The attending businesswomen were owners or directors of micro and small companies – restaurants, jewellery and fashion studios, beauty salons, and medium-sized companies in the hospitality and food and beverages industry. Their next visit is planned for 26–29 November 2019, when the “Fair of Ethno Food and Drinks” takes place at the Belgrade Fair.

The project's most ambitious undertaking was bringing successful individuals, who have excelled in a certain field of human activity, to audiences in Belgrade and other major cities. The first such person, who came to Belgrade with the great assistance of colleagues from D4D, was Uta Ibrahim, the first woman from Kosovo\* to climb Mount Everest. More than 40 mountaineering and alpinism enthusiasts came to Belgrade's Centre for Cultural Decontamination (CZKD) to hear her story on 16 November 2017. They listened on as she talked about what happens to the human body at such altitude, how one can mentally and physically prepare him/herself for such an expedition, and what was next in store. Furthermore, the talk was moderated by Goran Ferlan, a well-known Serbian alpinist, marathon runner, and – retired special forces colonel, who also fought in the Kosovo War. Over the course of one evening, therefore, the partners were able to showcase an example of overcoming a difficult past and looking towards the future.<sup>28</sup>

The “Changing Minds” project is supposed to end by 31 December 2019. However, two of its aspects are going to continue. The first concerns the production

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<sup>28</sup> Reports in Albanian were also published by Kosovo media. For instance, see: Uta Ibrahim merr pjesë në prezantimin publik në Beograd, 2017.



and broadcasting of a documentary highlighting some of the project's achievements on television stations with regional coverage. Second, four presentations by "exceptional individuals" are yet to take place and BFPE and its partners will seek support from other interested donors in hosting such events.

## Objective limits

The described projects were heavily dependent on a changing political context. At the time of their conceptualization, the process of normalization had just begun. Both sides seemed genuinely committed to attaining European Union membership and thus acted accordingly. It seemed as if there was space and understanding for such activities. However, by late 2016, the relations had started to worsen; there was little or no progress in the technical dialogue, and agreements reached were not either not being implemented or their implementation had been stalled. Of these, the most notable is certainly the agreement on the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM), protracted since mid-2015. As uncertainty grew, several high profile incidents ensued ("the Train Affair"; the arrests of high level civil servants on both sides or at the border/boundary; incursions to the North from Pristina by special police), ending with the decision of the Kosovo\* government to impose 100% tariffs on Serbian goods as a way of retaliating against Serbia's campaign aimed at revoking recognitions.

The activities were affected due to and by several other factors as well. One of those factors could be described as "pressure from above". The targeted professionals had to be careful and obtain permission from their superiors, who were less likely to grant them at a time of heightened tensions. Many of our participants were, after all, state employees. There was also "peer pressure": not all co-workers approved of the idea to meet and connect, especially if they came from war-affected areas. State-owned institutions were, as expected, the most difficult to penetrate leading to some unpleasant surprises; for



instance, at one state university, the first meeting seemed promising, but ended in disappointment and without any actual support from the institution.

There was also concern and fear for one's safety, which was understandable, especially in the wake of incidents. At times, the fear (concern) went directly against what was the rational thing to do: for instance, the organization came close to setting up a workshop for microbiologists at the height of the smallpox epidemic in late winter/early spring 2018. Despite obtaining recommendation letters from the very top of decision-making in Serbia, in spite of clear, shared public interest and a secured venue (the infectious disease clinic at the Belgrade Clinical Centre), the participants from Pristina backed out at the very last moment. What typically happens in these situations is that one individual gets "cold feet" and decides against participating – a chain reaction then ensues and the number of confirmations drops from 10 or 15 to 0. With hindsight, the decision to include medical doctors was, despite best intentions, too ambitious.

Next, the organizers had their own misconceptions about certain target groups. Not all IT experts, for instance, were open for collaboration, despite the positive image of tech-savvy individuals. Not all businessmen or women were interested in attending a fair or a B2B event in a smaller city instead of a major market in places such as Belgrade or Novi Sad. Concern for personal safety (large city vs. small town) was also present. There were situations where locals (experts coming from the host city) were the least represented, while it should have been the other way around, leaving the organizers to explain why this was so.

Time constraints also played a role. Preparations for an event could take months. In the meantime, a better opportunity – a fair, festival or other manifestation – would present itself and be missed. On several occasions, the organizers found out about such an event too late. Time constraints were also among the reasons why medical doctors were not an ideal target group. In both



Serbia and Kosovo\*, they are among professionals with the least time available, often working long hours and holding more than one job. For them the only pull factor would have been to have a world-renowned professional who excelled at his/her work deliver a presentation or demonstrate a radical new method, but the project's budget did not allow for this.

