Reconsidering the Security Predicament of Weak States in the Context of Human Security and Societal Security[1]

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Abstract

Nation-states are considered to have sovereignty over their territories. However, the sovereignty of weak states is questioned by several actors within them, especially in respect of the idea of the state. Since the classical formulation of "national security" seems to be inadequate for coping with insecurities in weak states, it is important to consider their security predicament with reference to human and societal security conceptions. Although much has been written on the security needs of individuals and communal groups, the interaction of the weak state concept with these two concepts has largely not been discussed among scholars of security studies. In this paper,

it will be argued that there should be a mutually reinforcing relationship between human security and societal security because state weakness is the structural cause of not only human insecurity but also societal insecurity as experienced in the daily lives of individuals and communal groups in Third World countries.

Keywords: security, societal security, human security, weak state, Third World

Introduction

Although sovereign states are often referred to as "nation-states" in the literature, very few of them comprise only one nation or people. Even though they are taken to be *de jure* equals in the arena of international politics, in weak states the empirical sovereignty of the state is questioned by several actors within them, especially in respect of the idea of the state. In weak states, the inability of the state actor to provide the main services to its citizens not only leads to human security problems, but also jeopardizes the societal security of identity-based communities. Therefore, the classical formulation of "national security" based on the principle of national sovereignty and its preservation seems to be inadequate for coping with insecurities in weak states.

National security is the imperative of defending a territory against, and deterring, "external" military threats. For most people in the world, however, much greater threats to security come from disease, hunger, environmental degradation or domestic violence. And for others, a greater threat may come from the state itself, rather than from an "external" adversary (Newman, 2001, p. 240). While there are those who advocate the widening and deepening of the concept of security, such as economic, environmental and individual security, on the other hand there are those who advocate that such an attempt would make the concept of security incoherent and meaningless. The question then arises whether the

new conceptions and extensions of security are necessary or whether the traditional concept is the right way to address intra-state security issues in particular. This article will argue that, with the widening and deepening of the security conception, a holistic approach through considering societal security and human security is needed to understand and explain the current circumstances of contemporary security given the growing importance of intra-state security problems. These two security conceptualizations have made crucial contributions to security thinking by considering referent objects of security aside from the state.

One important point that must be acknowledged is that although much has been written on the concepts of human security and societal security, the interaction of the weak state notion with these concepts has largely not been discussed among scholars of security studies. In this article, it is argued that weak states are particular sources of insecurity for global security in the twenty-first century. It will emphasize that there should be a mutually reinforcing and complementary relationship between human security and societal security, since state weakness is the structural cause of not only human insecurity but also societal insecurity as it is experienced in the daily lives of individuals and communities in Third World countries. This paper aims to remain predominantly theoretical and conceptual; to avoid empirically unsubstantiated ideas, however, some empirical examples will be presented from several weak states without focusing on any particular one.

The article is structured into three main parts. In first part, a theoretical discussion will be addressed with a focus on human security and societal security concepts and the arguable outdatedness of the traditional security conception in respect of weak states' security predicament. The second part will emphasize the importance of human and societal security conceptions for addressing the insecurities caused by weak states. The third part will

discuss how the regime security quest of political elites and groups in Third World countries contributes to jeopardizing human and societal security. Therefore, it is crucial to consider both human security and societal security in order to properly understand a vast array of threats that cannot be understood through the lens of the state security paradigm.

Theoretical Discussion: Thinking Inside of the State

According to the traditional security conception, violent and coercive actions of other states are the principal threats to national security. The traditional security approach thus persists in defining the field of security exclusively in terms of "the study of threat, use, and control of military force" (Walt, 1991, pp. 211–239). Military armament and/or the establishment of alliances are viewed as the only relevant and appropriate response to such military threats. The answer to the question "Who is responsible for providing security?" is that, since there is no reliable supra-national security provider for all states, the state itself is the only unit which can take care of its own security in a self-help system. In the traditional conception, the core values for whose defense the state is ready to go to war are related to the nation-state – preserving its sovereignty and national independence, and maintaining its territorial integrity (Miller, 2001, p. 17). However, the state security paradigm has proved to be too narrow for present circumstances. It has, therefore, been criticized on various grounds by scholars and practitioners especially after the end of the Cold War.