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## Lessons learned

The partners who implemented the projects described above have learned several important lessons. The first is to think of the target groups' needs in advance. Entrepreneurs will come if there is a way for them to either sell their product or find new suppliers with lower prices. The second is to make sure to have the locals' support. Fairs may be organized by local councils, regional bodies, and other state-owned or affiliated entities; having local businesses present looking to expand to new markets is helpful. The third is to have the budget in mind. The participants may not be ready to invest their own funds into travel and accommodation; covering one part of it helps. Also, mentors and experts are expensive. The fourth is that visibility must be ensured in both Serbia and Kosovo\*. The content prepared by the Innovation Center Kosovo (ICK in short, a premier hub for IT professionals in Pristina), broadcast via Facebook<sup>29</sup> is a perfect example of a group of young people who not only came to learn and find new business opportunities, but also enjoyed the city and met new friends. Most importantly, the partners opted early on for an approach where partnerships with other initiatives that were more "at home" with the proposed activity were actively sought out. In Belgrade, BFPE contacted the Krokodil festival on Transconflict's recommendation; in Pristina, D4D reached out to ICK. This enabled partners to showcase not only people but

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<sup>29</sup> For more detailed information see Facebook album „ICK to Belgrade“, available at: <https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.2036470319749592&type=3>.



also their efforts and to inspire similar ones to take place.

Where our efforts fell short was “translating into operational policies and projects by principled procedures” (Alkire, 2003: 6). Neither Government of Serbia, or its Office for Kosovo and Metohija have put policies in place that bring professionals together. Given the size of the challenge ahead – the ethnic distance between Serbs and Albanians remains among the greatest in the region – and the rhetoric employed by political leaders on both sides, the organization’s efforts aimed at peacebuilding will continue, albeit in a slightly altered form.



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## Book Review

Craig S. Brown<sup>1</sup>

Jørgen Johansen & Brian Martin. 2019. *Social Defence*. Sparsnäs, Sweden: Irene Publishing

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Social defence—otherwise known as nonviolent defence, civilian defence, civilian-based defence or defence by civil resistance—was the focus of some attention particularly during the Cold War, explored as an alternative (or complementary) to military-based defence, including nuclear postures. Since 1989, the focus has diminished. Yet, with Johansen and Martin's *Social Defence*, the authors seek a reappraisal and rejuvenation of ideas of social defence for our contemporary era.

Although *Social defence* is pertinent to various fields and subjects, given the necessary brevity of this review, I will only touch on the book's general structure. Consequently, I have focused on two of the text's themes that make it relevant to human security. The first concerns ways in which social defence, like human security, expands or shifts the focus of security away from the traditional state emphasis. The second, closely connected to the first, examines the relationship of social defence as bottom-up resistance to the suggestion—also noted in this journal (Martin, 2017: 24)—that human security could shift its emphasis towards resistance as a means of remaining relevant.

Johansen and Martin note that ideas regarding social defence have moved on little since the 1970s, which is why they seek to offer “some basics about social defence, aimed

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at a new generation" (2019: 20). The prologue offers an engaging fictitious scenario imagining the application of social defence in our technologically sophisticated world, helping the reader to consider its potential relevance. Chapter 3, 'Historical Cases', and Chapter 8, 'Kynefjäll: a case study', are important in that, even if an intentional strategy of social defence has rarely if ever been applied, there are cases that merit the definition that could be learnt from. In the face of seemingly insurmountable and mutually reinforcing military, state and economic structures, implementing the alternative of social defence may seem foreboding, but the prologue and case study chapters ground this alternative in practical potential for individual and organised action.

Chapter 2, 'The Downsides of Military Systems', may be well-trodden territory for established peace and nonviolence theorists and activists, but it provides a worthy recap—or accessible introduction to such criticisms for a 'new generation'—given that militarism has not gone away. Chapter 5, 'Social Defence in a Changing World', is complementary in this regard, particularly, I think, in its consideration of technological developments and the increasing sophistication of the opponents of nonviolent movements and neoliberalism—positing social defence as a viable option against aspects of deeper structural violence. In its turn, this argument for the viability of social defence is persuasively built and explored in Chapter 4, 'Ideas about Social Defence', in relation to broad social movements (Chapter 6) and personal action (Chapter 7). This effectively and rightly situates social defence as a means of radical, nonviolent social change.

Turning to the two themes of *Social Defence* focused on in this review, the first is the shift of security or defence away from the traditional state emphasis. This is summarised under the subheadings of Chapter 4—"social defence is defence of society or community, not necessarily of territory" (2019: 63) and "social defence challenges the state monopoly over legitimate violence" (2019: 64). More specifically, rather than defending a physical state's borders or territories, defending society or community



involves “practices and institutions that enable people to live cooperatively. This can include political practices such as free speech and assembly, economic practices such as production and distribution of goods and services, and social practices such as care for children” (2019: 63). As a nonviolent approach to defence by a mobilised, unarmed citizenry, the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence and, indeed, the state itself, become redundant (2019: 64). Further to this, to undertake successful social defence, it may be significant to defend an alternative centre of gravity such as the “unity, morale, and power and will of defenders” (2019: 72).

If one considers the documents that have seen human security crystallise and become tangible as a concept and practice at the supranational level, such as the UN Human Development Report 1994, it is clear that the orientation away from the “security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust” (UNDP, 1994: 22), is reflected in Johansen and Martin’s conceptualisation of social defence. Moreover, social defence as a counter to militarism and incorporating a process of disarmament reflects an underlying aspiration of the 1994 report (UNDP, 1994: 47-58).

Despite these similarities, this first theme of the book cannot be too far removed in this discussion from that of the second theme, which is social defence as bottom-up resistance. The “threats to human security”, originally stated by the UNDP, were economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (1994: 24), and it is clear that the sense was that a unified, global effort to resolve human insecurities was necessary (1994: 34) including for early warning and prevention (1994: 38). Without dwelling too much here on any failures of top-down interventions, sometimes of a military nature, in the interests of human security, it is apparent that where ‘dignity’ and ‘individual responsibility’ are discussed in relation to such security, Johansen and Martin convincingly show how the involvement of individuals and groups in



defending communities and societies could offer such empowerment. When a state fails to adequately protect its population, opening up questions concerning external intervention in various guises, a bottom-up social defence system offers “protection against state violence. If a community is organised to resist aggression and oppression nonviolently, this capacity can be used against the state (Johansen and Martin, 2019: 64).

Rather than follow Gene Sharp’s approach of seeking to get civilian-based defence accepted within the state system, Johansen and Martin propose that, “an alternative path is to raise the idea in social movements and to encourage them to incorporate elements contributing to social defence in their thinking and campaigning” (2019: 67). Chapter 6 provides a convincing argument as to social defence’s relevance to various social movements—the feminist, environmental, labour, youth and global justice movements (to a lesser extent business and faith-based movements)—not just as a method, but inherently reflecting those movements’ challenges to structural violence and the pursuit of social change.

Accordingly, *Social Defence* offers a solid contribution to the emerging discussion of human security as resistance, where awareness of the important role ‘local’ actors play in relation to top-down initiatives is expanding (Martin, 2017: 24; Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017). When one reads UN documents relating to the responsibility to protect doctrine, for example, there is a clear acknowledgement that the responsibility to avoid ‘atrocity crimes’ lies in deep-rooted individual and civil society practices promoting tolerance and upholding dignity, beyond the responsibility of the state (United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2012: 12-13). Moreover, there is the acknowledgement that various diplomatic and peaceful measures may be taken to pre-empt and avert affronts to human security (United Nations General Assembly & United Nations Security Council, 2012: 7). While *Social Defence* reflects this language and development of human security, I nevertheless feel that Johansen and Martin’s text goes



further, offering an argument and blueprint for a radically autonomous development of societies from the bottom-up which would arguably meet the conditions of human security. Although the implications for upholding human dignity and our individual responsibility to each other go far beyond the extreme case of military intervention to prevent the worst of atrocity crimes, one potential consequence of adopting *Social Defence* is that top-down initiatives for human security interventions, particularly those of a military nature in violent conflicts, could be markedly relegated in prominence due to the aims of such a social defence system.

If *social defence* is taken as an argument for the need for radical action to constantly re-secure and defend tenets of society that we cherish—fundamental rights, equality, tolerance, democratic principles—we may consider growing threats to these tenets, including the prospect of growing environmental insecurity and the knock-on effects in other areas, and take *Social Defence* as a point of departure for movements for social change to equip themselves with further means of resistance. In turn, this will help to secure defence of a space wherein the problems of militarism, nuclear proliferation, global warming and marginalisation can continue to be challenged from the bottom-up.



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## **Book Review**

Nevena Šekarić<sup>1</sup>

Vinthagen, Stellan & Johansen, Jørgen. (2019). Revolutionary Constructive Resistance, Benin 1989 in context and perspective. Irene Publishin. Treba da bude: Vinthagen, Stellan & Johansen, Jørgen. (2019). Revolutionary Constructive Resistance, Benin 1989 in context and perspective. Sweden: Irene Publishing

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The world has witnessed several civil society mobilization processes since the 1980s. The common characteristics of these phenomena are reflected in the challenging of these regimes and the peaceful nature of these revolutions. Vinthagen and Johansen's work on the Benin case, which addresses these kinds of changes to the ruling regimes, calls for researching and revisiting the role and nature of unarmed overturning of established regimes.