The conception of security that focuses on the security of the state may not be helpful in understanding the problem of (in)security in the Third World (Acharya, 1997, pp. 299–327). Kal Holsti argues that it is necessary to rethink the traditional security conception that focuses upon states as actors, sovereignty, security from exter-

nal threats, and war as the fundamentals of the national security problematics (Holsti, 1992). Indeed, such frameworks do not address the current security predicament of Third World countries, where threats to national security have internal rather than external manifestations, where the regime rather than the state is most frequently being challenged, and where conflicts arise from the irreconcilable demands of ethnic, religious, or national community aspirations (Job, 1992, p. 3). Therefore, security conceptions developed for Western-type states are inappropriate or incomplete for an analysis of security problems in the Third World (Holsti, 1992, p. 52).

Indeed, the ideal type is the nation-state where the ethnical and cultural borders are identical to the political ones. But this is an exception rather than the rule in contemporary world politics. Most states in the international system do not fit into the Westphalian model of the state that is emphasized by the traditional notion of security. Therefore, for example, neorealism is not able to explain internal conflicts and security issues because its main assumption is that anarchy exists in relations between states while inside the state there is order. However, civil conflicts show clearly that the state is not only the object that needs to be made secure – this is also true for the individual, the population or an ethnic group. Indeed, many humanitarian crises in Third World countries are associated with the failure of socio-political cohesion and the collapse of states.

While Barry Buzan admits that the state may indeed threaten the security of its people, he also argues that the very same state is "a necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of the individual" (Buzan, 2002). Therefore, states constitute the primary nexus when it comes to security for individuals and communal groups. Accordingly, in *The Third World Security Predicament*, Mohammed Ayoob emphasizes the need for adopting an "explicitly state-centric" definition when

studying security in the "Third World" on the grounds
that the state is the provider of security (Ayoob, 1995).
In fairness to Ayoob, he does not neglect other potential
referents for security, or its other dimensions such as
the economic and environmental. He rather thinks these
other dimensions and other potential referents should
be taken into consideration only if they "become acute
enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten
state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival"
(Bilgin, 2002, p. 106). But this focus on the state is a ma-
jor point of contention in Ayoob's work since it overlooks
the fact that many of the major threats to security in the
Third World are from governments towards individuals
and communal groups. Although the state is a good refer-
ent object, it does not always give the right and complete
answer, especially when we take into consideration that
the state is composed of many other groups and individ-
uals inside of it. In this sense, it is important to take into
consideration the distinction introduced by Barry Buzan
in his seminal book *People, States and Fear* between
"strong" and "weak" states (Buzan, 2002, p. 106). This
distinction has been an important corrective to the lack
of analysis of the state in security studies.

The dominant assumption of security studies is that
the people are secure if the state is secure. According to
this assumption, security beyond the state seems to be
impossible. However, this assumption is not valid when
states ignore the security of some of their people, when
they actively oppress some of their people, or when the
state lacks the capacity to provide security for its peo-
ple (Mutimer, 2007, p. 56). Accordingly, for scholars of
Critical Security Studies, the security of the individual is
no longer defined exclusively within the realm of states
and as a consequence of national security. Indeed, the
Commission on Human Security states that security be-
tween states remains a necessary condition for the se-
curity of people, but national security is not sufficient
to guarantee peoples' security (Commission on Human
Security, 2003, p. 3). Trends in modern conflict, which

reflect a high level of civil war and state collapse, have re-
sulted in a proportionately high rate of victimization and
displacement of civilians (Newman, 2001, p. 244). That
is why the security conception should be human-based
and designed according to the necessities of human be-
ings. The urgency of many threats faced by humanity as a
whole creates a critical need for the development of the
human security concept.

The concepts of national security and human securi-
ty are different, but in the end they are both human-cen-
tered, i.e. they (directly or indirectly) bring the human to
the forefront. This means that human security comple-
ments the notion of national and international security
by having it focus more on the human component. This
is because state security cannot be attained without hu-
man security and vice versa. Human security requires
strong and stable institutions but this is not necessarily
the case for all states because it can be observed that the
conception of human security is lacking in weak states.
The focus of human security is squarely on Third World
countries and the human security concept has indeed
been developed largely in the context of weak/fragile
and developing states.