As stated above, this publication focuses on the changing nature of political revolutions and the mobilization of civil society in order to overthrow or reform ruling regimes. In the first two chapters, drawing on evolution and the crucial determinants of different cases of peaceful revolutions across the globe, the authors identify seven waves of unarmed regime changes. A comprehensive approach towards this topic results in highlighting the contextual factors that drive such revolutions. In other words, the authors focus on historical context, present context, use of active nonviolence, external actors, sources of inspiration, and relations between new leadership and the old regime. In identifying gaps in the literature on civil resistance to

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established regimes within the waves of regime changes, the Benin case comes as a logical answer.

The third chapter, “Complex and Manifold Causes”, points out the specific context of Africa, which is necessary for analyzing issues of social uprising in this continent. The authors note that “The opening of the political space in Africa was the result of a very complex interplay between external and internal actors” (2019: 12). Recognizing the importance of diverse drivers of social movements is the first step in the analysis of the Benin case. The fourth chapter, “Economy in Bad Shape”, highlights the prevalent impact of economic factors (in terms of great national debt, widespread corruption and low standard of living) behind the rallying of dissatisfied social groups. Economy, societal factors such as the exile of the well-educated population, and corruption all led to moral decay and flourishing criminal activities in the form of “parallel economy”. The authors paint a vivid picture of the spillover of dissatisfaction into the education and banking systems and others important spheres of social life, which, in turn, deepened the rift within an already divided society. By placing the Benin case in an international context and linking it with other revolutionary demands across the globe, the authors highlight the importance of international factors that enable revolution to take place in some parts of West Africa, which is discussed in the fifth chapter.

Examining the societal factors in the seventh, eighth and ninth chapters, Vinthagen and Johansen put emphasis on human rights, the establishment of a national conference and the concept of civil society in Benin. What starts out as student protest quickly escalates into mass revolt. Infringement of human rights of people opposed to the ruling regime during the initial stages of the protests, as well as the important role of external financial and political actors (primarily from France), led to the establishment and development of a national conference aimed at the country’s democratization. Very soon, this national conference became the most important political organ in Benin. The authors especially underscore the fact that



this was an exceptional and novel form of civil society's expression of dissatisfaction against a state on the African continent, coloured by a nonviolent strategy. The result was the beginning of the democratization process in Benin: "The introduction of a multi-party system in Benin was the beginning of something new" (2019: 22).

Basing the concept of civil society in Africa on "its historical meaning, including basically all organized activity outside the state domain" (with the exception of groups using armed violence (2019: 23), the authors stress the significance of the student movement and its great effort to establish a national conference and free elections in Benin: "As in many other African countries, it was mainly university students who drove the struggle that would lead to democratization" (2019: 25). Recognizing students and the clergy as the main drivers of peaceful changes, Vinthagen and Johansen point out that "they demanded a new constitution, a multi-party system, liberalization of economic policy, an end to structural rationalization, freedom of association, right to strike, increased grants for students and improvements in university infrastructure" (2019: 29). Those demands functioned as a catalyst for a number of free unions to rise against the regime.

The escalation of dissatisfaction into a massive mobilization of civil society would not have been successful without the power of media. The tenth chapter recognizes this element, especially the power of private radios and newspapers in Benin: "In other words, the communication opportunities were decisive in giving the opposition a way to organize and discuss its goals and strategies" (2019: 32). Discussing the main factors that contributed to the changes, the authors acknowledge the economic ones but do not consider them as being instrumental. Instead, diverse expectations, a tradition of showing discontent in times of trouble, and the need to "be inclusive and constructive" made the qualitative difference between armed revolutionary aspirations and efforts to act peacefully.



Stressing that “Strikes, demonstrations, boycotts and other forms of protest have a completely different effect than violent means such as guerilla warfare” (2019: 41), the authors once again call attention to the institutional conditions, heritage, and other significant contextual factors behind the revolutionary transitions. Ultimately, it is the peaceful nature of expressing dissatisfaction that is fundamental. The authors make their concluding remarks in an attempt to inspire more in-depth studies of nonviolent means of regime changes. Taking into account all the key variables, such as the increasingly important drivers throughout different phases of the revolutionary processes, an analysis of this topic could be done.

What makes this publication valuable is that it not only focuses on the Benin case, but also compares and contrasts other similar revolutionary transitions. This helps to build up a picture of the interlinked nature of such phenomena and place it into an appropriate context. The character of nonviolent social movements aimed at overturning or reforming established regimes is problematized in a straightforward manner, making the study interesting for both scientific and lay communities.



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