However, the individual is not the sole actor in need
of security in human security discourse: the communi-
ty, sub-national and supranational, the nation, and other
identity-based communities are also referents of securi-
ty (Amouyel, 2006, p. 11). In this respect, the concept of
societal security has been introduced by the Copenhagen
School as a conceptual framework for comprehending
the conflictual relations between the state and sub-state
groups, which not only emphasizes the changing na-
ture of security but also addresses the role of identity in
achieving security by taking care of the security needs
of collective identity groups. The tremendous increase
in conflicts among societal groups since the 1990s has
led to a reconsideration of the established ways of think-
ing about security. Also, given that the state and nations

do not converge absolutely, the traditional security approach cannot introduce a suitable theoretical framework for the security needs of human collectivities. This is because until that time sub-state societal groups were not considered systematically in the context of security literature. However, post-Cold War developments such as ethnic separatism and conflicts in Third World countries have demonstrated that the security needs and interests of the state and society do not always coincide. Although societal security can be important from the state security perspective only if it threatens the security of the state (Smith, 1999, p. 84), in some circumstances achieving state security leads to an increase in societal insecurity.

Societal security is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom (Wæver et al., 1993, p. 23). This means that the concept of security is tied to very specific forms of political community, such as nations, ethnic groups or religious communities. Societal security therefore concerns those situations in which societies perceive a threat in identity terms and this conceptualization takes into account the origins, structures, and dynamics of collective identity formation. Threats against societal security emanate from inside the state rather than outside. Threats against societal security can be substantiated with discriminative language and education policies and laws against minorities, prohibition of or intervention in political elections, abolition of cultural autonomy and limitation of political participation and representation, destruction of symbols and institutions that are crucial for group identity, and ethnic cleansing, which requires the systematic destruction of members of a societal group. It can therefore be argued that threats against societal identity can have a military character (the killing of members of a group) or non-military forms. These actions are about the construction of threats against the "we" perception of the related societal group.

The state actor is the dominant unit in both securitizing and desecuritizing security issues in many circumstances. While the power of the state can be a provider of security for a societal group, at the same time it can become a threat to another one. State policies which are in accordance with preserving and improving the dominant national identity can cause repressive and discriminative practices against other identities. "National identity" can thus become a security problem for other identity-based communities. In more repressive instances, minorities may lose the ability to reproduce their cultures because the majority is using state authority to structure educational, media and other systems to favor the majority culture (Wæver, et al., 1993, p. 13). The basic problem of the state in solving societal insecurities is that it understands the issue as a political or military security problem while other parties to the issue perceive it as a societal security problem. It can be concluded that societal threats do not have a given nature but are constructed by actors themselves. Minority groups can be seen as threatening actors or vice versa depending on the identity construction processes of state and sub-state communities. Therefore, the ways of social construction of national and ethnic identities are important.

Identity-based conflicts and disagreements cannot be explained solely with reference to state institutions; their causes must also be sought in threats to the core values held by major societal groups. Therefore, one major advantage of the societal security concept is that it provides a substantive conceptual background which enables it to relate the significance of ethno-national and religious, as well as political, ideological, and socio-economic identities to the formation of social cohesion or, depending on the case, to the collapse of social structures. With the end of the Cold War, in fact, an array of new threats was identified that could not fit neatly into the established paradigm of state security. Societal actors articulate a number of threats, many of which stem from the policies of the state in which they find themselves. The paradigm of

state security fails to properly address these threats because in some cases the protection of the state's security leads to increased insecurity of the society. From the state security perspective, the security of a society is only important insofar as it threatens the security of the state. However, the atrocities committed by states against societal groups make this position untenable. Thus societal security is introduced to account for the developments that threaten the identity of social groups in especially weak states.

Weak State–Strong State Distinction and Societal Security

Until the turn of the twentieth century the issue of weak states was largely perceived by Western governments as a local affair. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, it became clear that if local problems are neglected, they have the potential to cause global security problems. Therefore, for instance, the 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (USA) called on the US military to strengthen the sovereign capacities of weak states to control their territories (National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2005). This new preoccupation with weak states is not limited to the USA. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has launched the Fragile States initiative in cooperation with the Low-Income Countries Under Stress program at the World Bank (World Bank, 2003). As these documents mention, weak states present a serious security threat not only to national security but to regional and international security as well. The issue of weak statehood is therefore at the core of most of today's relevant security problems.

Although states continue to be central players in the security field, two types of states should be distinguished according to their degree of socio-political cohesion (in the sense of the identification of the populations with

the existing states and their national identities). In this respect, Barry Buzan introduced the weak state/strong state distinction as an analytical tool to show different security features among them (Buzan, 1991, pp. 96–107). Weak or strong *states* refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion, whereas weak or strong *powers* refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other (Buzan, 1991, p. 97). To consider the socio-political cohesion of states in respect of security studies represents an important shift from the literature of traditional security studies and the Waltzian conception of security because the neorealist conception of security rejects domestic affairs as relevant factors of national security and considers states as "like units" in terms of their security functions irrespective of their internal characteristics (Waltz, 1979, pp. 95–97). However, since the idea of the state and its institutions are internally contested to the point of violence, weak states are not properly national in scope, and do not offer clear referents as objects of national security. When there is almost no idea of the state and the governing institutions are themselves the main threat to many individuals, national security almost ceases to have content and one must look to individuals and sub-state units for the most meaningful security referents (Buzan, 1991, pp. 100–101).

Weak states typically display all or many of the following characteristics: institutional weakness and an inability to perform basic state functions such as tax collection and providing law and order; political instability, as evidenced by coups, rebellions and frequent violent changes of government; the centralization of political power in a single individual or a small elite; unconsolidated or non-existent democracies; an ongoing economic crisis; external vulnerability to international actors; intense societal divisions along religious, regional and/or ethnic lines; lack of a cohesive or strong sense of national identity; and an ongoing crisis of legitimacy for both the government of the day and the institutions of the state

in general (Buzan, 1991, p. 100; Jackson, 2007, p. 150). In this respect, weak states face a security environment in which the primary threats to security come from internal rather than external sources. Under these conditions, weak state elites are often forced to rely on coercive power and state intimidation to secure continued rule. Political regimes in these states are therefore seen as a source of insecurities rather than a provider of security. Accordingly, military coups, guerrilla movements, secessionist movements, mass uprisings and political factionalism constitute crucial threats for social groups and individuals (Buzan, 1991, pp. 104–105). This unstable and conflictual environment may not be limited to the territorial space of the state and can threaten its neighboring countries.

Due to the lack of the necessary capacity to effectively control state borders, the insecurities of weak states such as humanitarian emergencies, insurgency, secession, rebellion, terrorism, organized crime, refugee crises and mass migration have a spill-over effect (Patrick, 2006, p. 1). Regionally, instability can spill over well past state borders and create a conflict dynamic affecting neighboring countries. Internationally, they can become safe havens for terrorist organizations and criminal groups (Ottoway & Mair, 2004, p. 1). Al-Qaeda, for example, enjoyed the hospitality of Sudan and Afghanistan, where it built training camps and enlisted members. Indeed, a major challenge for weak states is posed by the activities of a variety of violent non-state actors (VNSA), which undermine the state's monopoly on the use of force (Ağır & Arman, 2014). With the erosion of state control, threats to human security and societal security increase, because individuals and communal groups are the direct targets of violence. Indeed, many "new wars" are predominantly driven by issues of identity and typically involve mobilization along ethnic, racial or religious lines (Kaldor, 1999). In this process, countermeasures taken by the state against VNSAs can also endanger human lives, jeop-

ardize fundamental freedoms and seriously impair the dignity of human beings.

From a security perspective, the principal distinguishing feature of weak states is their high level of concern with domestically generated threats. First, there is no socially cohesive society within the borders of the weak state, but often there are a variety of communal groups contending for their own securities. Second, the regime in power usually lacks the support of a significant component of the population, because the regime represents the interests either of a particular ethnic or social sector or of an economic or military elite that has taken control. The result is often an absence of perceived popular legitimacy to the existence and security interests of the regime. Third, the state lacks effective institutional capacities to provide peace and order, as well as the conditions for the satisfactory physical existence of the population. Fourth, the sense of threat that prevails is that of internal threats to and from the regime in power rather than externally motivated threats to the existence of the nation-state (Söderberg & Ohlson, 2003). Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no single form of national security within the weak state. Instead, there are competing notions of security advanced by contending forces within its society. So, the concept of "national" security is of limited utility in explaining the security predicament of weak states (Acharya, 1997, p. 304). As Montserrat Guibernau states, the historical, social, political and economic circumstances leading to the establishment of the nation-state in the Third World have no parallel in the context within which the nation-state emerged in Western Europe (Guibernau, 1996, p. 118). In other words, the nation-states of the Third World did not come into being as a result of the processes of social change similar or comparable to those which shaped the European nation-state system.

The central characteristic of the Hobbesian model of the state is the exchange of "security" for its citizens against the legitimate monopoly of violence within its

borders. However, the major failure of state-centered security is to not take into account that the state today is partly or completely failing to fulfill its social contract, that is to say to protect people (Amouyel, 2006, p. 11). In this case, academia talks of "failed" or "collapsed" states, "quasi-states" or "weak states" (Schneckener, 2006, pp. 23–40). Accordingly, the problem of preventing weak states from becoming failed states, and failed states from collapsing, will remain a crucial problem for global security.

A weak state reaches the stage of a failed state when its basic functions are no longer performed. The state is paralyzed and inoperative (Orchard, 2004). Citizens then naturally turn more and more to the kinds of sectional and community loyalties that are their main recourse in times of insecurity, and these affiliations are often in opposition to the state (Williams, 2008). Civil wars which characterize failed states therefore usually stem from or have roots in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity. These kinds of states – failed states and collapsed states (an extreme form) – are proliferating in number and posing larger challenges to world order and security. They constitute security threats because of the disorder and non-state actors which they harbor, and these threats are increasingly defining the national and international security agenda.

Inevitable Truth: A Quest for Regime Security in Weak States

Regime security is basically a question of the ability of the government, the ruling group or elite to successfully manage and overcome the problems of governance while maintaining the continuity of its authority and hold on power (Acharya, 1992, p. 144). Therefore, a common response to disorder within weak states will be one of regaining and maintaining control, rather than addressing root causes. This conception is dependent on the maintenance of appropriate security and intelligence capabil-

ities. Also, in many weak states leaders attempt to erase the distinctions between the state and the ruler. In such situations, the objective interests of the state are indistinguishable from the subjective interests of the ruler of the regime in power (Jackson, 2007, p. 153). Thus, when a regime points to the security of the state, in reality it is the regime itself that is threatened (Wæver, 1996, p. 108). In the context of profound internal threats and constraining external conditions, national security becomes a matter of maintaining short-term regime security. In such a milieu, the regime's instinct for self-preservation often takes precedence over the security interests of the individuals, society or the nation (Acharya, 1997, p. 303; Acharya, 1992, pp. 143–144). Therefore, in its ideal sense, the concept of national security is wholly inapplicable.

As a typical regime security strategy in weak states, political elites favor certain groups in the allocation of state resources, oppress minorities viewed as hostile, create minority scapegoat groups during times of unrest and appoint members of the elite's own ethnic group to positions of power (Jackson, 2007, p. 154). Such strategies are self-defeating in the long run, as they further provoke even more serious opposition from social groups. For most weak state elites, however, there is no way out of this dilemma; if they neglect regime security in favor of more genuine state-building activities such as strengthening state institutions and forging a sense of national identity, they are just as likely to be overthrown in a coup or toppled by a rebellion (Jackson, 2007, p. 155). As a result, in weak states repression and identity politics undermine state institutions and threaten the welfare and livelihoods of individuals and societal groups.

The state thus often ceases to be a protector of its citizens and becomes a security threat to them as in the case of totalitarian regimes. Within the protected domain of the Westphalian state, numerous unspeakable atrocities have been committed, and human security thus violated with impunity (Møller, 2001). However, the notion of sov-

ereignty is considered as a normative shield for the survival of such totalitarian regimes. For instance, the Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) meeting in their first extraordinary session on 3 February 2003 adopted a number of changes to the Constitutive Act. One of these changes was to extend the right of the Union to intervene in a member state to include situations where there is a serious threat to legitimate order for the purpose of restoring peace and stability in that member state (Baumi & Sturman, 2003, pp. 37–45). This amendment is not intended to protect individual and community rights but to entrench the regimes in power.

Indeed, the weak state's sovereignty is principally guaranteed by the international community. Weakness persists in weak states because they are granted juridical sovereignty by the international community despite lacking sufficient empirical sovereignty (domestic control) (Closson, 2006). Since weak states derive their legitimacy from the international norms rather than from their own domestic social and political structures, military structures of weak states are much more focused on the domestic realm. However, a strong state should not be recognized for deriving its strength from its military capacity, but for possessing a high level of socio-political consensus centered around the idea of the state. The high level of socio-political cohesions of strong states is directly correlated with consolidated participatory democracies and strong national identities. They thus offer high levels of security from political, communal and criminal violence and ensure political freedom and civil liberties both for individuals and collectivities. In the context of the growing importance of democratic principles and human rights, sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within a state (Newman, 2007, p. 62).

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released their report

entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* (R2P)*.* The report addressed "the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk" (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001). The intention behind the Report is to completely shift the focus from the "right to intervene" to the "responsibility to protect". Thus, the responsibility to protect seems to overturn established international law that has been designed to maintain national jurisdiction free from external intervention. Accordingly, sovereignty is slowly being viewed as conditional, specifically on the ability to provide security to individuals and social groups. Indeed, with its focus on individuals as the fundamental referents of security, human security can be seen as the underlying framework for the development of the R2P. Although the shield of international norms for weak states has gradually come into question with the concept of the "responsibility to protect", human security could thus be the best remedy to illegitimate intervention (Amouyel, 2006, p. 20) because there is a complementary relationship between human security and state security.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War and globalization have caused fundamental shifts in the international arena and the state-centric and military-based security conception has consequently been revisited and criticized by new perspectives. In this process, the intra-state dimension of security is mostly privileged by scholars due to an increasing number of internal conflicts in weak Third World states, in which physical, structural and cultural violence is widespread. Indeed, when we consider the statistics of Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme, the dramatic conditions in these states display themselves clearly (UNDP, 2017). Therefore, the security conceptualizations that prioritize

individuals and communal groups reflect the broadened agenda of security and its deepening in terms of the referent objects of security. In this respect, contrary to the state security paradigm, the conceptualizations of human security and societal security give attention to the internal dimension of the state and the state itself in a critical manner.

However, complex situations in weak states cannot be explained solely with the conception of human security. What is required is not only human dignity or well-being, but also probably more significantly a minimum level of survival in respect of identity. For a society to be secure, it is not necessary to have a high level of socio-economic development. Instead, the expression and reproduction of identity in a safe manner could be equally important. Therefore, the level of human development cannot ensure the aspiration of self-determination of a society, especially under politically and societally repressive conditions. If both human and societal security needs of the people are met, societies will be more stable and less prone to fragmentation and violence. It is therefore important to create facilities to provide participation in the constructive collective project – the foundation of a successful community or nation-state.

The argument in this article suggests that the concept of security must change away from the Cold War and realist preoccupations with territorial security to focus on people's security, and away from armaments towards a reformulation in terms of sustainable human development. However, it must be kept in mind that a man/woman still needs the state; that, without a strong state, it would be more difficult for a man/woman as an individual to face modern security challenges, risks and threats. Thus, the questions of how best to strengthen weak states and prevent state failure seem to remain one of the most urgent questions of the twenty-first century. International community engages in several peace-building activities mostly by privileging the organization of

the state in post-conflict Third World societies. However, the focus on state-building as the core of peacebuilding overlooks critical issues affecting the relationship between societal groups and the state. As a policy recommendation, peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies should consider not only the constituting of institutions, but also give priority to humanitarian and societal aspects of security. Strengthening the socio-political cohesion of the state is a complex process which includes democratization, establishing the rule of law, and providing and recognizing civil, political and community rights of the people. However, it should be kept in mind that a change in the conception of the problem leads to a change in the prescription. Thus, if the source of the security problem is the nature of the domestic regime, an accumulation of military capabilities by the state would not be a useful solution but rather a part of the problem (Miller, 2001, pp. 20–21). A real sense security for a state and its regime requires the consideration of the complementary relationship between human security and societal security.

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